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Introduction
This thesis concerns the enforcement of contracts in the presence of uncertainty.
Uncertainty is a basic fact of human life. The uncertainty might be exogenously
given as the event of a loss in an insurance contract. In addition, there is strategic
uncertainty, because the behavior of other players is unknown. Moreover, uncertainty
often generates communication between the contracting parties to set up the contract
and to enforce it.
This communication can influence the amount of uncertainty for the contracting
parties. At the same time, it is their choice whether to communicate or not. Thus,
there is an interaction between communication and uncertainty. I analyze this
interaction as it changes the incentives of the contracting parties and the structure of
optimal contracts. The aim is to enhance our understanding of contracting practices
and to inform regulation and policy.
This thesis consists of four chapters that are linked in several ways: All chapters
contribute to our understanding of contracting in the presence of uncertainty. Yet
applications vary and cover topics such as insurance, competition law, industrial
organization, contracting, and decision theory. From a theoretical point of view,
the first two chapters form an entity as they consider costly state verification with
uncertainty. Chapter 3 is concerned with communication and information transmission
in order to limit the amount of uncertainty. Chapter 4 is more technical and compares
different ways of modeling economic uncertainty.
Another link can be seen between Chapters 1, 2, and 4: They consider ambiguity-
1
Introduction
averse agents and uncertainty that cannot be specified in a statistical way. Nevertheless
the overlap between the chapters is negligible; the questions scrutinized and the
applications analyzed differ strongly. Hence, this thesis exemplifies the level of
abstraction of economic models and theories.
Chapter 1 is based on joint work with Achim Wambach (Lang and Wambach, 2010).
It shows that insurers use ambiguity about auditing strategies to fight insurance
fraud. For this purpose, we study a costly state verification model with uncertainty.
The insurers abstain from commitment to an auditing strategy, even if commitment is
possible without incurring any costs. This contrasts with conventional wisdom, which
claims that it is optimal to commit, as the credible announcement of thoroughly
auditing claim reports might act as a powerful deterrent to insurance fraud. Yet,
empirically it is very unusual for insurers to try to overcome the credibility issue.
We prove that it can be optimal for the insurers to maintain the ambiguity and
forgo commitment. Thus, strategic ambiguity, i.e., the strategic choice to withhold
information about auditing costs and strategies, is an equilibrium outcome. This
finding contributes to the literature on unraveling and is also relevant for other
auditing settings, like tax enforcement.
Fraudulent claims on insurance policies and fraud-detection strategies are an
important issue for insurers. Previous literature suggests that there is a commitment
problem. Insurers should announce the level of auditing to deter insurance fraud.
Given the announced level of auditing, there are only few fraudulent claims. As
auditing is costly, however, the insurer has an incentive to deviate and to audit only
very few claims ex post. These incentives make its ex-ante announcement not credible.
Credible commitment to a given level of auditing is a solution to this dilemma.
Yet, in reality, it is very unusual for insurers to make their level of auditing publicly
available. This behavior indicates that conventional wisdom neglects some aspects of
the setting. We depart from the canonical setting of insurance fraud by assuming
ambiguity-averse agents and uncertainty about the insurer’s auditing costs. If the
costs of an audit were known, policyholders could compute auditing probabilities in
equilibrium. Commitment dissolves the ambiguity about auditing as it makes the
2
auditing level public. Even if the market is competitive, it can be optimal for the
insurers to maintain the ambiguity and abstain from commitment.
The problem of costly state verification is not limited to insurance fraud, but also
appears in different settings such as tax and benefit fraud. The cause is asymmetric
information between the parties of a contract. To avoid the exploitation of these
asymmetries, the other side has to use costly state-verification technologies, like
ticket inspections in public transport. Thus, there is a trade-off between auditing
costs and losses due to the remaining information asymmetries. It is a very robust
result in these models that commitment is optimal. Hence, there have been various
proposals to make commitment feasible. Yet we show that it is often optimal to
avoid commitment to an auditing strategy, even if this commitment were credible
and comes without costs.
The second chapter considers a setting of competition law. Legal uncertainty is a
major issue in competition law, as legal procedures are very complex. In addition,
there has been a shift towards rules of reason in the United States and to a more
economic approach in the European Union. Both approaches imply a certain degree
of legal uncertainty. I prove that legal uncertainty inherent in many legal rules can
be welfare-enhancing if the uncertainty is not too large.
This finding contradicts conventional wisdom that legal uncertainty necessarily
decreases welfare, but is a price to pay for more selective rules. I show that legal
uncertainty allows screening firms and influencing their market behavior in a beneficial
way. This result holds in a model with classical expected-utility preferences. If firms
are ambiguity averse, uncertainty about the enforcement of competition rules has
additional deterrence effects making the enforcement of the competition authority
more efficient.
It is often claimed that legal uncertainty yields disproportionate deterrence – over-
deterring socially beneficial actions, while under-deterring socially detrimental ones.
To scrutinize this claim, the second chapter formally models the legal uncertainty
inherent in a legal rule.
3
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The analysis shows that legal uncertainty itself might advance the objectives of
the policymaker and might have positive effects on social welfare if the uncertainty is
not too large. Legal uncertainty allows working around the policy restrictions of the
competition authority. Hence, the actual deterrence level gets closer to the optimal
one that depends on aspects unobservable by the competition authority. Thus, the
competition authority may use legal uncertainty as a screening device.
Consider the following two examples of legal uncertainty. Article 101 (TFEU)
prohibits vertical restraints, like resale price maintenance or exclusive dealings, in the
European Union. Yet, there is a block exemption so that this rule does not apply if the
market shares of the involved parties are below 30%. There are guidelines available
how the competition authorities calculate the relevant market shares. Nevertheless,
it is extremely difficult to predict correctly the market share that the competition
authorities will determine in the end. The reasons are different definitions of the
relevant market, information asymmetries or imprecision in the measurement of sales,
and other factors. This exemplifies legal uncertainty as scrutinized in the chapter.
The second example concerns abusive tying. In particular, Microsoft bundled
its operating system with additional software, like a web browser and a media
player. In both instances, the European Commission found an abuse of a dominant
market position under Article 102 (TFEU). As a thought experiment, imagine a scale
beginning with products where the bundling is socially beneficial, as the integration
implies better performance and independent competing products are non-existent.
On the other end of the scale are products where the bundling implies few efficiency
gains, but competition is harmed considerably. On both ends of the scale there is
legal certainty. In the middle of the scale, however, it is very difficult to exclude legal
uncertainty completely.
In addition, there is uncertainty about the size of the fine that firms have to pay
in case of a conviction. Suppose the uncertainty about the fine does not change the
expected value of the fines and the competition authority is concerned about efficient
enforcement. Then, the second chapter shows additional beneficial effects of legal
uncertainty.
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This chapter is also relevant for the trade-off between per-se rules and rules of
reason. Per-se rules prohibit some clearly specified practices. A rule of reason, on the
other hand, judges the use of a practice as illegal whenever the practice is used in an
anticompetitive way. Thus, rules of reason imply a certain degree of legal uncertainty.
The results in the second chapter could be understood as explaining some of the
appeal of rules of reason in competition law.
The previous two chapters show that uncertainty can be beneficial. In some
settings, however, uncertainty is detrimental for social welfare. Then, it is important
to understand how communication allows limiting the amount of uncertainty.
The third chapter analyzes a principal-agent model, in which the performance
measure of the principal is non-verifiable and unobservable by the agent. Instead,
the principal has the possibility to communicate with the agent. The communication
occurs at the very end of the interaction and there is no repeated interaction. Never-
theless, it is crucial for the agent’s motivation that the principal gives feedback and
justifies her evaluation.
Providing feedback is important, in particular, in case of bad outcomes. In addition,
it is optimal to pool evaluations and to compress wages at the top. These results
fit well with empirical observations, like the leniency bias and the centrality bias.
Accordingly, evaluations are lenient and wage dispersion for the best evaluations is
low. Chapter 3 argues that this pattern of the evaluations can be understood as a
feature of the optimal contract instead of biased behavior.
Consider two parties, the principal and the agent, who may write a contract. As
there is no objective standard to measure the agent’s work, the agent’s compensation
depends on the principal’s evaluation. For this purpose, the principal privately collects
information about the agent’s performance, like reports from colleagues, observations
of the agent at work or of the agent’s output. A very small part of this information
is known to the agent. After the principal determines her evaluation of the agent’s
work, she decides about the form of communication.
She can either just tell the agent the result of her evaluation or invest some time
and explain her evaluation to the agent by telling him also about the collected
5
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The Agent’s
Compensation
on the
Equilibrium
Path
Result
of the
Evaluation
Feedback No Feedback
Figure 0.1: Communication Pattern
information. Messages are not necessarily truthful and providing justifications is
costly. Independent of the principal’s choice of communication, the agent can reply
to the principal’s evaluation.
Making the principal explain her evaluation requires additional incentives for the
principal. This yields the following optimal contract. On the equilibrium path, the
principal justifies low evaluations and adjusts the agent’s compensation exactly to
her evaluation of his work. For good evaluations, the principal in equilibrium just
pays a high wage and abstains from providing any justifications. This yields pooling
and wage compression at the top.
There is an additional, more technical contribution of this chapter. I show that it
is possible to have an optimal contract that is ex-post budget-balanced. Instead of
payments to third parties, stochastic contracts use differences in the risk preferences
of the parties to implement the required incentives.
Finally, I turn to the way uncertainty is modeled. In contrast to risk, ambiguity
denotes uncertainty that cannot be quantified exactly. There is a long literature show-
ing that ambiguity matters for the empirical behavior of economic agents. Chapters
1 and 2 contribute to this literature. There are, however, several ways to model the
ambiguity and ambiguity-sensitive preferences. Therefore, it remains to scrutinize
whether results relying on ambiguity are robust to the choice of representation. The
6
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Figure 0.2: First-Order and Second-Order Ambiguity Aversion
fourth chapter studies this question.
Corresponding to the distinction between first-order and second-order risk aversion,
I define first-order and second-order ambiguity aversion. Consider indifference curves
in a contingent wealth space with two states of the world. The indifference curves can
be kinked or smooth along the 45-degree line. I denote the former behavior first-order
ambiguity aversion, and the latter second-order ambiguity aversion.
With second-order ambiguity aversion, for every ambiguity-averse agent there
is an ambiguity-neutral agent so that the set of all improvement directions at an
unambiguous endowment is the same for both agents. With first-order ambiguity
aversion, in contrast, the set of improvement directions is a strict subset of the
improvement directions of an ambiguity-neutral agent. Contrary to risk, there are
tractable representations for both kinds of ambiguity aversion.
Chapter 4 provides three equivalent definitions for the distinction between first-
order and second-order ambiguity aversion. For this purpose, I introduce a general
ambiguity premium and a notion of reference beliefs of an ambiguity-averse agent.
This distinction has direct implications for settings in finance, insurance, and con-
tracting. In particular, I consider the validity of an adapted version of Holmström’s
informativeness principle under ambiguity aversion.
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Chapter1
The Fog of Fraud
Mitigating Fraud by Strategic Ambiguity
1.1 Introduction
Fraudulent claims on insurance policies are an important issue for insurers. The
extent of insurance fraud varies widely from small overstatements of claims to
deliberately pretending damages that never occurred or that were intentionally
arranged. Due to the nature of fraud, estimating the losses for the insurance industry
is not an easy task. Nevertheless, the Insurance Information Institute, for example,
estimates that in both 2004 and 2005 insurance fraud amounted to $30 billion in the
US property and casualty insurance market.1 This is consistent with the estimate of
$20 billion for 1994 by the National Insurance Crime Bureau as stated in Brockett
et al. (1998). According to Caron and Dionne (1997), 10% of the insurance claims in
the automobile insurance are fraudulent to some extent in the Canadian province of
Quebec.
Therefore the strategies of insurers to deter insurance fraud do matter. Dionne
et al. (2009, p. 69), for example, estimate that in their sample, companies could save
up to 41% of the costs due to fraudulent claims by implementing the optimal auditing
strategy. Such a strategy has to balance auditing costs and benefits, like exposed
1See Rees and Wambach (2008), p. 135.
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fraudulent claims. In the mass market and with small claims, it is too costly to
audit each claim that is made. Consequently, claim reports are usually scanned for
known patterns of fraud and only a certain fraction of these reports is verified in
detail. Previous literature, like Picard (1996), who analyzes the canonical model of
insurance fraud, suggests a commitment problem. Ex ante the insurers are interested
in announcing a high level of auditing to deter insurance fraud. Given the announced
level of auditing, the policyholders indeed report only few fraudulent claims. As
auditing is costly, however, the insurer has an incentive to audit only very few claims
ex post, rendering its ex-ante announcement not credible. Credible commitment to
a certain level of auditing solves this dilemma. Thus, the absence of commitment
implies a welfare loss. In contrast to this theoretical result, empirically it is very
unusual for insurers to make their level of auditing publicly available. There are
also no observable efforts to overcome the credibility issue by having an industry
association scrutinize their level of auditing or using another third-party verification
mechanism. Insurance firms not only announce no data on fraud detection and
auditing, but even block access to it. Thus, there are very few empirical studies
available.2 This behavior indicates that conventional wisdom neglects some aspects
of the setting.
Therefore we suggest that there is an additional issue. We depart from previous
literature by assuming ambiguity-averse agents and uncertainty about the insurer’s
costs of an audit. We model the ambiguity on the type space, as the insured do
not know which type of insurer they are facing. This leads to ambiguity about the
probability of an audit. In our model, ambiguity-averse agents undertake less fraud
due to this uncertainty. Yet commitment dissolves this ambiguity as it makes the
level of auditing common information. We show that, even in a competitive market,
it can be optimal for the insurers to maintain the ambiguity and forgo commitment.3
Thus, strategic ambiguity is an equilibrium outcome.4 First, we prove that holding
insurers’ behavior fixed, ambiguity makes fraud less appealing. Next, we endogenize
the insurers’ behavior. In the second step, we show that for a given contract, if the
2A notable exception is Dionne et al. (2009). In the context of tax enforcement, the Internal
Revenue Service in the U.S. defended in several court cases its right to keep auditing procedures
secret.
3Notice that this result requires uncertainty about primitives of the model, here the auditing costs.
Uncertainty as a purification of mixed strategies, as proposed by Harsanyi (1973), is not sufficient.
4Strategic ambiguity denotes here the strategic choice to withhold information in order to maintain
the ambiguity for the other contract party, not the choice of strategic uncertainty in the sense of
ambiguous strategies. The notion is discussed at the end of this section.
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insurer abstains from commitment, ambiguity aversion either lowers the amount of
fraud while holding the level of auditing fixed, or vice versa. Third, it will be shown
that avoiding commitment is optimal if the auditing costs satisfy certain conditions
discussed in the next paragraph. Finally, we also endogenize the contracts. It is shown
that the utility-maximizing contracts that just break even under no commitment can
be the unique equilibrium outcome.
The insurance companies have different reasons to forgo commitment. Insurance
companies with high costs save on auditing costs, if they hide their type by abstaining
from commitment, because the average auditing probability is higher than their
own. Insurance companies with low costs also prefer the uncertainty to commitment,
because a higher level of fraud due to the lower average auditing makes their auditing
even more profitable. This is caused by the improved ratio between their low costs and
recovered indemnities and fines imposed on the uncovered fraudsters. Risk aversion
leads to different effects in the model than ambiguity aversion. If the degree of risk
aversion increases, the deterrence of insurance fraud becomes easier both with and
in the absence of commitment. Ambiguity aversion has only deterrence effects if
there is no commitment. Therefore, only ambiguity aversion influences the balance
between commitment and non-commitment. After all, it is the uncertainty that
makes ambiguity-averse agents less inclined to engage in insurance fraud.5
In our model, the policyholders are ambiguity averse. Ambiguity denotes uncer-
tainty about probabilities resulting from missing relevant information. We therefore
distinguish ambiguity and risk.6 In the absence of ambiguity, there is a known
probability distribution, while under ambiguity the exact probabilities are unknown.
Savage (1954) and Schmeidler (1989) have developed two axiomatized approaches to
this problem. The Subjective Expected Utility of Savage requires the decision maker
to be ambiguity neutral. This approach has been criticized for various reasons. From
a normative point of view, it seems appropriate to take into account the amount
5We were encouraged in this view when one insurance executive told us that besides being bad
publicity, communicating detailed data on fighting insurance fraud, like the level of auditing, might
induce more policyholders to give it a try. Moreover, according to Reinganum and Wilde (1988,
p. 794), the IRS confirms that ‘one of the tools in the arsenal of the IRS which promotes voluntary
compliance is the uncertainty in the minds of the taxpayers.’
6Unfortunately, the literature uses various notions. Sometimes ambiguity is called (Knightian)
uncertainty or imprecision. The technical details of representations with ambiguity aversion are
discussed in Appendix 1.A.
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of information on which a decision is based. This point was first made by Ellsberg
(1961). In addition, there are empirical observations, like Kunreuther et al. (1995)
or Cabantous (2007), which suggest that the Subjective Expected Utility approach
neglects the distinction between risk and ambiguity. Insurers, which face ambiguity,
usually request higher premiums and reject to offer an insurance policy in more cases
than in the absence of ambiguity. The model in this chapter uses the representations
of preferences with ambiguity aversion by Klibanoff et al. (2005) and Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). In both representations, the decision maker judges situations with
missing information more pessimistically than an ambiguity-neutral individual.
The problem of costly state verification considered here is not limited to insurance
fraud, but also appears in different settings such as financing (Gale and Hellwig, 1985),
accounting (Border and Sobel, 1987), principal-agent relationships (Strausz, 1997a)
or enforcement of TV license fees (Rincke and Traxler, 2011). The main point is that
there is often asymmetric information between the parties of a contract. To avoid the
exploitation of these asymmetries, the other side has to use costly state verification
technologies, like ticket inspections in public transport. Townsend (1979) began
this analysis of the trade-off between auditing costs and losses due to the remaining
information asymmetries. Commitment is optimal in these models, as discussed
in, e.g., Baron and Besanko (1984). Hence, there have been various proposals to
make commitment feasible and credible. Melumad and Mookherjee (1989) introduce
delegation as a commitment device and Picard (1996) proposes a common agency
financed by lump-sum payments to subsidize auditing costs. This lowers the variable
costs of auditing claims in order to solve the credibility problem. Yet we will argue in
this chapter that in some circumstances it is optimal for firms to avoid commitment
to an auditing strategy, even if commitment were possible and costless.
Previous literature that combines costly state verification and uncertainty about
auditing costs often uses a setting of tax evasion. Cronshaw and Alm (1995) ana-
lyze this case, but without ambiguity aversion and the possibility of commitment.
Therefore, in their model, uncertainty could be counterproductive. Snow and Warren
(2005), on the other hand, model ambiguity aversion by a subjective weighting of
probabilities. Their paper studies the behavior of taxpayers given this ambiguity, but
there is no possibility of commitment. Thus, our model is the first to consider the
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strategic decision of commitment versus uncertainty.
The notion of strategic ambiguity as the strategic choice to withhold information
in order to maintain the uncertainty for the other contract party has been used by
Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and Baliga and Sjöström (2008) in the context of
ambiguity-neutral players. In Baliga and Sjöström (2008), a country in equilibrium
withholds the information about its military arsenal instead of acquiring arms with
certainty and uses strategic ambiguity as a substitute for arms acquisition. In
Bernheim and Whinston (1998), on the other hand, strategic ambiguity denotes the
choice of an incomplete contract. Bernheim and Whinston (1998, p. 920) show “that,
when some aspects of behavior are observable but not verifiable, it may be optimal to
write a contract that leaves other potentially contractible aspects of the relationship
unspecified.” The assumption of observable, but unverifiable aspects, while common
in this literature, does not apply here. Individual fraud is either unobservable and
unverifiable without an audit or becomes verifiable after an audit. Aggregate fraud
levels are unobservable for the policyholders and in reality for the insurers, too. The
type of an insurer is unobservable for the insured, while the occurrence of an audit is
verifiable. Therefore there is no scope for negotiations that could make incomplete
contracts optimal. Instead it is one party, the insurer, who decides to withhold the
information about its auditing probability at a later stage after the contracting.
The optimality of incomplete contracts is confirmed by Mukerji (1998) for ambiguity-
averse parties. In his paper, contractual incompleteness lessens the effects of ambiguity,
because it leads to renegotiations that yield a proportional split of the surplus. This
reduces the utility losses due to ambiguity, as it makes the considerations of both
parties how to determine the worst distribution more similar.7 In our model, avoiding
7The reason is that the Choquet expectation is only additive for comonotonic acts. Thus, with
ambiguity aversion the expected sum of the surpluses is larger than the sum of the expected surpluses,
because the incentive compatibilities for the two parties require the transfers to be noncomonotonic.
Therefore it is impossible to implement first-best effort. Contracts with comonotonic transfers, like
incomplete contracts, cannot mitigate this, but avoid some of the ex-ante ambiguity premia and
might be optimal.
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commitment enhances the effects of ambiguity.8
A second contribution of this chapter is to scrutinize a model with ambiguity
aversion in a game-theoretic framework. Although many papers deal with the effects
of ambiguity aversion in decision making and finance, there are few papers on games
with ambiguity-averse players.9 The reasons are problems with the equilibrium
concepts, as addressed by Dow and Werlang (1994), Lo (1996, 1999), Eichberger and
Kelsey (2000), Lo (2009), Bade (2011a), and Riedel and Sass (2011). We avoid these
problems by modeling the ambiguity on the type space, i.e., the auditing costs of
the insurers. This approach is also used by Lo (1998), Levin and Ozdenoren (2004),
Bose et al. (2006), and Bodoh-Creed (2012) to study auctions with ambiguity-averse
bidders. Bade (2011b) uses this approach, too, in order to establish the existence of
equilibria in games of multidimensional political competition. It allows the use of
common equilibrium concepts, like perfect Bayesian equilibria.
The third contribution is to consider whether competition makes firms provide
relevant information to consumers and educate them. The argument by, e.g., Laibson
and Yariv (2007) has been that competitive pressure gives consumers all the relevant
information, as a competitor could always reveal the information and win market
share. In our model, this is not the case. There is a market equilibrium with perfect
competition where firms do not announce their information about auditing levels
and ambiguity prevails that allows mitigating the effects of insurance fraud. In this
respect, our results are similar to Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and Heidhues et al.
(2012), where in equilibrium firms shroud the prices of some add-ons to their products.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 sets up a stylized
model to give an intuition as to how ambiguity about the level of auditing decreases
insurance fraud. In addition, it explains the decision process of the ambiguity-averse
8Another neoclassical explanation for the withholding of the auditing information and not using
commitment might be the repeated structure of the interaction. Therefore the static contracts in use
by the industry might be improved by leaving room for relational contracts. Yet again this requires
some observability. Either the policyholders derive the level of auditing from, e.g., income statements
or the competitors observe the amount of auditing implemented. As we argued before, firms try to
withhold information about auditing levels. Therefore it is difficult to get this information. Moreover
it seems implausible that policyholders choose their insurer according to past auditing strategies
or stochastic information about it. If competitors were to use the repeated interaction to enforce
joint auditing levels, that behavior might be illegal and, in addition, their incentives are unclear.
Therefore we conclude that relational contracts do not explain the observed behavior.
9See Mukerji and Tallon (2004b) and Gilboa and Marinacci (2011) for a survey of the literature.
14
1.2 Ambiguity in Auditing
policyholders. In Section 1.3, we take contracts as given and insurers decide on their
auditing probabilities and whether or not to commit to their fraud detection strategy.
We show that commitment can decrease profits and that insurers do not want to
commit, even if they have the possibility to do so. In Section 1.4, insurers compete
in contracts and decide on their auditing strategies. Even in this competitive market,
firms in some cases want to forgo commitment. Then Section 1.5 compares the effects
of ambiguity aversion with risk aversion. Finally, Section 1.6 exploits some extensions
of the model and Section 1.7 contains the concluding remarks.
1.2 Ambiguity in Auditing
To strengthen the intuition of our results, we begin with a stylized model that
shows how the ambiguity aversion of the policyholders makes them less inclined
to engage in insurance fraud. The mechanism for the commitment decision of the
insurers requires the full model which is set up in the next section. A risk-averse
and ambiguity-averse agent takes out an insurance with a premium P and coverage q
against a possible loss L > 0. Without loss of generality, we normalize the outside
wealth of the agent to 0. The agent’s preferences are represented by an increasing
and strictly concave utility index u. A loss L occurs with probability δ and no loss
with probability 1− δ. Given this loss distribution, a policyholder who reports a loss
smaller or higher than L is immediately recognized as a fraudster. If, however, no loss
occurs, the policyholder can nevertheless claim a loss of L, because the occurrence of
a loss is private information of the policyholder. As it is common in the literature on
costly state verification, the policyholder faces no direct costs or disutility for this
behavior.
The insurer cannot observe the loss directly. It just receives the report of the
policyholder. If the insurer pays out the claim, the policyholder gets q and therefore
in case of fraud ends up with a final wealth of q − P . The insurer, however, has
a technology to audit a fraction p of the reports for their truth. This technology
is deterministic. Thus, if the insurance company audits a report, it knows for sure
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whether the report is true or not.10 In case the insurance company detects a fraud,
it pays no indemnity and the policyholder has to pay a fine M that is determined
by law. This is commonly known, but the fraction of audits p is private knowledge
of the insurer. The policyholders only know that some reports will be verified. The
insurer, however, may choose to disclose this fraction p to the policyholders. Without
disclosure there is uncertainty about the level of auditing. We will show that the
uncertainty lowers auditing costs, because it deters ambiguity-averse policyholders
from fraud.
This uncertainty about probabilities due to the lack of relevant information is called
ambiguity. In order to model ambiguity-averse agents, we use smooth ambiguity
aversion by Klibanoff et al. (2005). A formal introduction to smooth ambiguity
aversion is available in Appendix 1.A. Yet the results of this chapter do not depend
on this specific representation of preferences. In Appendix 1.B, we repeat the exercise
with Maxmin Expected Utility. This confirms that additional uncertainty decreases
the inclination of the policyholders to engage in fraud.11
In the representation of smooth ambiguity aversion by Klibanoff et al. (2005), there
is a set Π that contains the possible values for the first-order probability pˆ, here the
probability of an audit. On the other hand, µ(pˆ) denotes the second-order probability
of pˆ being the correct first-order probability. We assume that Π and µ are such that
the true value of p is contained in Π and equals the expected value, i.e., p =
∫
Π pˆdµ(pˆ).
The ambiguity index φ is continuous, strictly increasing, and concave. Thus, without
a loss, the policyholder’s utility is φ(u(−P )) if she makes no claim, and
∫
Π
φ
(
(1− pˆ)u(−P + q) + pˆu(−P −M)
)
dµ(pˆ)
for fraudulent claims. If the level of auditing is disclosed, the probabilities are known
and become objective. Thus, there is no ambiguity and µ is degenerate. Therefore
10An alternative interpretation would be a stochastic technology in the sense that fraud is exposed
only with a certain probability. Yet this does not change the analysis, because we can interpret p as
the reduced probability of a claim being audited and being correctly identified if it was fraudulent.
11Gollier (2011) finds that an increase in ambiguity aversion may actually increase the demand for
an ambiguous asset, in contrast to our result. The intuition for his result is similar to Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1971) who show that a higher riskiness does not necessarily lower the demand of risk-averse
agents for the risky asset.
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the policyholder overstates the loss if the probability p of an audit is smaller than
pb = u(−P + q)− u(−P )
u(−P + q)− u(−P −M) .
The following lemma compares this threshold to the case with ambiguity.
Lemma 1.1. Suppose the level of auditing is fixed. If the insurer does not announce
the level of auditing and the ambiguity-averse policyholders do not have all the relevant
information to determine it exactly, there is less insurance fraud than in the case of
available information about the auditing probability.
The proof and all other proofs are given in Appendix 1.C. Thus, not revealing
the probability of an audit decreases the level of auditing that is necessary to deter
the policyholders from committing fraud. This means that withholding information
about the level of auditing from the policyholders reduces their inclination to engage
in insurance fraud. As the main model assumes heterogeneous policyholders with
respect to the degree of ambiguity aversion, we next analyze comparative statics in
the degree of ambiguity aversion. For this purpose, consider two policyholders with
ambiguity index φ1 and φ2. We call the second policyholder more ambiguity-averse
than the first policyholder if there is an increasing and strictly concave function g,
such that φ2 = g(φ1).
Lemma 1.2. Suppose the level of auditing is fixed, but ambiguous. Then the more
ambiguity-averse policyholders commit less insurance fraud.
The next section sets up the main model in the framework of Picard (1996) in
order to capture the commitment decision of the insurers.
1.3 The Main Model
There are N > 3 insurers facing a continuum of potential policyholders with mass
one. The insurers make contract offers, then decide whether to commit to an auditing
strategy. Finally, they choose their level of auditing. The policyholders select a
contract and decide whether to make a claim.
17
Chapter 1
• At t = 0, the degrees of ambiguity aversion are realized and revealed to the
insured.
• At t = 1, insurers make contract offers (qi, Pi).
• At t = 2, the insured choose contracts.
• At t = 3, auditing costs c ∈ {cL, cH} are realized and revealed to the insurer;
insurers can commit to an auditing probability pi.
• At t = 4, losses L are realized.
• At t = 5, the policyholders make insurance claims.
• At t = 6, the insurers decide on the extent of auditing if no commitment was
made.
• At t = 7, indemnities and fines are awarded after auditing the filed claims.
?
Figure 1.1: Timing of the Model
The timing is summarized in Figure 1.1. First, the degree of ambiguity aversion
is assigned to the potential policyholders. Then risk-neutral and ambiguity-neutral
insurers make contract offers. Each insurer i provides a quote for coverage qi and a
premium Pi, such that 0 ≤ Pi ≤ qi. In the next stage, the insured choose a contract
from the pool of contract offers. At t = 3, nature determines the costs c of an audit
for the insurer from the set {cL, cH} with cH > cL > 0. In the extension, we modify
this timing by assuming that the insurance company knows its cost already before
the contracting stage. The auditing costs are revealed only to the insurers. The
policyholders only know the set of possible auditing costs, but not the distribution
according to which nature is choosing. Therefore, the uncertainty is modeled, à la
Harsanyi (1967), on the type space. The policyholders have no objective probabilities
on the type space, but use subjective probabilities. Denote the subjective probabilities
of facing a low-cost insurer by r, its non-degenerate distribution by µ(r), and the
subjectively expected probability by r¯ =
∫
rdµ(r).12 After observing its auditing costs,
every insurance company has the possibility to commit to some auditing level. The
12This implies that auditing costs are realized independently for each insurer.
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commitment could be implemented by delegation, as in Melumad and Mookherjee
(1989), or by a common agency following Picard (1996). We abstract from this
issue and assume that commitment is costless for the insurer to make our case as
difficult as possible. If there are costs for communicating the auditing probability
and making this announcement credible, it only strengthens our results. After that,
at t = 4, the policyholders privately observe the occurrence of a loss L that occurs
with probability δ. Then, at t = 5, they decide whether or not to file an insurance
claim. At t = 6, the insurer chooses to what extent to audit the filed claims. The
auditing technology works as before. Finally, the insurer pays the indemnity q or
gets a part m ≤M of the fine M a policyholder has to pay if an audited claim was
fabricated. The remaining part is lost due, e.g., to litigation. As they are determined
by law and legal process, M and m are exogenous in the model. This modeling choice
is common in the costly state verification literature, like Picard (1996).
We restrict the analysis here to the case of smooth ambiguity aversion as proposed
by Klibanoff et al. (2005).13 We assume a population of agents with different degrees of
ambiguity aversion. Thus, there is a family of strictly concave ambiguity functions φA
indexed by A ∈ [A, A¯]. The higher A, the more ambiguity-averse the agent is, as
defined in Section 1.2 above. The degree of ambiguity aversion A is distributed
according to a distribution function F with a density f > 0. The insurers, who know
this distribution, cannot observe the degree of ambiguity aversion of a policyholder.
In this section, stages 1 and 2 are taken as given. Thus, only the stages 3 to 7 of the
game are considered. Section 4 solves the full model. As a first step, we determine
the equilibrium of the auditing game beginning after stage 4.
1.3.1 Solving the Auditing Game
There are two cases to consider. First, we consider the case in which the insurer
commits itself to a certain level of auditing in stage 3. We solve the model backwards.
If the insurer committed to a certain level of auditing p, in stage 6 it has to stick to
that decision and conduct the audits accordingly. In the next step, we analyze the
decision of the insured in stage 5 whether or not to report a claim in the absence of
13The results of this chapter are robust to other representations of preferences and, in particular,
also hold with Maxmin and Choquet Expected Utility.
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a loss. The level of auditing is known, so the policyholders do not care about the
auditing costs of the insurer. Therefore their beliefs about the type of the insurer
and the ambiguity aversion do not matter. As before, the critical value for the level
of auditing is pb = u(−P+q)−u(−P )
u(−P+q)−u(−P−M) . If more claims are audited, no fraud occurs. For
lower levels of auditing, every policyholder makes a claim. In the third stage, the
insurers choose pi, depending on the costs of auditing ci, to maximize their profits.
The equilibrium in this game is the same as the one described in Proposition 1 of
Picard (1996)14 and depends on the costs of auditing ci. If the insurer’s costs are
above a threshold, i.e., ci > c′ = (1−δ)qδpb , the insurer of type i does not audit any claims
and all the policyholders claim a loss. If the costs of auditing are below the threshold,
a fraction pb of all claims is audited and no insurance fraud occurs.15 We now turn
to the case in which the insurer decides not to commit.
Solving the model backwards, the analysis begins at t = 6. As no commitment was
made, the insurer will choose the level of auditing p to maximize its profits, given that
a fraction α of policyholders without a loss reported a false claim. A policyholder
anticipates an auditing probability pL of the low-cost insurer and pH of the high-cost
type. If the policyholder is ambiguity neutral, she expects an audit with probability
r¯pL + (1− r¯)pH . Yet, the more ambiguity-averse she gets, the more averse she gets
with respect to the risk of facing the low-cost insurer. Thus she reports truthfully if
φA(u(−P )) ≥
∫
φA
((
r(1− pL) + (1− r)(1− pH)
)
u(−P + q)+
(
rpL + (1− r)pH
)
u(−P −M)
)
dµ(r). (1.1)
Therefore, the following program determines the equilibrium, in which the insurers
choose the auditing probabilities pL and pH , after the policyholders have decided
14Picard (1996) assumes an exogenously given fraction θ of opportunistic policyholders in an
otherwise honest population. Setting θ = 1 resembles our model with credible announcement.
15To make the equilibrium unique, the insured have to abstain from fraud if the level of auditing
is pb, although they are indifferent. This seems natural, as the insurer could audit a fraction pb + 
of all insurance claims with an arbitrarily small  to make this behavior of the policyholders a
unique best response. On the other hand, the insurers are indifferent for c = c′. For uniqueness, it
is assumed that insurers have a preference for less fraud if profits do not change.
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whether to submit fraudulent claims.
max
pi∈[0,1]
P − q
(
δ+α(1− δ)(1− pi)
)
+mαpi(1− δ)− ci(δ + α(1− δ))pi, ∀i ∈ {L,H}
subject to α =
∫
A
1dF (A) with the set
A =
{
A ∈ [A, A¯]
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
φA
((
r(1− p∗L) + (1− r)(1− p∗H)
)
u(−P + q)+
+
(
rp∗L + (1− r)p∗H
)
u(−P −M)
)
dµ(r) > φA(u(−P ))
}
To calculate the optimal auditing probabilities, p∗i , consider the reasoning of the
insurer. The insurer acts after the insured reported their claims. Thus, the level of
fraud α is taken as given. The insurer is indifferent between auditing or not, if the
costs are at the threshold c?(α), which depends on the amount of fraud.
c?(α) = α(1− δ)
δ + α(1− δ)(q +m) with
∂c?(α)
∂α
> 0 ∀α ≥ 0. (1.2)
The fraction α(1−δ)
δ+α(1−δ) is the insurer’s belief after stage 5 about a claim to be false.
Hence, at the threshold the costs of auditing equal the expected benefits of auditing,
i.e., the claims q that need not to be paid and the fines m awarded to the insurer. This
allows describing the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium (modulo out-of-equilibrium
beliefs and strategies) of the game after stage 4 given a contract with premium P and
reimbursement q.16 The following proposition distinguishes four cases, which are
illustrated in Figure 1.2. If the costs of both types are very high in case (a), there will
be no auditing and complete fraud. For lower costs, there are two cases, (b) and (d),
in which one type will be indifferent with respect to auditing. Finally, there remains
the case (c) where every type of insurer plays a pure strategy as auditing is beneficial
for the low-cost type, but not for the high-cost type.
16To have a unique equilibrium, firms have to prefer less auditing, ceteris paribus, in particular
if it does not change the level of fraud. Moreover, while the insurer’s type is unobservable, the
policyholders nevertheless correctly anticipate the equilibrium strategy of each type of insurer.
Hence the uncertainty only concerns the type space. Therefore the analysis does not require new
equilibrium concepts, as discussed in the introduction.
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cLc?(1)c?(α˜)
c?(α˜)
cH
Case (a)
Complete fraud
No audits
Case (b)
Type L indifferent
pH = 0
α = δcL(1−δ)(q+m−cL)
Pure strategies
Case (c)
pL = 1
pH = 0
α = α˜
Case (d)
Type H indifferent
pL = 1
α = δcH(1−δ)(q+m−cH )
Figure 1.2: Auditing Equilibria in Proposition 1.1 for 0 < α˜ < 1
Proposition 1.1. For given contracts, beliefs µ(r) and without commitment the
equilibrium has the following form:
(a) If the costs of both types are above the upper threshold, cL≥c?(1)=(1− δ)(q+m),
there is complete fraud, α = 1, and no audits, pH = pL = 0.
(b) If the costs of the low-cost type are between the two thresholds, c?(α˜)≤cL<c?(1),
there is a high level of fraud α = δcL(1− δ)(q +m− cL) ∈ (α˜, 1), and a low level
of audits pH = 0 and pL = h(0, F−1(α)).
(c) If the costs of both types are separated by the lower threshold cL < c?(α˜) ≤ cH ,
there is some fraud α = α˜ and partial audits of pH = 0 and pL = 1.
(d) If the costs of both types are below the lower threshold, cH < c?(α˜), there is a
low level of fraud α = δcH(1− δ)(q +m− cH) ∈ (0, α˜), and a high level of audits
pH = h(1, F−1(α)) and pL = 1.
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with h(x,A′) a solution to φA′(u(−P )) =
=
∫
φA′
(
u(−P +q)−
(
rx+(r+(1−2r)x)h(x,A′)
)(
u(−P +q)−u(−P −M)
))
dµ(r)
and the level of fraud α˜ = F (A∗) defined by case (c), such that
A∗ = sup
({
A ∈ [A, A¯]
∣∣∣ ∫ φA((1− r)u(−P + q) + ru(−P −M))dµ(r) >
> φA(u(−P ))
}
∪ {A}
)
.17
To sum up, in equilibrium smaller costs of auditing reduce the level of insurance
fraud by increasing the auditing probabilities. Additionally, the level of auditing and
the amount of insurance fraud depend negatively on each other. In general, insurers
with high costs do not audit, except for the last case (d) of the proposition. In
contrast to Picard (1996), it is possible to have auditing and the insurers employing
pure strategies. Therefore the equilibrium differs if the auditing costs of both types
are not too high; in particular case (c) is impossible without cost heterogeneity.
Introducing ambiguity aversion either lowers the amount of fraud, while holding
the level of auditing fixed, or vice versa. Uncertainty about the level of auditing
has an additional deterrence effect. The effect discussed in Section 1.2 causes this
reduction.
The level of fraud α˜ in case (c) is important for the structure of the proposition,
because it determines the lower threshold for the costs c?(α˜). Thus, case (b) is only
feasible if the low-cost type can induce some policyholders to behave honestly, α˜ < 1.
This implies either a high expected probability r¯ for a low-cost insurer, a high amount
of ambiguity in terms of the variance of µ or a high degree of ambiguity aversion in
the population, or else that fraud is unattractive, i.e., pb is low. On the other hand, if
the low-cost type can induce all policyholders to behave honestly, α˜ = 0, the cases (c)
and (d) do not arise at all.
There remain two interesting implications of Proposition 1.1. First, the insurers’
profits vary continuously, as the parameters change, even if the type of equilibrium
17As there is no continuity in A, we have to consider the supremum of these values of A for which
fraud is optimal instead of using the indifference condition (1.1). A captures corner solutions.
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changes. Second, commitment allows eliminating insurance fraud completely, which is
impossible without commitment. Nevertheless, the next section shows that ambiguity
aversion in some cases allows reducing the total costs of the insurers by forgoing
commitment.
1.3.2 Comparing Commitment with Non-Commitment
In this section conditions are derived under which non-commitment may lower
the insurers’ total costs. If the insurers are of the high-cost type, they need to
implement less audits than under commitment and can profit from the low fraud
caused by the high average auditing probability. For insurers of the low-cost type
auditing is cheap. Hence they profit from the higher fraud in the population compared
to a situation with commitment due to the lower average auditing if the ratio of
their costs to the fines is low enough. In order to show that non-commitment can
be preferred, we compare the costs due to insurance fraud, α(1 − δ)(1 − pi)q, and
auditing, (δ + α(1− δ))pici, minus the recovered fines, mαpi(1− δ), in the absence of
commitment to the costs of auditing under commitment, δpbci. Commitment implies
a loss for the insurance firms if
α(1− δ)(1− pi)q −mαpi(1− δ) + (δ + α(1− δ))pici ≤ δpbci. i ∈ {L,H} (1.3)
The next proposition shows that this condition is feasible in the cases (a) and (c) of
Proposition 1.1.
Proposition 1.2. In the game beginning at stage 3, commitment has, in equilibrium,
no advantage for the insurers if and only if
• the costs of the low-cost type are low enough, while the costs of the high-cost
type are sufficiently large, ∃α ∈ (0, 1]
cL ≤ mα(1− δ)
δ(1− pb) + α(1− δ) and cH ≥ αc
′. (1.4)
If condition (1.4) holds for α = α˜ as defined in Proposition 1.1, there is pooling
with respect to the commitment decision. For other values of α, there is partial
pooling.
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• the costs of auditing are high for both types, cL > c′ = (1−δ)qδpb . In this case,
the insurers do no auditing and therefore are indifferent with respect to the
commitment decision.
Figure 1.3 summarizes the commitment decision. The most interesting case for the
next section is pooling on non-commitment in the upper left corner (A). In this area,
the costs of the types differ significantly and, as argued above, both types are better
off by not committing. Partial pooling refers to a situation in which one type uses
a mixed strategy with respect to the commitment decision. This allows adjusting
the level of fraud in the absence of commitment to make non-commitment optimal
for both types. For α < α˜, the high-cost insurer commits with some probability. For
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Figure 1.3: Signaling Equilibria in Proposition 1.2 for 0 < α˜ < 1
In area (A), all types avoid commitment. Adjacent to (A), there are two areas with partial pooling.
Then, one type avoids commitment with a strictly positive probability, while the other type always
abstains from commitment. Along the 45° degree line, there is pooling on commitment. Finally, in
area (B) there is a fully separating equilibrium. Then, only the low-cost type uses commitment.
Regions with multiple equilibria are shaded.
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α > α˜, the low-cost insurer commits with some probability. There is commitment to
an auditing probability if the costs of an audit are close to each other for both types.18
Then auditing is sufficiently cheap for the high-cost type to prefer a positive auditing
probability and commitment. Alternatively, auditing costs are sufficiently high for
the low-cost type to prefer commitment and the corresponding reduction in auditing
levels. In area (B), it is optimal for the low-cost type to implement commitment and
do some auditing. In the absence of commitment, there is a high level of fraud. Given
the high costs of auditing, abstaining from commitment makes the low-cost type
worse off. The high-cost type, on the other hand, implements no audits anyway and is
therefore indifferent with respect to the commitment decision. Finally, if the auditing
costs are sufficiently high, both types abstain from auditing independent of their
commitment decision. Hence, insurers are indifferent with respect to the commitment
decision. Then there are multiple equilibria. In summary, the policyholders do not
know which type of insurer they face in the absence of commitment and there will
be some, but not too much fraud. Both types of insurer could commit to a level
of auditing pb and completely deter the policyholders from filing fraudulent claims.
In area (A) of Figure 1.3, however, they have an incentive not to do so and strictly
prefer an equilibrium without commitment. We now consider the insurance market
and characterize the equilibrium of the entire game starting at t = 0.
1.4 Market Equilibrium
So far we have analyzed the behavior of the policyholders and the insurers for
given contracts. Now we endogenize these contracts according to the timing in
Figure 1.1. The characterization of the equilibrium in the insurance market requires
the definition of two benchmark contracts. These benchmark contracts serve the
purpose to characterize the equilibrium. There are no restrictions on strategies. The
first contract (qNC , PNC) is the utility-maximizing contract that just breaks even, if
the insurers avoid commitment and only the low-cost insurer audits as in case (c) of
Proposition 1.1. The second contract (qC , PC) is defined accordingly just for the case
18There is also an equilibrium with commitment for large costs, cL ≥ m(1−δ)1−δpb , in particular if
commitment does not deter fraud.
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with commitment. Therefore define the contract (qNC , PNC) as an element of the
following set
(qNC , PNC) ∈ arg max
q,P∈R+
δu(−L+ q − P ) + (1− δ)u(−P )
with P ≥ δ(q + r¯cL) + (1− δ)(r¯(cL −m) + (1− r¯)q)α˜[q, P ] (1.5)
and α˜[q, P ] as defined in Proposition 1.1.19 Assume that this set is a singleton. The
expected profits correspond to pooling in case (c) of Proposition 1.1. The contract
(qC , PC) is defined analogously, but the budget constraint is this time
P ≥ δ(q + r¯cLpb[q, P ]) + (1− r¯) min{δcHpb[q, P ], (1− δ)q}.
The next proposition shows that in equilibrium firms will choose the non-commitment
contract (qNC , PNC) and there is pooling with respect to the commitment decision.
Proposition 1.3. Suppose the auditing costs of both types are not excessively high,
cH <
(1− δ)qNC
δpb[qNC , PNC ] and cL < m(1− δ) (1.6)
and condition (1.4) holds for α = α˜[qNC , PNC ] and (q, P ) ∈ {(qC , PC), (qNC , PNC)}.
In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, firms make zero profits and avoid commitment.
Furthermore, (qNC , PNC) is the only contract accepted by policyholders in equilibrium.
First, we show that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium as characterized by the
proposition. By the definition of contract (qNC , PNC) insurers make zero expected
profits. Proposition 1.2 showed that insurers are worse off with commitment given
condition (1.4). Conditions (1.6) ensure that there are no profitable deviations.
The proof proceeds along the following lines. Fraud reduces the insurance contract
to stochastic redistribution with efficiency losses. This cannot generate a positive
surplus. Consequently, a deviation with a contract that only attracts policyholders
anticipating fraudulent behavior is not profitable. Second, a deviation with a contract
implementing commitment is unprofitable, because, given our assumptions, even
the best contract with commitment, (qC , PC), is less attractive than the contract
19We write α˜[q, P ] and pb[q, P ] to make clear that both depend on the contract (q, P ).
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(qNC , PNC) for the policyholders. Third, all the policyholders anticipating honest
reporting behave homogeneously and therefore receive the same expected utility
in equilibrium. In case of a deviation this means that the new contract attracts
either all or no honest policyholders. This leaves only the policyholders anticipating
fraudulent behavior in the previous contract and yields a change in the insurers’
auditing strategy, because auditing becomes more beneficial as the probability of
catching a fraudulent claim increases to 1 − δ. Since the remaining policyholders
anticipate this behavior by the insurers, they also move contracts and cherry-picking
by the deviating insurer becomes impossible.
To show that these properties hold in any equilibrium, we prove that there is no
market equilibrium in profitable contracts. Furthermore, it is impossible to offer
a more attractive contract than (qNC , PNC) and avoid losses. This concludes the
analysis of the model, showing that even market pressures do not force insurers to
implement commitment. They use the uncertainty created by missing commitment
as a deterrence device that makes it possible to offer better contracts. The corollary
summarizes this comparison.
Corollary 1.1. If commitment is obligatory, insurers offer the contract (qC , PC) in
equilibrium, which is in utility terms less attractive for the policyholders than the
contract (qNC , PNC) without commitment given the conditions of Proposition 1.3.
Therefore forgoing commitment implies an ex-ante Pareto improvement.
1.5 The Model in the Absence of Ambiguity
Aversion
In the absence of ambiguity aversion, it does not matter whether information about
aggregate behavior is available. In particular, it does not matter whether policyholders
expect an average auditing level or insurers also commit to this auditing level. In
equilibrium, aggregate behavior is common information. Therefore announcing this
information does not change agents’ behavior. This irrelevance contrasts with the case
where ambiguity aversion plays a relevant part, as then the availability of auditing
data matters. Ambiguity aversion has different implications from risk aversion for the
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commitment decision. This can be seen most clearly in inequality (1.3) summarizing
the firm’s commitment decision. The intuition is that ambiguity aversion changes the
firm’s profits in the absence of commitment, i.e., the left-hand side of inequality (1.3),
without touching the profits with commitment, i.e., the right-hand side. Ambiguity
aversion matters only in the case of non-commitment. Risk aversion, on the other
hand, affects both cases and both sides of the inequality.
Formally, in the absence of ambiguity aversion, the ambiguity index φ is linear
and can be neglected. According to Proposition 1.2, type uncertainty is a necessary
condition to have insurers abstain from commitment in equilibrium. Additionally,
insurers prefer to abstain from commitment only in the third case (c) of Proposition 1.1.
Therefore, we focus on this case in the following. In the absence of ambiguity aversion,
there is complete fraud.20
Corollary 1.2. Consider given contracts, beliefs µ(r), a linear ambiguity index φ,
and no commitment in the game beginning in stage 4. If r¯ < pb and the costs of both
types are separated by the threshold cL < c?(1) ≤ cH , there is complete fraud, α = 1,
and partial audits of pH = 0 and pL = 1.
In contrast to Proposition 1.1, we can determine α˜ explicitly by comparing the
probabilities r¯ and pb. If r¯ ≥ pb, the low-cost insurer, on its own, can completely
deter fraud and α˜ = 0. This means that case (c) is impossible. On the other hand,
for r¯ < pb, ambiguity aversion changes behavior, because the low-cost insurer on
its own cannot deter fraud and α˜ = 1. Then case (c) implies complete fraud, as
α˜ = 1. Yet, in this case, Proposition 1.2 implies that a preference for non-commitment
implies complete fraud, α = 1. This reduces the insurance contract to stochastic
redistribution – an undesirable feature.
As we allow for heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion, the counterpart might be
heterogeneity in risk aversion, which we consider next. For this purpose, assume a
family of strictly concave von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility indices uR indexed by
R ∈ [R, R¯]. The higher R, the more risk-averse the agent is. Policyholder 1 is more
risk-averse than policyholder 2 if there is an increasing and strictly concave function g,
such that u1 = g(u2). The degree of risk aversion R is distributed according to a
20In the non-generic case r¯ = pb, there are multiple equilibria. Now, the low-cost insurer has to
audit every claim to deter insurance fraud. Therefore the level of fraud is 1 ≥ α ≥ δcL(1−δ)(q+m−cL) .
29
Chapter 1
distribution function F ◦ with a density f ◦ > 0. With commitment, insurer i ∈ {L,H}
chooses the auditing level to maximize its profits according to
sup
Ri∈[R,R¯]
P − q
(
δ + F ◦(Ri)(1− δ)(1− pb(Ri))
)
+mF ◦(Ri)pb(Ri)(1− δ)−
− ci(δ + F ◦(Ri)(1− δ))pb(Ri)
In general, this yields a positive level of fraud α = F ◦(Ri) > 0. In the absence of
commitment, heterogeneity of the risk preferences allows case (c) with an intermediate
level of fraud, 0 < α < 1.
Corollary 1.3. Consider given contracts, beliefs µ(r), a linear ambiguity index φ,
no commitment, and heterogeneous risk aversion in the game beginning in stage 4. If
r¯ < pb(R) and the costs of both types are separated by the threshold cL < c?(α˜) ≤ cH ,
there is some fraud, α = α˜, and partial audits of pH = 0 and pL = 1. The level of
fraud α˜ = F ◦(R∗) is determined by
R∗ = sup
({
R ∈ [R, R¯] |(1− r¯)uR(−P + q) + r¯uR(−P −M) > uR(−P )
}
∪ {R}
)
.
In this case, the low-cost insurer audits every claim and prefers non-commitment
if its costs are low enough. Then the insurer has to pay few indemnities and earns
some income from fine payments. Commitment reduces the auditing probability of
the low-cost insurer. The corresponding savings on auditing costs do not compensate
for the loss in indemnities and fines if the auditing costs of the low-cost type are
sufficiently small. The advantage of not committing for the high-cost type is smaller
than with ambiguity aversion. The insurer might still profit by reducing its auditing
probability, if its costs are sufficiently high. Yet, in a market equilibrium in which
insurers set contracts, the heterogeneity in the risk aversion complicates the analysis
of policyholders’ behavior. Even if policyholders behave honestly, they have different
valuations for a given policy. These differences in valuation make it possible to screen
policyholders into different contracts. Then in each contract policyholders have a
similar degree of risk aversion resulting in the setting of Corollary 1.2. Thus, whether
a market equilibrium similar to Proposition 1.3 exists is an open question.
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1.6 Extensions
As already mentioned in Footnote 5, the Internal Revenue Service in the U.S.
stated on several occasions that it regards uncertainty about auditing procedures as
a valuable method to increase tax compliance. Furthermore, it went to great lengths
to defend this approach in several court cases brought under Freedom of Information
Acts. If we assume that taxpayers are mobile to some extent and counties compete
for tax revenues, the model in this chapter can be modified accordingly. Instead
of receiving insurance, agents have to pick one county where they pay taxes. Not
declaring their income correctly would correspond to reporting a fraudulent claim.
Then the mechanism in this chapter might explain why counties stick to the IRS
strategy of avoiding commitment. The deviation of attracting many taxpayers with
low tax rates financed by committing to an auditing regime is not profitable in the
equilibrium of our model.
The next extension goes back to the initial insurance model, but shifts the realization
of the cost type after the commitment decision. Therefore, firms do not know which
type they are, when they have the possibility to commit to a certain level of auditing.
In this case, the considerations of the firms change. If the insurance company commits
and the auditing costs are high, it has to bear the high auditing costs or the costs
of fraud due to the low auditing probability. This threat is weighted against the
usual advantages of commitment for the insurer with low costs. The decision about
commitment depends on which effect dominates in equilibrium. Another modification
of the timing allows auditing costs to be realized before insurers make their contract
offers. Figure 1.4 summarizes the changes. Now, insurers can signal the auditing costs
by their contract offers and there is two-sided asymmetric information already at the
contracting stage. Thus, at t = 0 nature determines the costs of an audit for the
insurer, which are the same for all firms, but uncertain.21 After that, the game is the
same as before. Therefore the analysis of Section 1.3 remains unchanged and there
is again a perfect Bayesian equilibrium without commitment. In this equilibrium, a
21See Jost (1996) for a model with heterogeneous costs. In the model of Jost (1996), however, the
coverage q is conditional on the claim being audited, which is not a common feature of insurance
contracts.
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• At t = 0, auditing costs c are realized and revealed to the insurer; furthermore,
the degrees of ambiguity aversion are realized and revealed to the insured
• At t = 1, insurers make contract offers (qi, Pi)
• At t = 2, the insured choose contracts
• At t = 3, insurers can commit to an auditing probability pi...
Figure 1.4: Modified Timing of the Extended Model
contract (q˜, P˜ ) is offered by both types, which is an element of the following set
(q˜, P˜ ) ∈ arg max
q,P∈R+
δu(−L+ q − P ) + (1− δ)u(−P )
with P ≥ δq + (1− δ)qα˜[q, P ].
Similar to the last section, the existence of the equilibrium without commitment
requires additional assumptions: we assume that condition (1.4) in Proposition 1.2 is
satisfied for the contract (q˜, P˜ ) and for the contract
(q˙, P˙ ) ∈ arg max δu(−L+ q − P ) + (1− δ)u(−P )
with P − δq − δcLpb[q, P ] ≥ P˜ − δq˜ − δcLpb[q˜, P˜ ]. Furthermore, α˜[q˜, P˜ ] < 1 and the
probability of a loss should be sufficiently high (respectively low), i.e.,
δ ≥ (≤) (N − 1)P˜ + α˜[q˜, P˜ ](cL −m)
(N − 1)q˜ + α˜[q˜, P˜ ](cL −m) + (Npb[q˜, P˜ ]− 1)cL
(1.7)
depending on the sign of the denominator.22 This condition guarantees that the
advantage of the uncertainty is sufficiently big to restrain the low-cost type from
revealing itself and capturing the whole market. Intuitively, for a positive denominator
there have to be enough losses to reduce the possible cases of fraud. Thus, the amount
22It can easily be seen that the denominator is bigger than the numerator, such that the fraction
is always smaller than one and the constraint set is therefore non-empty. If the denominator is
positive, the fraction might be negative, and in this case, the constraint is trivially satisfied. If, on
the other hand, the denominator is negative, the fraction is always positive and thus the probability
of a loss can be lower than the threshold.
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of claims to audit is quite high even with commitment, and commitment does not
pay for the insurance company, because it loses the deterrence effect and the fine
income. If, on the contrary, the denominator is negative, catching fraudulent claims
is so attractive for the insurer that a low incidence of losses is necessary to stabilize
the equilibrium.23
Proposition 1.4. Given the discussed conditions, there is an equilibrium with every
insurer offering exclusively the contract (q˜, P˜ ) and avoiding commitment.
The equilibrium has an interesting feature. When the insurers consider a deviation,
both types want to mimic the other type. The high-cost type wants to deviate if
the out-of-equilibrium beliefs are tilted towards the low-cost insurer, because there
will be little fraud. If, on the other hand, the beliefs are tilted towards the high-cost
type, the low-cost insurance company can by deviating increase its market share
and profits due to the beliefs of the policyholders about a low auditing probability.
Yet the competitors use the commitment decision to signal the type of the deviating
firm. This is why the out-of-equilibrium beliefs depend on the type of the deviating
firm. Hence, the deviation is no longer profitable, because once the type of the
deviating firm is revealed, the insurer is worse off than before by the conditions of
Proposition 1.4. This holds even though the insurer may serve the whole market after
a deviation. Thus, the actions of the competitors make this equilibrium possible.
If the type is revealed before the contract stage, in the equilibrium with commitment,
the insurance market can break down. This happens if the high-cost type is realized
and cH ≥ c′. Then no agent has a utility higher than without an insurance. Ambiguity
allows avoiding this fate by making contracts feasible that rely on the deterrence
effect of the uncertainty in the absence of commitment. If there is sufficient ambiguity,
the level of fraud is always smaller than 1.
23The equilibrium is not unique. There will usually be a continuum of the equilibria, like (q˜, P˜ + ),
of the type described in Proposition 1.4, depending on the parameter values. Furthermore, there is
a separating equilibrium with each cost type offering the best contract that just breaks even, if the
type of the insurer is known. The change in the timing yields an informed principal problem that
differs fundamentally from the model considered in the previous sections.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we discuss a costly state verification model with ambiguity about
auditing costs. For this purpose, we use an insurance fraud setting. We show that
ambiguity aversion reduces the inclination to engage in insurance fraud at a given
level of auditing. The insurers, on the other hand, can gain by not committing to an
auditing probability and maintaining the uncertainty, even if this means abandoning
the advantages of commitment. This is the main contribution of this chapter, as we
prove that uncertainty can be a feasible deterrence device.
The second contribution is to study a model with ambiguity aversion in a game-
theoretic framework. Although ambiguity seems even more relevant in a strategic
interaction than for a single player, the literature on ambiguity aversion has so far
focused on decision theory and finance with notable exceptions discussed in the
introduction. We provide a game-theoretic analysis of ambiguity-averse policyholders.
Modeling the ambiguity on the type space, i.e., the auditing costs of the insurers,
allows the use of common equilibrium concepts.
The third contribution of this chapter is to consider whether competition forces
firms to educate consumers. According to a common line of argument, competitive
pressure provides consumers with all relevant information, as competitors have an
incentive to reveal the information in order to increase their market shares. In our
model, uncertainty prevails and on the equilibrium path no firm has an incentive to
make the auditing costs public. Therefore, there is a market equilibrium with perfect
competition where firms do not grant access to their information about auditing
probabilities and costs and the uncertainty allows mitigating the effects of insurance
fraud.
Finally, we summarize the incentives of insurers to avoid commitment. Insurers
benefit from the higher perceived probability of auditing and the resulting lower level
of fraud if their costs of auditing are high enough. For low costs, however, the insurers
gain from non-committing, as they catch more fraudsters, thus saving indemnities
and earning fines at low costs. In some cases, these effects are so strong that the costs
caused by fraud and its deterrence are lower than under credible commitment to an
auditing level. Consequently, the insurers will opt to implement strategic ambiguity.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
1.A Decision Making with Ambiguity Aversion
There are several representations of preferences that allow for ambiguity aversion,
like Schmeidler (1989) or Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011).24 Formally, ambiguity aversion
is defined to be the preference of a mixture of lotteries compared to the lotteries
themselves if the agent is indifferent between the lotteries.25 The chapter mainly
uses smooth ambiguity aversion proposed by Klibanoff et al. (2005), which goes
back to Segal (1987).26 The agent knows the first-order and second-order probability
distributions, but does not compute the reduced lottery. The first-order probability
distribution is a distribution for the states of the world, i.e., the state space. The
second-order probability distribution, on the other hand, reflects the probability
for a first-order distribution. In their interpretation, the first-order distribution
characterizes risk and the second-order distribution ambiguity. This distinction
corresponds to the assumption that the first-order and second-order probabilities are
based on different information. The intuition is that the agents have some theories or
models of the world, that assign probabilities to the states of the world. The trust in
each model is denoted by its second-order probability. The agent’s preferences are
represented by
f →
∫
Π
φ
(∫
u ◦ fdP
)
dµ.
The function φ reveals the attitude of the agent towards ambiguity. Therefore we will
call it the ambiguity index. An ambiguity-neutral subject with a linear φ simply takes
the expectation and derives simple probabilities for each state of the world. With
ambiguity aversion, φ is strictly concave. The concavity of this function corresponds
to the degree of ambiguity aversion. The function u is a von-Neumann-Morgenstern
utility index, which determines the attitude towards risk.27 In addition, P is a proba-
bility measure on the state space and Π is a set of first-order probability measures P .
24Gilboa and Marinacci (2011) provide an excellent survey of such representations.
25See Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) for alternative definitions.
26Similar representations are Seo (2009), Ergin and Gul (2009), Chew and Sagi (2008) and Nau
(2006).
27Ambiguity aversion is independent of the attitude towards risk. An agent may be ambiguity-averse
and at the same time risk-neutral, and conversely.
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µ is a probability measure that corresponds to the second-order distribution on Π.
The preference functional may be interpreted as a double expectation. First, the
expected utility for every first-order distribution P is calculated. Then the expected
utility for every P is transformed by the function φ. Finally, the mean with respect
to the second-order probabilities is calculated. Yet the results do not hinge on this
choice of representation.
An alternative representation is Maxmin Expected Utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), which is equivalent to Choquet Expected Utility of Schmeidler (1989) in
our setting. Again there is a (finite) set Π of first-order probability measures,
which are considered relevant. In contrast to smooth ambiguity aversion, however,
agents have no second-order probabilities available. Consequently, they behave as if
the probability distribution that yields the lowest expected utility is correct. The
preferences are represented by
f → min
P∈Π
∫
u ◦ fdP
The axiomatisations of both representations are based on the common decision-
theoretic axioms, except that the independence axiom is restricted to specific acts.
This is less restrictive than independence for all acts.
1.B The Model with Maxmin Expected Utility
This section shows that the results of Section 1.2 are valid also in Maxmin Expected
Utility. We assume a set of relevant probability distributions Π such that the
probability of an audit is in the interval [(1−A)p, (1−A)p+A] with a parameter
A ∈ [0, 1]. Accordingly, the policyholders know that the auditing probability is
around p, but are unaware of the exact value.28 For A = 0, there is no ambiguity and
agents simply take the subjective probability p of Section 1.2 into consideration. On
the other hand, with ambiguity, A > 0, policyholders are more cautious and allow
for some margin of error. Consequently, they behave as if the probability of getting
caught were higher.
28In another approach, Gajdos et al. (2008) propose an axiomatic foundation for such a contraction
representation.
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Lemma 1.3. Suppose the level of auditing is fixed. If the insurer does not announce
the level of auditing and the ambiguity-averse policyholders do not have all the relevant
information to determine it exactly, there is less insurance fraud than with easily
available information about the auditing probability.
Proof: Without a loss, the Maxmin Expected Utility is
(
1− ((1−A)p+A)
)
u(−P + q) + ((1−A)p+A)u(−P −M)
for fraudulent claims and u(−P ) without a claim. First, suppose the level of auditing
is disclosed. Thus, there is no ambiguity and A = 0. Therefore the policyholder
overstates the loss if the probability p of an audit is smaller than pb, as before.
In the second case, the insurer does not reveal the probability of auditing a
claim. Then there is ambiguity. With ambiguity aversion and ambiguity, A > 0, the
policyholder considers the worst probability distribution in her set Π. So an ambiguity-
averse policyholder acts as if the probability of detection were (1−A)p+A. Once
again there is a threshold p? for honest reporting, with
p? = (1−A)u(−P + q) +Au(−P −M)− u(−P )(1−A)[u(−P + q)− u(−P −M)] =
= pb − A1−A
u(−P )− u(−P −M)
u(−P + q)− u(−P −M) < p
b.
As the last fraction is positive, we can conclude that p? < pb for A > 0.
This confirms our earlier result of Lemma 1.1 and shows that it is robust to the way
ambiguity aversion is modeled.
1.C Additional Proofs
Lemma 1.1 shows that ambiguity reduces the amount of insurance fraud, holding
auditing strategies fixed.
Proof of Lemma 1.1: First, suppose the level of auditing is disclosed. Then there
is no ambiguity. Therefore the policyholder has an incentive to engage in fraud if the
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probability p of an audit is smaller than
pb = u(−P + q)− u(−P )
u(−P + q)− u(−P −M) .
If p ≥ pb, the policyholder will behave honestly and report only true losses.
In the second case, the insurer does not reveal the probability of auditing a claim.
Thus, the policyholder lacks relevant information. The difference to the first case
depends on the ambiguity aversion and the amount of ambiguity perceived by the
policyholder. An ambiguity-neutral policyholder, i.e., with a linear φ, takes the same
subjective probability into account and evaluates her possible actions as before. With
ambiguity aversion φ is strictly concave. By Jensen’s inequality it holds∫
Π
φ
(
(1− pˆ)u(−P + q) + pˆu(−P −M)
)
dµ(pˆ) ≤
≤ φ
(∫
Π
(1− pˆ)u(−P + q) + pˆu(−P −M)dµ(pˆ)
)
=
= φ
(
(1− p)u(−P + q) + pu(−P −M)
)
.
Thus, an ambiguity-averse policyholder acts as if the probability of detection were
higher. Hence if the expected probability p =
∫
Π pˆdµ(pˆ) is at least pb, no insurance
fraud occurs. If the second-order distribution is non-degenerate, this holds even for
lower expected probabilities.
Proof of Lemma 1.2: Suppose the second-order distribution µ(pˆ) is such that
the first policyholder weakly prefers to abstain from fraud. Then∫
Π
φ1
(
(1− pˆ)u(−P + q) + pˆu(−P −M)
)
dµ(pˆ) ≤ φ1 (u(−P )) .
As the second policyholder is more ambiguity-averse than the first one, Jensen’s
inequality yields
∫
Π
φ2
(
(1− pˆ)u(−P + q) + pˆu(−P −M)
)
dµ(pˆ)≤
≤ g
(∫
Π
φ1
(
(1− pˆ)u(−P + q) + pˆu(−P −M)
)
dµ(pˆ)
)
≤
≤ g (φ1 (u(−P ))) = φ2 (u(−P )) .
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If the second-order distribution is non-degenerate, the first inequality is strict. Hence,
the more ambiguity-averse policyholders commit less insurance fraud.
Proposition 1.1 characterizes the equilibrium of the game after stage 4 given a
contract with premium P and reimbursement q.
Proof of Proposition 1.1: As the beliefs µ about r are considered as fixed in the
Proposition, it does not consider any signaling or adverse selection effects. Lemma 1.2
ensures monotonicity of the fraud decision of the policyholders in A. Now define α˜
as the fraction of policyholders engaging in fraud if the low-cost insurer audits every
claim, pL = 1, and the high-cost insurer audits no claims, pH = 0. Then α = F (A∗)
and
A∗ = sup
({
A ∈ [A, A¯]
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
φA
(
(1− r)u(−P + q) + ru(−P −M)
)
dµ(r) >
> φA(u(−P ))
}
∪ {A}
)
.29
Solving the equilibrium backwards, we consider the insurer setting the level of auditing.
As the problem for the insurer is linear, at least one type has a corner solution and
audits all or none of the claims made. If for a level of fraud α the costs of auditing
are lower (resp. higher) than c?(α), as defined in (1.2), all (none of the) claims are
audited. Consequently, an ambiguity-neutral policyholder acts as if the expected
probability of an audit is
E(p) =

1 if cH < c?(α)
p ∈ [r¯, 1] if cH = c?(α)
r¯ if cL < c?(α) < cH
p ∈ [0, r¯] if cL = c?(α)
0 if cL > c?(α)
depending on the auditing costs. Thus, we distinguish the following five cases: (a) no
auditing p = 0, (b) low partial auditing 0 < p < r¯, (c) partial auditing p = r¯, (d) high
partial auditing r¯ < p < 1, and (e) complete auditing p = 1.
(a) If policyholders expect no audits, p = 0, every policyholder will report a claim,
29See footnote 17 for an interpretation.
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even if no loss occurred. Ex post it will still be optimal to abstain from auditing for
the insurer if the costs of auditing c for both types of insurer are higher than the
expected benefit of detecting a fraudster, (1− δ)(q +m). This is the first case (a) of
the proposition with cL ≥ c?(1). If the costs are lower, this is not an equilibrium as
the insurers do some auditing.
(b) If the level of auditing is low, i.e., 0 < p < r¯, the low-cost insurer is exactly
indifferent between auditing claim reports or not. Therefore the high-cost insurer
will abstain from auditing any claims and we can solve the equilibrium backwards by
calculating
α = δcL(1− δ)(q +m− cL)
from the definition of c?(α) in equation (1.2) to make the low-cost insurer indifferent.
The level of fraud determines by equation (1.1) the necessary level of auditing as a
solution p∗L to
φA′(u(−P )) =
∫
φA′
(
u(−P + q)− rpL
(
u(−P + q)− u(−P −M)
))
dµ(r)
with A′ = F−1(α). The right-hand side of this equation is decreasing in pL and is
bigger than the left-hand side for pL = 0. Therefore, p∗L > 0. In addition, p∗L < 1 and
the low-cost insurer can on its own deter enough policyholders from filing false reports
if α˜ < 1. This condition corresponds to a high expected probability r¯ for facing the
low-cost insurer. Hence, the level of fraud is α ∈ (α˜, 1) depending on the auditing
costs cL of the low-cost insurer. If these costs are lower than c?(α˜), the low-cost
insurer has an incentive to audit as many claims as possible. Then it is impossible to
make the low-cost insurer indifferent with respect to its auditing decision. If, on the
other hand, these costs are higher than c?(1), it would not be worthwhile to audit any
claims for the insurer. Consequently, the second part (b) of the proposition requires
c?(α˜) ≤ cL < c?(1). Notice that α˜ < 1 if the condition is satisfied, because c?(α) is
increasing in α.
(c) In the next step, consider an intermediate level of auditing, p = r¯. Then,
the low-cost insurer audits every claim made and the high-cost insurer does not
audit any claims. Therefore the costs have to be cL < c?(α˜) ≤ cH . Otherwise one
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type of insurer has an incentive to deviate. The level of fraud is α˜ by definition.
0 < cL < c?(α˜) implies that there will be some fraud and α˜ > 0, as c?(0) = 0. Part (c)
of the proposition describes this equilibrium.
(d)More auditing is achieved if the low-cost insurer audits every claim and the high-
cost insurer audits some claims, i.e., pL = 1 and pH > 0. The high-cost insurer has to
be indifferent to find this level of auditing optimal. Therefore we solve equation (1.2)
of the definition of the indifference costs for the corresponding level of fraud as in
case (b)
α = δcH(1− δ)(q +m− cH) .
α is smaller than one if and only if cH < (1 − δ)(q + m) = c?(1). Equation (1.1)
determines the level of auditing in equilibrium as a solution p∗H to
φA′(u(−P )) =
∫
φA′
(
u(−P + q)− (r+ (1− r)pH)
(
u(−P + q)−u(−P −M)
))
dµ(r)
with A′ = F−1(α). The right-hand side of this equation is decreasing in pH and is
smaller than the left-hand side for pH = 1. Therefore, p∗H < 1. In addition, p∗H > 0
if α˜ > 0 and the low-cost insurer cannot on its own deter all policyholders from
filing false reports. This condition corresponds to a low subjective probability r¯ for
facing the low-cost insurer. Hence, the level of fraud is α ∈ (0, α˜) depending on the
auditing costs cH of the high-cost insurer. If these costs are above c?(α˜), it would
not be worthwhile to audit any claims for the insurer. Consequently, part (d) of the
proposition requires cH < c?(α˜). Notice that α˜ > 0 if the condition is satisfied.
(e) Finally, if every claim is believed to be audited, only true claims are reported.
Then, however, the best strategy of the insurer ex post is not to audit any reports.
Therefore, in the absence of commitment, some policyholders will always report false
claims in equilibrium.
Lemma 1.4 is required for the proof of Proposition 1.2.
Lemma 1.4. Assume there is no commitment and the insurer of type i ∈ {H,L}
is indifferent with respect to audits by the level of fraud, as α = δci(1−δ)(q+m−ci) . Then
the insurer of type i prefers to commit to a level of auditing pb independent of the
policyholders’ beliefs about its type.
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Proof: The costs with commitment are lower than in its absence if
α(1− δ)(1− pi)q −mαpi(1− δ) + (δ + α(1− δ))pici ≥ δpbci.
Collecting the pi terms we get
α(1− δ)q − pi
[
α(1− δ)q +mα(1− δ)− (δ + α(1− δ))ci
]
≥ δpbci.
Rearranging the terms in the square brackets gives
α(1− δ)q − pi
[
α(1− δ)(q +m− ci)− δci
]
≥ δpbci.
As α = δci(1−δ)(q+m−ci) the term in square brackets equals 0 and we get α(1−δ)q ≥ δpbci.
This means that the auditing costs, (δ+α(1− δ))pci, and cost savings due to exposed
frauds, i.e., indemnities not paid out, qαp(1− δ), in combination with fines received
by the insurer, mαp(1− δ), offset each other. Consequently only the losses due to
falsely stated claims, α(1−δ)q, matter. The indifference condition (1.2) of the insurer
in equilibrium causes this effect. Inserting α yields δci(1−δ)(q+m−ci)(1− δ)q ≥ δpbci.
Multiplying the inequality by q + m − ci leads to q ≥ pb(q + m − ci). Finally,
arranging the terms for ci and dividing by pb gives us
− q
pb
+ q +m ≤ ci. (1.8)
m ≤M and  = [u(−P )− u(−P −M)]q − [u(−P + q)− u(−P )]M > 0, because the
utility index u is strictly concave. Therefore,
q−pb(q+m) = (1−pb)q−pbm ≥ (1−pb)q−pbM = [u(−P+q)−u(−P−M)]−1 > 0.
This ensures that the left-hand side of inequality (1.8) is negative. Then, the
inequalities are satisfied and the respective insurer can make itself better off by
committing to an auditing level pb.
Proof of Proposition 1.2: We begin by considering pooling equilibria with both
types avoiding commitment. Then the policyholders’ beliefs remain unchanged at µ
if no commitment is observed. In the case of commitment, the beliefs are irrelevant.
In the following, we consider different cost ranges. For high costs of auditing, the
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insurers abstain from auditing and this is common knowledge. Consequently, they
are indifferent on the commitment issue and the beliefs do not matter. Due to
Proposition 1.1, Lemma 1.4 and the fact that c′ > c?(1), this is the case for cL > c′.
Below c′, under commitment, audits become worthwhile and there is no insurance
fraud. Without commitment, auditing is still too expensive. Therefore, commitment
is necessary to avoid complete fraud and at least one type has an incentive to
commit.30 Yet, once the auditing costs of the low-cost type drop below c?(1), there is
auditing even without commitment. We now distinguish the following cases according
to Proposition 1.1. In case (b) or (d), commitment is always preferable to no
commitment, because the insurer which does partial auditing has an incentive to
commit itself. The reason is the same as in Picard (1996). As the indifference of the
insurer determines the level of fraud, the insurer’s costs are independent of its level of
auditing. Therefore replicating the auditing level pb of the commitment case does not
change profits. Without commitment, the insurer still faces fraud causing additional
costs for indemnities and audits that are not balanced by income from fines. The
details can be found in Lemma 1.4. Consequently, there is an incentive to commit to
an auditing level in these cases and no pooling equilibrium exists with both types
avoiding commitment. Now suppose case (c) of Proposition 1.1 with audits of pH = 0
and pL = 1. Then the low-cost type prefers not to commit if and only if equation (1.3)
is valid for pL = 1 or −mα(1− δ) + [δ + α(1− δ)]cL ≤ δpbcL. Rearranging the terms
yields
cL ≤ mα(1− δ)
δ(1− pb) + α(1− δ) .
The fraction on the right-hand side is positive and does not depend on cL. Furthermore
the threshold is smaller then c?(α˜), because by Lemma 1.4
q − pb(q +m) > 0
⇔ α(1− δ)q + δ[q − pb(q +m)] > 0
⇔ α(1− δ)q[δ(1− pb) + α(1− δ)]−mpbδα(1− δ) > 0
⇔ α(1− δ)(q +m)[δ(1− pb) + α(1− δ)] > m(δ + α(1− δ))α(1− δ)
30Due to the definition of pb and the concavity of u it holds c′ > c?(1). Formally, this is equivalent
to q/(δpb) > q + m. Consequently, it is enough to show that q − pb(q + m) > 0. This is done in
Lemma 1.4.
43
Chapter 1
⇔ mα(1− δ)
δ(1− pb) + α(1− δ) <
α(1− δ)(q +m)
δ + α(1− δ) = c
?(α).
Therefore condition (1.4) on cL guarantees case (c). Consequently, for cL small enough
the low-cost type of insurer forgoes commitment. By equation (1.3), the high-cost
type, on the other hand, avoids to commit if α(1 − δ)q ≤ δpbcH , as pH = 0. This
leads to
cH ≥ α(1− δ)q
δpb
= αc′.
Moreover, this threshold is higher than the threshold for cH in case (c) as seen by
Lemma 1.4 and
q − pb(q +m) > 0
⇔ q
δpb
>
q +m
δ
>
q +m
δ + α(1− δ)
⇔ αc′ = α(1− δ)q
δpb
>
α(1− δ)(q +m)
δ + α(1− δ) = c
?(α).
Thus, the high-cost insurer has no incentive to commit if its costs are high enough.
In summary, we have found a range of parameters such that, in equilibrium, the
insurers choose not to commit to an auditing level, even if they have the possibility
to do so credibly and free of charge. Area (A) in Figure 1.3 on page 25 illustrates
this range of parameters. So far, we have considered only complete pooling with
respect to the commitment decision. Yet by including partial pooling, it is possible
to increase the parameter range for cL and cH , because the line of argument does not
depend on the specific level of fraud α. If condition (1.4) holds only for an α < α˜
with α˜ as defined in Proposition 1.1, it is possible to choose α, such that the high-cost
type is indifferent with respect to commitment. Thus, it plays a mixed strategy and
commits to an auditing level with some probability σH . This changes equilibrium
beliefs if no commitment was observed. Then, the probability of a low-cost insurer is
r + (1− r)(1− σH) with subjective probability µ(r). Hence, the equilibrium level of
fraud decreases. As shown before, this behavior is sequentially rational. If, on the
other hand, condition (1.4) holds only for α > α˜, choose α, such that the low-cost
type plays a mixed strategy with respect to the commitment decision. This decreases
equilibrium beliefs if no commitment was observed. Hence, the equilibrium level
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of fraud increases. Figure 1.3 depicts the bounds on the costs of the two types.
Now consider pooling equilibria with both types committing. For cL ≥ c?(1) this
equilibrium exists independently of the out-of-equilibrium beliefs. For costs below
this threshold, we distinguish three cases corresponding to cases (b), (c), and (d) in
Proposition 1.1, depending on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Suppose the beliefs given
that no commitment was observed are such that the insurer of type L is indifferent
with respect to audits as in case (b). Then the high-cost insurer abstains from
auditing, pH = 0, if it does not commit to an auditing level. By the same reasoning
as before, commitment is only optimal in this case if cH ≤ α(1−δ)qδpb = qcLpb(q+m−cL) and
cL < c
?(1). If, on the other hand, the beliefs are such that the insurer of type H
is indifferent as in case (d), the low-cost insurer will do complete auditing, pL = 1,
in the absence of commitment. Then commitment is only optimal for both types if
cH ≤ c?(1) and cL ≥ mα(1−δ)δ(1−pb)+α(1−δ) with α = δcH(1−δ)(q+m−cH) . Finally, the beliefs could
be such that both insurers have a corner solution as in case (c) of Proposition 1.1.
Analogously, this is sequentially optimal only if there exists an α ∈ (0, 1] such that
c?(α) < cH ≤ α(1− δ)q
δpb
and c?(α) > cL ≥ mα(1− δ)
δ(1− pb) + α(1− δ) .
In addition, there is a corner solution for α = 1 with cH > c?(1) and c?(1)> cL ≥ m(1−δ)1−δpb .
Finally, consider separating equilibria with type i committing and the other type j
avoiding commitment. Then there is no ambiguity. Without ambiguity, however,
commitment is at least weakly optimal. Policyholders’ beliefs in the absence of
commitment are degenerate at r = 1 or 0, respectively. According to Proposition 1.1
with α˜ = 0 or 1, respectively, this yields two cases for the non-committing insurer.
First, there might be some fraud, α = δcj(1−δ)(q+m−cj) for low costs, cj < c
?(1). In this
case and in all other cases where the indifference of the insurer determines the level
of fraud, Lemma 1.4 shows that commitment is preferable to no commitment, as
it decreases the insurer’s costs. Second, there is complete fraud, α = 1, for high
costs, cj ≥ c?(1). To ensure non-commitment is optimal for type j, it has to hold
cj ≥ c′. Above this threshold, the non-committing insurer j is indifferent with
respect to the commitment decision and avoiding commitment is sequentially optimal.
Yet the committing insurer i might profit from a deviation to avoid commitment.
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This deviation is only profitable if the committing insurer i is the low-cost type.
−m(1− δ) + cL ≥ δpbcL makes this deviation unprofitable, as the low-cost type will
audit every claim. Rearranging the terms gives cL ≥ m(1−δ)1−pbδ , which is smaller than c′,
as q
δpb
> q+m by Lemma 1.4. Together with cH ≥ c′, this allows for a fully separating
equilibrium in area (B) of Figure 1.3. Moreover, we have shown that in every fully
separating equilibrium at least one type is indifferent with respect to the commitment
decision.
Proposition 1.3 considers the market equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1.3: First, we show that the strategy profile in the proposi-
tion is an equilibrium of the game. Given that the other insurers offer the contract
(qNC , PNC), each insurer makes zero expected profits in equilibrium, because by
Proposition 1.1 and 1.2 in combination with condition (1.4) it is optimal to avoid
commitment and have the low-cost type doing the auditing, i.e., pL = 1 and pH = 0.
Therefore there is pooling with respect to the commitment decision. At the time of
contracting, auditing costs have not been realized yet. Thus, signaling is impossible.
Yet the commitment decision allows for signaling. The equilibrium beliefs are µ, as no
commitment is observed. Off the equilibrium path, beliefs about types are given by
the behavior characterized in Proposition 1.2 if they are on the equilibrium path of
the continuation games beginning with the realization of insurer’s types. Otherwise
set them to µ.
Consider insurer j deviating by offering a less appealing contract, denoted by (qˆ, Pˆ ),
where the appeal or the attractiveness of a contract is given by
δu(−L+ q − P ) + (1− δ)u(−P ).
By definition no policyholder who behaves honestly with probability one will ac-
cept (qˆ, Pˆ ) independent of her beliefs. Thus, only policyholders who behave fraudu-
lently might opt for the contract (qˆ, Pˆ ). Yet, compared to the equilibrium contract,
fraud implies stochastic redistribution financed by the policyholders themselves with
efficiency losses due to the auditing costs and the difference M − m in the fine
payments. As agents are risk averse and ambiguity averse, any profitable contract
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with this property offers less utility than the contract (qNC , PNC).31 Consequently,
the contract (qˆ, Pˆ ) will either make a loss or attract no demand at all. Hence, this
deviation is not profitable.
Now consider a deviation with a (weakly) more attractive contract (q¯, P¯ ). In this
case all consumers who are made weakly better off switch contracts. Then the insurer
makes a loss with every policyholder unless the insurer succeeds in lowering its costs
due to auditing and fraudulent claims by changing the level of fraud in this contract.
The next two paragraphs show that it is impossible to do so.
First, assume that the new contract (q¯, P¯ ) implements commitment for some
types of the insurer to reduce the costs related to fraudulent behavior. Given con-
dition (1.4), however, commitment makes contracts more expensive for the insurer
according to Proposition 1.2. Therefore even the best available contract (qC , PC)
with commitment is less attractive than (qNC , PNC). If the deviating insurer antici-
pates to use commitment independent of its type, the condition on cL in (1.4) and
(1− δ)α˜q < min{δcHpb[qC , PC ], (1− δ)q} by the condition on cH result in
cL <
mα˜(1− δ) + 1−r¯
r¯
(min{δcHpb[qC , PC ], (1− δ)q} − (1− δ)α˜q)
δ(1− pb[qC , PC ]) + α˜(1− δ)
r¯δcL + (1− δ)(r¯(cL −m) + (1− r¯)q)α˜ <
< r¯δcLp
b[qC , PC ] + (1− r¯) min{δcHpb[qC , PC ], (1− δ)q}. (1.9)
The right-hand side of the inequality calculates the costs of fighting fraud with
commitment. It is higher than the costs in the absence of commitment. If, on the
other hand, the deviating insurer makes the commitment decision dependent on
its type, the following cases are feasible by Proposition 1.2. The fully separating
equilibrium for (q¯, P¯ ) is never profitable, because it implies complete fraud for the
high-cost type and condition (1.9) ensures that the insurer is worse off. Moreover,
it is impossible due to cL < m(1− δ). Now consider contracts that result in partial
pooling, i.e., one type of insurer plays a mixed strategy with respect to the commitment
decision. As the mixing type of insurer is indifferent between commitment and non-
31The condition cL < m(1 − δ) ensures that a fully separating equilibrium is impossible, as
m(1 − δ) < m(1−δ)1−δpb for all pb > 0. If α˜[qNC , PNC ] + pb[qNC , PNC ] < 1, condition (1.4) already
implies cL < m(1− δ).
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commitment, its profits are the same in both cases and the budget constraint (1.5) is
still binding.32 By the definition of contract (qNC , PNC) the contract (q¯, P¯ ) cannot
be profitable. Consequently, the contract (q¯, P¯ ) makes losses with commitment and
the deviating insurer will not implement commitment.
Second, the deviating insurer engages in cherry-picking and the policyholders with
a low degree of ambiguity aversion are attracted to the contract (qNC , PNC) offered
by the remaining insurers. Thus, fraud will be low in contract (q¯, P¯ ). This yields a
change in the auditing regime in the contracts (qNC , PNC). Due to the assumptions
on cL and cH , complete fraud is never optimal in contract (qNC , PNC), as the insurers
adapt their auditing strategies accordingly. Thus, some policyholders will report
honestly, although they have chosen the contract (qNC , PNC), which is a contradiction.
Hence, this deviation is not profitable. Together with Propositions 1.1 and 1.2, this
completes the first part of the proof and shows that offering the contract (qNC , PNC)
without commitment and the low-cost type doing the auditing, i.e., pL = 1 and
pH = 0, is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game.
In the second part of the proof, we show that any equilibrium satisfies the properties
stated in the proposition. For this purpose, assume to the contrary that there is an
equilibrium with different contracts accepted by the policyholders. If in expectation
insurers make profits on their contracts in this alternative equilibrium, we show a
contradiction in the next three steps. First, assume to the contrary that there are at
least two profitable contracts with complete fraud. If cL ≥ c′ in the corresponding
contract and the contract is profitable, no one will accept the contract. Therefore the
only remaining case is pooling on non-commitment with α˜ = 1. Then it is a profitable
deviation to propose a contract that does not attract any honest policyholders, but
is preferred by the fraudsters from the first two contracts. This is always feasible
and decreases profits per policyholder, but increases total profits due to the gain in
market share. Therefore there is at most one contract with complete fraud.
32The change in the level of fraud caused by the partial pooling makes it more difficult to satisfy
the budget constraint (1.5). If the low-cost insurer is using partial commitment, the level of fraud
increases in the case without commitment compared to both types not committing. Yet partial
pooling is only implemented if in the contract (q¯, P¯ ) the level of fraud with pooling is lower than
in a corresponding contract where complete pooling is optimal. Therefore fraud is still lower than
in the pooling contract. If such a contract is more profitable than (qNC , PNC), this contradicts
the definition of (qNC , PNC). The argumentation is analogous if the high-cost insurer uses partial
commitment.
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Second, assume to the contrary that in equilibrium there are at least two profitable
contracts with commitment and some policyholders who always behave honestly.
This implies partial pooling or complete pooling on commitment. Now reduce the
premium P by a small  > 0 and implement commitment as in the initial contract.
The honest policyholders now choose the new contract and increase the market share
of the insurer, making this deviation profitable. Therefore there is at most one
profitable contract with commitment and honest policyholders in equilibrium.33
Third, take one of the profitable contracts with honest policyholders and no
commitment, (q1, P 1). By the previous steps, there exists at least two of them, as full
separation is impossible by cL < m(1− δ). Moreover, by Proposition 1.2, the auditing
regime corresponds to pooling on case (c) of Proposition 1.1. In these contracts,
beliefs about types and auditing probabilities for each type of insurer are identical at
the contracting stage. This allows for a profitable deviation by offering a contract that
is slightly more attractive than (q1, P 1) instead of (q1, P 1). The modified contract
attracts all the policyholders from the contracts in this class.
Therefore, in equilibrium, some insurers make zero profits on their contracts. If
these contracts are less attractive than the contract (qNC , PNC), an insurer may
deviate by offering the contract (qNC , PNC + ) with  > 0, such that the contract
is still more attractive than the equilibrium contracts. Then all policyholders, who
before anticipated behaving honestly independently of the commitment decision or
were in a contract with complete fraud, opt for the new contract, because it increases
their utility. Other policyholders follow suit, as they anticipate that auditing regimes
are changing due to the different distribution of ambiguity aversion in the previous
contracts. This guarantees positive profits for the deviating insurer.
Assume to the contrary that the equilibrium contracts are (weakly) more attractive
than contract (qNC , PNC). As shown in the first part of the proof, the contracts make
losses if they use commitment or if there is complete fraud. Therefore, by Proposi-
33In equilibrium it is infeasible to have partial pooling with respect to commitment and every
policyholder filing a claim in the absence of commitment. The reason is that policyholders get a
higher utility the higher the probability is of facing a high-cost type in the absence of commitment.
This can be achieved by changing the probability of commitment of the types. The level of fraud
remains unchanged, as α = 1. Furthermore, profits remain unchanged due to the indifference
condition of the mixing type of insurer. Consequently, the policyholders would be willing to enter a
more profitable contract. This is a profitable deviation and shows why such an auditing regime is
impossible.
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tion 1.2, the only remaining auditing regime is pooling in case (c) of Proposition 1.1
and all equilibrium contracts offer the same expected utility for an honest policyholder.
By the definition of contract (qNC , PNC), insurers make a loss if the policyholders
are split up equally between insurers. Now assume the distribution of policyholders
into contracts is heterogeneous, so that the amount of fraud differs between contracts.
In some contracts, it is above α˜[q, P ], while in others it is below α˜[q, P ]. Yet it is
impossible to reduce the costs due to auditing and fraudulent claims and screen the
policyholders according to their ambiguity aversion. The reason is the following. If
r¯/(1− r¯) = q/(m−cL), profits do not change in the amount of fraud and any contract
except (qNC , PNC) that is (weakly) more attractive than (qNC , PNC) makes a loss. If
r¯/(1− r¯) < q/(m− cL), profits are decreasing in the level of fraud and contracts with
fraud above α˜[q, P ] make losses. Given the high indemnity, however, these contracts
attract the policyholders anticipating fraudulent behavior, as the auditing regime
remains unchanged. If, on the other hand, r¯/(1− r¯) > q/(m− cL), the contracts with
fraud below α˜[q, P ] make losses. Again, the low indemnity deters the fraudsters from
those contracts generating a loss for the insurer. Yet, in equilibrium there are no
insurers with loss-making contracts. Consequently, (qNC , PNC) is the only accepted
contract in any equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 1.4 considers the market equilibrium in the extension of the game.
Proof of Proposition 1.4: The beliefs of the insured about the type of insurer
are µ if they observe the contract (q˜, P˜ ). If, on the other hand, they observe a different
contract and at least N − 2 of the insurers commit, they update their beliefs to
µ(1) = 1. Otherwise beliefs remain at µ. If a deviation at the contracting stage
occurs, firms with low costs cL commit at t = 3. The beliefs of the insurer about the
ambiguity aversion of its policyholders are according to the distribution F .
The low-cost type makes positive profits with the contract (q˜, P˜ ), because according
to Proposition 1.2 in combination with condition (1.4) auditing is profitable and the
premium is set, such that no auditing gives zero profits and auditing is profitable for
the low-cost type. If a firm j of the low-cost type tries to capture the whole market
by offering a more attractive contract (qˆ, Pˆ ), due to the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
agents know its type, since the behavior of the competitors reveals it. Consequently,
insurer j always wants to commit to an auditing level in its contract (qˆ, Pˆ ). No matter
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whether the insured go to the deviating insurer or stay with the equilibrium contract,
we show that the deviation is not profitable.34 The profits with the new contract
(qˆ, Pˆ ) are lower, because by assumption Pˆ − δqˆ − δpb[qˆ, Pˆ ]cL ≤ P˜ − δq˜ − δpb[q˜, P˜ ]cL
and condition (1.7) yields
P˜ − δq˜ − δpbcL ≤ 1
N
[
P˜ − δq˜ +mα(1− δ)− (δ + α(1− δ))cL
]
⇔ (P˜ − δq˜)(N − 1)−NδpbcL ≤ mα(1− δ)− (δ + α(1− δ))cL
⇔ (N − 1)P˜ + α(cL −m) ≤ δ
[
q˜(N − 1) +NpbcL −mα− (1− α)cL
]
⇔ δ ≥ (≤) (N − 1)P˜ + α(cL −m)(N − 1)q˜ + α(cL −m) + (Npb − 1)cL .
35
The direction of the inequality in the last line depends on the sign of the denominator,
as discussed before. The strategy of the other insurers is sequentially optimal,
as commitment is optimal for an insurer offering contract (q˜, P˜ ) given the beliefs
Pr(cL) = 1. Therefore it is a best response for the low-cost insurer to offer (q˜, P˜ ) in
this equilibrium.
The high-cost type, on the other hand, has no incentive to deviate either, because
by offering the contract (q˜, P˜ ) with commitment, the insurer would make a loss
according to Proposition 1.2. Similarly, the insurer would incur a loss if it offered
a more attractive contract by the definition of contract (q˜, P˜ ). Given the beliefs µ,
the other insurers have no incentive to commit. Therefore no profitable deviation
is possible. In equilibrium, both types of insurers decide to avoid commitment and
every firm offers the contract (q˜, P˜ ).
34Indeed, for cH ≤ (1−δ)q˜δpb[q˜,P˜ ] , all insured opt for the new contract (qˆ, Pˆ ), because the new contract is
more attractive and the insured behave honestly. If cH is higher, some policyholders may stay with
the old contract.
35Here we suppress the dependency of α and pb on [q˜, P˜ ] for notational convenience.
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Legal Uncertainty
An Effective Deterrent in Competition Law?
2.1 Introduction
Given the complexity of legal procedures in competition law, legal uncertainty is a
major issue.1 Previous literature has shown that legal uncertainty yields dispropor-
tionate deterrence – over-deterring socially beneficial actions, while under-deterring
socially detrimental ones.2 This chapter sets up a formal model to study whether the
legal uncertainty inherent in a legal rule can advance the objectives of the policymaker.
The analysis shows that legal uncertainty itself might have positive effects if it is not
too large. The reason is that it allows mitigating the policy restrictions of the compe-
tition authority. Legal uncertainty allows getting closer to the optimal deterrence
level that is contingent on aspects unobservable by the competition authority. Thus,
the competition authority may use legal uncertainty as a screening device. A certain
business practice can be pro- or anticompetitive depending on the circumstances
and the competition authority cannot perfectly distinguish between them. In this
case, uncertainty about the threshold of legality deters firms with few gains from the
1With legal uncertainty, I refer here to circumstances where it is not clear whether a certain
business practice is legal. This is similar to the notion of D’Amato (1983).
2See for instance Calfee and Craswell (1984); Craswell and Calfee (1986), Schinkel and Tuinstra
(2006) or Katsoulacos and Ulph (2012).
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business practices that are close to the threshold. Yet, firms with large gains still
pursue the new business practices, even if they are near the legal threshold. This
allows screening firms according to some unobservable characteristics and increases
social welfare, as the inherent legal uncertainty makes the rules more selective. If
a consumer welfare standard is pursued, the result still holds, as legal uncertainty
increases the probability of a conviction and thus reduces the enforcement costs of
the competition authority.
There are different reasons for this kind of legal uncertainty. According to Calfee
and Craswell (1984, p. 968) ‘it is difficult to predict . . . how an antitrust court will
distinguish between ‘predatory’ and ‘competitive’ price cuts.’ Alternative reasons
are the existence of different procedures, measurement errors by the competition
authority, different assessments of efficiency defenses or uncertainty about what kind
of evidence will be allowed. Consider two examples. First, in the European Union
vertical restraints, like resale price maintenance or exclusive dealings, are prohibited
under Article 101 (TFEU), formerly Article 81 (EC).3 There is a Block Exemption,
however, so that this rule does not apply if the market shares of the involved parties
are below 30%. Although the European Commission gives guidelines how the relevant
market shares are to be determined, it is extremely difficult to predict correctly the
market share determined by the competition authorities. The causes are discrepancies
in the definition of the relevant market, information asymmetries or imprecision in
the measurement of sales, and other factors. This creates the kind of uncertainty
analyzed in the model.
The second example is the case of Microsoft tying its operating system with
additional software, in particular, a web browser and a media player.4 In both
instances the European Commission found an abuse of a dominant market position
under Article 102 (TFEU), formerly Article 82 (EC). Think of a scale beginning with
products where the bundling with the operating system is socially beneficial, as the
integration allows for new features or higher performance and independent competing
products are non-existent. On the other end of the scale are products where the
bundling yields few or no efficiency gains, but competition is harmed considerably.
3See European Commission (2010a) for details.
4These are the cases COMP/39.530 and T-201/04 Microsoft vs. Commission. The commission
summarizes its findings in the former case in European Commission (2010b).
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While there is legal certainty on both ends of the scale, in the middle there is a region
where it is very difficult to exclude legal uncertainty completely. According to the
model in this chapter this legal uncertainty might actually be socially beneficial.5
In an extension of the model I analyze uncertainty about the size of the fine that
is imposed on firms in case of a conviction. After a conviction by the competition
authority, firms might turn to the courts to change the fine. If the competition
authority is more concerned about enforcement costs than its income from fines, this
additional uncertainty is beneficial, as long as there is no change in the expected
value of the fines. Legal uncertainty about the fine makes enforcement easier for the
competition authority.
A caveat applies here. Although this model points out positive effects of legal
uncertainty, too much legal uncertainty actually decreases social welfare. Furthermore,
there may be negative effects of legal uncertainty that are not captured in our analysis.6
Consequently, legal uncertainty is no panacea. The policymakers, however, might
positively influence the effects of legal uncertainty and the direction of the deterrence
effects towards anticompetitive behavior by complementing a rule of reason with
per-se exceptions, like safe harbors, or detailed information with respect to some
aspects of the procedure.7
The effects of legal uncertainty discussed in this chapter might also influence
the trade-off between per-se rules and rules of reason. With per-se rules, some
clearly specified practices, like, e.g., certain rebates or resale price maintenance, are
prohibited. A rule of reason, on the other hand, judges the use of a practice as illegal
whenever the practice is used in an anticompetitive way. Thus, the test of legality
is whether competition was promoted or hindered.8 Therefore a business practice
may be legal in some cases, but not in others, depending on its consequences. Hence,
rules of reason typically imply a certain degree of legal uncertainty. Recently, there
5Although both examples are from Europe, the results of this chapter are also valid for U.S.
competition law. Yet in the United States courts have frequently interpreted legal uncertainty in
favor of the investigated party, thereby reducing overall deterrence.
6For instance, legal uncertainty may reduce the possibility to control the competition authority, as
it becomes more difficult to detect incompetent or corrupt behavior. In addition, legal uncertainty
might result in socially wasteful expenses in safeguards and evidence production.
7Ahlborn et al. (2004) and Christiansen and Kerber (2006) propose such modified or structured
rules of reason.
8Kaplow and Shapiro (2007, p. 54ff) provide a good discussion of rules of reason in antitrust.
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has been a major shift away from per-se rules — exemplified by the case Leegin
vs. PSKS, as the court’s decision allowed resale price maintenance if it does not
impede competition.9 Also the competition authorities in the European Union aim to
pursue a more economic approach. This approach focuses more on the market effects
of the business practice under consideration. An example is the discussion of the
European Commission about the enforcement of Article 102 (TFEU), formerly Article
82 (EC).10 Previous literature has argued that rules of reason allow differentiating the
competition law in a more selective way at the price of some inherent legal uncertainty,
because firms sometimes do not know whether their conduct is legal. Katsoulacos
and Ulph (2012, p. 3) summarize this issue as follows: ‘legal uncertainty induced
by effects-based procedures [i.e., rules of reason] should lead the CA [competition
authority] to favor per-se procedures.’ This chapter shows that the conclusion depends
very much on the amount of legal uncertainty. If it is sufficiently small, it could even
improve the balance in favor of rules of reason.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the relevant
literature. Section 2.3 sets up the model with the competition authority choosing a
policy that determines which actions will be punished if the competition authority
detects a firm implementing them. The competition authority can observe only one
of two dimensions of the action, and thus cannot distinguish pro- and anticompetitive
actions perfectly. Section 2.4 provides the analysis why legal uncertainty may be
beneficial. The reason is a screening effect, as legal uncertainty allows influencing
firms’ behavior depending on unobservable aspects of their type. Section 2.5 discusses
an extension of the model, allowing firms to turn to the courts to repeal the decision
of the competition authority. Finally, Section 2.6 contains the concluding remarks.
2.2 Related Literature
Legal uncertainty inherent in legal rules is closely related to the trade-off between
rules of reason and per-se rules that has been studied before. Ehrlich and Posner
9Supreme Court of U.S. ‘Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. vs. PSKS, Inc.’ Decision No. 06-480,
June 28th, 2007.
10Cf. European Commission (2009), Kroes (2006), European Commission (2005) or Gual et al.
(2005).
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(1974) discuss the advantages and disadvantages of having per-se rules replaced by
rules of reason, as these could better distinguish beneficial from harmful actions, but
provide less guidance for the concerned parties. Yet, they do not analyze the overall
effects on welfare. Kaplow (1995) assumes mutual ignorance about the nature of the
considered action, because firms do not know the exact rules and the competition
authority does not know the specific circumstances of the firm. Therefore both parties
have to invest if they want to get the information. Thus, Kaplow (1995) models the
trade-off between compliance costs and selectivity of rules. He shows that compliance
costs are often low, even for quite complex rules. There is no legal uncertainty,
however, if a firm decides to invest in order to learn the rules.
Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009) model the trade-off between different procedures in
competition law. They characterize the conditions, when the distinction of pro- and
anticompetitive procedures by rules of reason is welfare-enhancing compared to per-se
rules. In many circumstances rules of reason are welfare superior. The extension of
Katsoulacos and Ulph (2012) scrutinizes, in particular, the arising legal uncertainty
by introducing a second dimension of uncertainty about the nature of the considered
business practice similarly to my model. They find that the selectivity of a rule of
reason often outweighs the losses due to the arising legal uncertainty. I concentrate
on legal uncertainty and do not consider the comparison between per-se rules and
rules of reason. My model allows varying continuously the legal uncertainty inherent
in legal rules. I show that the uncertainty itself might increase social welfare if the
amount of uncertainty is sufficiently small.
Calfee and Craswell (1984) discuss the kind of legal uncertainty I consider here
and Craswell and Calfee (1986) formalize it. In their model, however, there is no
information asymmetry about the nature of the considered action. Therefore, the
legal uncertainty only hinders the implementation of the optimal legal threshold
and either causes too much or too little deterrence. I show that legal uncertainty is
beneficial and has positive effects on welfare.
The beneficial effects of legal uncertainty have appeared in different contexts.
Strausz (2011) points out that regulatory risk might be advantageous and studies
the necessary market structures. Choné and Linnemer (2008) study the effect of
uncertain efficiency gains on merger control. They characterize the market structure
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and demand elasticities that make such uncertainty beneficial. Furthermore, the
deterrence effect of uncertainty is already used in tax enforcement. According to
Reinganum and Wilde (1988, p. 794), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the U.S.
confirms that ‘one of the tools in the arsenal of the IRS which promotes voluntary
compliance is the uncertainty in the minds of the taxpayers.’ There are additional
aspects to consider, however, as individuals as well as firms are affected.11
Finally, there is a literature on costly state verification. Besanko and Spulber
(1989) use such a model to analyze optimal enforcement of antitrust laws, but do
not touch on the issue of legal uncertainty. The problem of costly state verification
(Townsend, 1979) considered here is not limited to competition law, but also appears
in different settings, like regulation (Baron and Besanko, 1984), financing (Gale and
Hellwig, 1985), or accounting (Border and Sobel, 1987).
2.3 The Firms Facing the Competition Authority
In the model there is a competition authority facing a continuum of firms with mass
one.12 Its objective is to maximize total welfare, i.e., the sum of consumer surplus and
firms’ profits, weighting the firms’ profits by α with 0 ≤ α < 1.13 The competition
authority sets competition policy by choosing two enforcement parameters xˆ and p.
xˆ ∈ [0, 1] captures the threshold of legality. In the first example of vertical restraints
this is a specific market structure, e.g. a market share of 30%. p is the fraction of
firms audited. Every firm has the binary choice whether to implement a specific,
new business practice, like, e.g., bundling, retail price maintenance or rebates, or to
abstain from it. Depending on its choice, I refer to a firm as active or deterred.
The nature of the available action depends on the firm’s type (x, b) that is two-
dimensional as in Katsoulacos and Ulph (2012). The firm knows its type (x, b) in
both dimensions. The first dimension x captures the aspects that the competition
authority can observe with its auditing technology at a cost c per audit. Returning to
11For a discussion, see Cronshaw and Alm (1995), Snow and Warren (2005), Osofsky (2011),
and Gergen (2011). In a different realm, Teitelbaum (2007) discusses the effects of ambiguity on
individuals in tort law, while Harel and Segal (1999) consider criminal law.
12This is equivalent to a single firm. Both interpretations are valid.
13Besanko and Spulber (1993) and Neven and Roller (2005) study the relative merits of different
welfare standards.
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my examples from the introduction, this refers to the market structure, for example,
market shares in the case of vertical restraints. In the case of Microsoft x denotes
the kind of software added to the operation system and whether the integration is
socially beneficial or harmful. The value x of the firm’s type is drawn from a uniform
distribution G on the interval [0, 1].14 The value b is unobservable by the competition
authority. As b influences the decision of the firm, I will call b the private benefits
of the company, which are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, b¯] with
b¯ > 0.15
Social welfare remains unchanged if the firm continues its previous market behavior.
If a firm of type (x, b) adopts the new business practice, it generates negative
externalities of h(x) given by the function h(·) and private benefits of b.16 Thus,
weighted welfare changes by αb − h(x). The first dimension of the firm’s type x is
ordered in such a way that a higher x signifies higher social harm, i.e., h′(x) > 0.
Yet, for some types implementing the business practice is socially beneficial and for
some it is socially harmful, such that h(0) < 0 and h(1) > 0 to make the problem
interesting. Thus, the practice can be pro- or anticompetitive depending on the firm’s
type. There are many examples for business practices that can have pro- as well as
anticompetitive effects. Price reductions, e.g., might reflect lower costs or an attempt
at predatory pricing. The same holds for bidding patterns in procurement contests
or standardization efforts, which might have beneficial effects or be part of some
collusive agreement in order to harm other market participants. In the case of vertical
restraints, a simplification would be to consider only the market shares. If these are
very low, the restraints do not harm other market participants, h(0) < 0. The vertical
restraints, however, could be socially very harmful, h(1) > 0, if the firms involved
dominate their respective markets. In the case of Microsoft, h(1) > 0 corresponds to
implementing a web browser in order to acquire a dominant position in the browser
market by abusing its dominance in the market for operating systems. h(0) < 0, on
14This assumption is only a small restriction, as I could redefine the units of x to match any
distribution that admits a density and has connected support.
15The model is robust to the introduction of some correlation between b and x. As long as the
correlation with x is not too strong, the mechanism in this model works. With perfect correlation
the competition authority could infer the value of b from the x value and therefore does not need
legal uncertainty as a screening device.
16The externality function h(x) should be differentiable on the whole domain, i.e., |h′(x)| <∞.
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Figure 2.1: Active Firms in the First-best Policy
the other hand, corresponds to integrating new and socially beneficial features, like a
basic firewall, touchscreen support or improved USB drivers.
As a benchmark consider the first-best policy, where the firm’s type is observable and
verifiable. In this case a firm of type (x, b) should be active, whenever αb− h(x) ≥ 0.
Then only the firms depicted in Figure 2.1 are active and implement the new business
practice. In the model the competition authority cannot perfectly observe and verify
the firms’ type. In particular, the competition authority might prohibit the business
practice for some firms depending on the observable aspects, i.e., the first dimension,
of their type. Due to the monotonicity of h(x), it is optimal for the competition
authority to forbid all actions above a threshold, i.e. x ≥ xˆ. Therefore restricting
competition policy to setting a threshold of legality xˆ is without loss of generality. If
the competition authority finds the firm to have x below xˆ, its actions may well be
socially efficient and therefore the competition authority allows the firm to continue.
Above xˆ, however, actions are judged as anticompetitive and are prohibited. If the
competition authority detects a firm violating this policy, it can make the firm pay a
fine f > b¯. Yet for this purpose, the competition authority has to invest resources to
produce evidence. The competition authority can make the observed x verifiable at
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• At t = 0, the competition authority announces the threshold xˆ and commits to
an auditing probability p.
• At t = 1, the firm’s type (x, b) is realized and revealed to the firm.
• At t = 2, the firm chooses whether to adopt the new business practice.
• At t = 3, the firm has to pay the fine f if anticompetitive behavior was detected
and the competition authority pursues its claim at costs κ.
?
Figure 2.2: Timing of the Model
costs κ with κ < (1− α)f .17 The costs κ capture experts’ testimonies, reports and
other expenses to prove the competition authority’s case. Figure 2.2 summarizes the
timing of the model.
Legal uncertainty makes the auditing technology of the competition authority
imperfect. By an audit, the competition authority does not learn the first dimension x
of the type exactly, but receives only a noisy signal xM = x + δ with δ uniformly
distributed on [−∆,∆] with a small ∆. In the case of vertical restraints this captures
the difficulty in determining, whether the market share is 29.8% or 30.1%. With
Microsoft the uncertainty might arise for products, like anti-virus software, where tying
might offer great benefits, but also has the potential to harm other market participants
considerably. This uncertainty about the legal threshold or this measurement error
is implied by the structure of the legal rules and is exogenous to the competition
authority.18 Therefore the case without legal uncertainty, i.e., ∆ = 0, serves only
as a benchmark. Proposition 2.1 will show that legal uncertainty increases welfare
compared to a rule of reason without legal uncertainty.
17The fine f is exogenous. Yet, making the fine endogenous does not change the model. The results
in this chapter just require a jump in the fine at xˆ which is optimal, even if the fine is completely
endogenous. Appendix 2.A discusses this case. For a discussion of the setting of fines in Europe see
European Commission (2006) and Wils (2007).
18Even in very formalistic approaches such uncertainty can arise. An example is the case of
Michelin II. The European Commission fined Michelin for using pure quantity rebates, although
most scholars at that time believed these to be legal. The details can be found in European
Commission ’Manufacture Française des pneumatiques Michelin vs. Commission’ Decision 2002/405,
June 20th, 2001. See Motta (2006) for a discussion.
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To sum up, the expected change in weighted welfare is
w(x, b) =

−cp if the firm (x, b) is deterred
αb− h(x)− cp if the active firm (x, b) is not fined
αb− h(x) + (1− α)pf − (c+ κ)p if the active firm (x, b) is fined.
On the other hand, the expected profits of the firm are
pi(x, b) =

0 if the firm (x, b) is deterred
b if the firm (x, b) is active and not fined
b− pf if the firm (x, b) is active and fined.
Thus, the firm’s type is two-dimensional. Yet the competition authority can only
observe a costly and imprecise signal about one dimension of the firms’ types. Given
its policy constraints, it cannot enforce the first-best policy. To make the problem
interesting, I assume that on average the new behavior is harmful
α
b¯
2 <
∫ 1
0
h(x)dG(x). (2.1)
Therefore a social planner restricted to a binary rule, i.e., xˆ = 0 or 1, would prohibit
all the business practices in the class considered here. This assumption is not crucial
for the results, but allows avoiding a corner solution with the competition authority
approving all actions. Furthermore, I assume that the costs of auditing are not
excessively high, so that auditing is worthwhile. That is
c <
f
b¯
max
xˆ
∫ xˆ
0
α
b¯
2 − h(x)dG(x). (2.2)
To guarantee an interior solution of the competition authority’s optimization, another,
more technical assumption is required
∫ x′+∆
x′−∆
2f 2(1− x′ − 13∆)h
′(x)− fh(x)− b¯((1− α)f − κ)dx > 0, (2.3)
for all x′ ∈ [∆, 1 −∆], which is equivalent to the slope of the externality function
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being sufficiently high, such that the policy of the competition authority matters.
The next section shows that legal uncertainty allows mitigating the limitations of
policy enforcement.
2.4 The Effects of Legal Uncertainty
First, we consider the decision process of the firm. The firm faces the fine f if it is
caught by the competition authority implementing the controversial business practice
and xM ≥ xˆ. Therefore the firm will only take action if its private benefits b are
high enough. Thus, there is a cut-off level bˆ(x), such that only firms above bˆ(x) will
become active. The cut-off for the private benefit bˆ(x) will vary with x. If the firm’s
type is low, x < xˆ −∆, the firm will always implement the new business practice,
as long as the private benefits are positive. Beginning at x = xˆ −∆, bˆ(x) will be
increasing in x. Consequently, the cut-off level will be
bˆ(x) =

pf if x > xˆ+ ∆
x−xˆ+∆
2∆ pf if xˆ−∆ ≤ x ≤ xˆ+ ∆
0 if x < xˆ−∆.
(2.4)
Therefore legal uncertainty created by the imprecise measurement allows some screen-
ing of firms. If they are close to the policy threshold xˆ, firms with low private benefits
will abstain from taking action for lower values of x than firms with a high value
of private benefits. If the rule of reason would provide complete legal certainty, the
measure of the competition authority would be perfect, i.e., ∆ = 0, and the policy
threshold would be sharp. Then below xˆ, all firms will take action. Above xˆ, only
those with a private value above the cut-off bˆ(x) = pf will implement the new business
practice. Figure 2.3 depicts this situation. It is easy to recognize that the right-hand
side is closer to the optimal schedule of Figure 2.1 than the left-hand side, as there is
no discontinuous jump at the threshold xˆ. Consequently, a rule of reason with some
inherent legal uncertainty about the policy threshold is beneficial, as this makes the
behavior of the firm more gradual around the threshold. Before the next proposition
formalizes this argument, we turn to the competition authority. The competition
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Figure 2.3: Changes in Active Firms due to Legal Uncertainty
authority chooses the threshold xˆ and the auditing probability p to maximize total
welfare W (xˆ, p) which is given by
∫ xˆ−∆
0
α
b¯
2 − h(x)dG(x)+
+
∫ xˆ+∆
xˆ−∆
b¯− bˆ(x)
b¯
αb¯+ bˆ(x)2 − h(x) + x− xˆ+ ∆2∆ (f(1− α)− κ)p
 dG(x)+
+
∫ 1
xˆ+∆
b¯− pf
b¯
(
α
b¯+ pf
2 − h(x) + (f(1− α)− κ)p
)
dG(x)− cp. (2.5)
The first term in equation (2.5) captures the region where the competition authority
judges all business practices as procompetitive. In the intermediate region, there
is legal uncertainty which decreases the probability of a firm implementing the
new business practices while increasing its expected benefits. The second integral
represents this behavior. Finally, in the anticompetitive region, activity is limited
to the firms with the highest benefits. The intuition is that the active firms, under
the policy implemented by the competition authority, match more closely the active
firms in the first-best policy, because firms’ behavior allows some inference about the
second dimension. Payments of the fine enter the considerations of the competition
authority if the weight of firms’ profit α in the objective function of the competition
authority is smaller than one. As legal uncertainty increases the probability of a
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conviction, this effect can make legal uncertainty attractive if the weight α is very
low.19 Proposition 2.1 summarizes these arguments.
Proposition 2.1. Legal uncertainty with ∆ > 0, i.e., uncertainty about the legal
threshold à la Craswell and Calfee (1986), increases social welfare compared to a
regime with ∆ = 0 and legal certainty if the uncertainty is not too large.
Proof: Taking the derivative with respect to ∆ results by the envelop theorem in
∂W (xˆ, p)
∂∆ = −α
b¯
2 + h(xˆ−∆) + αb¯− α
(pf)2
3b¯
− h(xˆ+ ∆) b¯− pf
b¯
+
+ b¯− pf
b¯
h(xˆ+ ∆)− h(xˆ−∆)−
∫ ∆
−∆
h(xˆ+ x) x2∆2
pf
b¯
dx− αb¯
2 − (pf)2
2b¯
+
+ (f(1− α)− κ)p
2f
3b¯
.
Rearranging gives
α
b¯
2 + (f(1− α)− κ)p
pf
3b¯
− α(pf)
2
3b¯
−
∫ ∆
−∆
h(xˆ+ x) x2∆2
pf
b¯
dx− αb¯
2 − (pf)2
2b¯
=
= α(pf)
2
6b¯
+ ((1− α)f − κ)fp
2
3b¯
− pf
2∆2b¯
∫ ∆
−∆
h(xˆ+ x)xdx.
In order to approximate the integral, a second-order Taylor extension around x = 0
is used for h(xˆ+ x)x. Accordingly, the term h(xˆ+ x)x equals
h(xˆ+ x)x = h(xˆ)0 + x(h′(xˆ)0 + h(xˆ)) + x2h′(xˆ+ ) = xh(xˆ) + x2h′(xˆ+ ) (2.6)
with  ∈ (0, x). We define h′max = max
∈[−∆,∆]
h′(xˆ+ ) > 0 to derive an upper bound in
the next step. Consequently, the integral is bounded by
∫ ∆
−∆
h(xˆ+ x)xdx ≤
∫ ∆
−∆
xh(xˆ) + x2h′maxdx =
2
3∆
3h′max. (2.7)
Therefore we get a lower bound for the derivative.
19A lump-sum payment of all active or all firms, in general, cannot replicate this effect. Revenues
might be equivalent but ex-ante incentives for firms to implement the business practice change.
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∂W (xˆ, p)
∂∆ ≥
pf
3b¯
(
p((1− α2 )f − κ)−∆h
′
max
)
(2.8)
Under a per-se rule or with a perfect auditing technology, there would be no mea-
surement error and ∆ = 0. Yet having some legal uncertainty and some imprecision
in the measurement increases social welfare as the derivative is positive for small ∆.
∆ < (2− α)f − 2κ2h′max
p⇒ ∂W (xˆ, p)
∂∆ > 0. (2.9)
Notice that the assumption κ < (1− α)f ensures that (2− α)f − 2κ is positive and
the condition is feasible.20 This concludes the proof and shows how legal uncertainty
might increase social welfare.
The next step considers the effects of legal uncertainty on the policy threshold xˆ.
Suppose there is some legal uncertainty ∆ about the threshold of legality inherent
in the legal rules. This allows a lower policy threshold without hurting too many
procompetitive business practices if the externality function is convex.
Proposition 2.2. If the externality function, h(x), is convex, legal uncertainty
decreases the policy threshold xˆ. With a concave externality function legal uncertainty
raises the policy threshold.
Proof: For social welfare as stated in (2.5), the first derivative with respect to the
policy threshold xˆ equals
∂W (xˆ, p)
∂xˆ
= α b¯2 − h(xˆ−∆)− h(xˆ+ ∆)
b¯− pf
b¯
+ h(xˆ−∆)−
∫ xˆ+∆
xˆ−∆
h(x) pf
2∆b¯
dx−
− αb¯
2 − (pf)2
2b¯
− ((1− α)f − κ)pb¯− pf
b¯
+ b¯− pf
b¯
h(xˆ+ ∆). (2.11)
Rearranging the terms delivers
∂W (xˆ, p)
∂xˆ
= α(pf)
2
2b¯
− p((1− α)f − κ) b¯− pf
b¯
− pf
2∆b¯
∫ xˆ+∆
xˆ−∆
h(x)dx. (2.12)
20Finally, consider the second derivative ∂
2W (xˆ,p)
∂∆2 =
pf
∆3b¯
∫ ∆
−∆
h(xˆ+ x)xdx− pf
2∆b¯
(h(xˆ+ ∆)− h(xˆ−∆)) ≤ pf
∆b¯
∫ ∆
−∆
1
3h
′
max −
1
2h
′(xˆ+ x)dx. (2.10)
It is negative if, e.g., h(x) is linear. Then the benefits of legal uncertainty decrease in its size.
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Then the first-order condition corresponds to
αpf∆− 2(1− α)f − κ
f
∆(b¯− pf) =
∫ xˆ+∆
xˆ−∆
h(x)dx, (2.13)
if an interior solution exists.21 As, the externality function h is increasing, there is
a unique solution to (2.13). Due to assumption (2.1) and the increasing externality
function, equation (2.13) shows that there is consequently never a corner solution at
the right end and xˆ < 1 −∆. Yet there might be a corner solution at the left end
with xˆ = 0 if the business practice under consideration is very harmful. In this case
the competition authority uses a per-se prohibition. Using Taylor’s theorem there is
a function  : [−∆,∆] 7→ (xˆ−∆, xˆ+ ∆), such that the integral equals
∫ xˆ+∆
xˆ−∆
h(x)dx=
∫ ∆
−∆
h(xˆ) + h′(xˆ)x+ 12h
′′((x))x2dx= 2∆h(xˆ) + 12
∫ ∆
−∆
h′′((x))x2dx.
The sign of the last term corresponds to the sign of the second derivative of the exter-
nality function. Consequently, the curvature of the externality function determines
the effect of legal uncertainty and for the policy threshold xˆ it holds that
h(xˆ) = 12αpf −
(1− α)f − κ
f
(b¯− pf)− 14∆
∫ ∆
−∆
h′′((x))x2dx. (2.14)
On the other hand, the condition for the policy threshold is
h(xˆ) = 12αpf −
(1− α)f − κ
f
(b¯− pf), (2.15)
if there is no legal uncertainty, ∆ = 0, and the measurement is sharp. The same
policy threshold results if the externality function h is linear. Making the externality
function concave increases the policy threshold xˆ above (2.15). On the contrary, a
convex externality function results in a lower threshold.
Depending on the curvature of the externality function, the policy threshold xˆ is
changed by legal uncertainty in the legal rule. If the externality function is convex,
there is a low threshold of legality prohibiting more actions than in the case with
an exact measurement and legal certainty about the policy threshold. Thus, the
21Appendix 2.D shows that the conditions of a maximum are satisfied.
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competition authority adapts its policy to the uncertainty. Finally, I scrutinize the
optimal auditing probability and show that there will always be some auditing. In
contrast to the common costly state verification models, even deterministic auditing
is optimal if auditing costs are small. Lemma 2.1 in Appendix 2.C determines the
optimal auditing level for interior solutions.
Proposition 2.3. Auditing occurs with positive probability. Moreover, complete
auditing is optimal if the auditing costs are sufficiently low, c < 13∆((1− 5α)f − κ).
Proof: To show that it is never optimal to have no auditing, I compare social welfare
with complete deterrence to welfare without auditing. Without any auditing, social
welfare is independent of the policy threshold xˆ
α
b¯
2 +
∫ 1
0
h(x)dx < 0, (2.16)
which is negative by assumption (2.1). With complete deterrence, p ≥ b¯
f
, the policy
threshold xˆ matters and social welfare W (xˆ, p) equals
xˆ−∆∫
0
αb¯
2 − h(x)dx+ ∆
2αb¯2
3pf −
∆(2 b¯
pf
−1)∫
−∆
∆− x
2∆ h(xˆ+ x)dx+ ((1− α)f − κ)
∆p
3 − cp.
By assumption (2.2) the last expression is positive for the optimal xˆ and ∆ = 0.
Therefore social welfare is lower without auditing, W (xˆ, 0) < W (xˆ, b¯
f
)|∆=0. Increas-
ing ∆ raises social welfare by Proposition 2.1. Consequently, having a small ∆ > 0
increases the objective function of the competition authority further. Therefore social
welfare is higher with auditing, W (xˆ, 0) < W (xˆ, b¯
f
), and it is never optimal to abstain
from auditing, p = 0.
On the other hand, it is sometimes optimal to implement complete auditing,
p = 1. Increasing the value of the externality function in the interval [1 − ∆, 1]
increases the optimal p according to Lemma 2.1. Therefore using complete deterrence,
p ≥ b¯
f
, is optimal if some actions with positive mass are very harmful. This does
not imply complete auditing. Yet if, in addition, the auditing costs are small,
c < 13∆((1− 5α)f − κ), the competition authority prefers to audit every firm.22 The
22This result is derived in Lemma 2.2 in Appendix 2.C.
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reason is that complete deterrence just holds for firms in the illegal region, x > xˆ+ ∆,
in contrast to firms close to the threshold of legality, xˆ−∆ ≤ x ≤ xˆ+ ∆(2 b¯
pf
− 1),
that are still active, although they might face a fine. This extreme case, however, is
impossible if legal uncertainty is sufficiently small. In that case decreasing p from
p = 1 slightly allows the competition authority to save on auditing costs, while at
the same time the deterrence effect does not change for x /∈ (xˆ−∆, xˆ+ ∆), because
f > b¯.
This completes the analysis of the model.
2.5 Extensions - Ambiguity and the Courts
So far I abstracted from the interaction between the judicial system and the
competition authority. In the following I want to model it more explicitly. Thus, a
convicted firm might turn to the courts. If the courts decide in favor of the firm and
repeal the assessment of the competition authority, the fine is reassessed.23 Therefore
there is an additional stage, t = 5, at which the courts can overturn the decision of
the competition authority and change the fine f to fL or fH with fL < f ≤ fH . It
seems plausible that there are no objective probabilities available of the courts setting
the fine because of few precedents and inconsistent decisions. This creates ambiguity,
as it is unclear how severely the courts assess the infringement of the firm.24 The firm
exhibits ambiguity aversion à la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Therefore it has a set
of priors Π and maximizes its expected utility under the worst possible distribution.
The preferences of the firm are represented by
g 7→ min
pi∈Π
∫
u ◦ gdpi. (2.17)
Due to the risk neutrality of the firm, the von-Neumann Morgenstern utility index u
is linear. I assume that the subjective probability of a high fine fH can take one
of the following values {q1, . . . , qn}. An ambiguity-neutral agent is not concerned
23In Lagerlöf and Heidhues (2005), firms can produce efficiency defenses to influence the decision of
the competition authority.
24The notion of ambiguity is introduced in Appendix 2.B which also discusses the assumption of
ambiguity-averse firms.
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by this ambiguity and behaves as if she anticipates the high fine with a subjective
probability qN , such that
min
1≤i≤n
qi < qN < max1≤i≤n qi.
I write E(f) = qNfH + (1− qN )fL for the fine expected by an ambiguity-neutral agent.
This completes the model set-up. Now turn to the analysis. Ambiguity-averse firms
will turn to the courts whenever maxi(qifH + (1− qi)fL) = fA < f . Assume this is
the case. Then the cut-off level for firms to be active is
bˆ(x) =

pˆfA if x > xˆ+ ∆
x−xˆ+∆
2∆ pf
A if xˆ−∆ ≤ x ≤ xˆ+ ∆
0 if x < xˆ−∆.
(2.18)
The competition authority takes this modified cut-off level into account when setting
its policy. The next proposition shows that the additional uncertainty surrounding
the judicial decision has positive welfare effects, because the ambiguity about the fine
makes the firm implement less anticompetitive business practices than in the absence
of ambiguity.
Proposition 2.4. Having ambiguous procedures increases social welfare compared to
a regime without ambiguity, if auditing costs are higher than the expected income due
to fines collected by the competition authority
c > ((1− α)E(f)− κ)1
b¯
(13pf
A∆ + (1− xˆ)(b¯− pfA)).
Proof: The competition authority can implement any policy xˆ, p with a strictly
lower probability of auditing than in the absence of ambiguity. As it is easier to
enforce compliance, the competition authority can save on auditing costs to the
extent of cp(1−E(f)/fA). The reason is that, at a given probability of auditing, an
ambiguity-averse firm will have a higher cut-off value bˆ(x) than an ambiguity-neutral
firm in the region with intervention of the competition authority x > xˆ−∆. This is
caused by overvaluing the fine. Notice that the ambiguity aversion does not change
the beliefs, but the firms only act as if the probability for a high fine fH were higher.
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Yet at the same time the fine income of the competition authority decreases by
(1− α)E(f)− κ
b¯
(
∆
3 pf
A + (1− xˆ)(b¯− pfA)
)
p
(
1− E(f)
fA
)
(2.19)
In total, the effect is positive if the change in income of fines imposed by the
competition authority is smaller than the marginal auditing costs
(1− α)E(f)− κ
b¯
(
∆
3 pf
A + (1− xˆ)(b¯− pfA)
)
< c.
Social welfare is not affected by ambiguity premia. The reason is the following. The
fraction of active firms and their utilities remains unchanged by the ambiguity if the
competition authority reduces it auditing correspondingly. In addition, ambiguity
does not affect the utility of deterred firms. This gives a lower bound for the welfare
gains due to ambiguity, because the competition authority can reoptimize its policies.
Therefore ambiguous procedures increase social welfare compared to a regime without
ambiguity.
To understand this result, notice that the ambiguity has no negative effects on firms’
behavior, because the competition authority can always balance the ambiguity by
reducing the auditing probability and the firms can avoid the ambiguity.25 Moreover
the ambiguity only affects firms violating the rules of competition law. If the firm is
in the procompetitive region, x ≤ xˆ−∆, it does not care about the ambiguity in the
fine. If it is in the prohibited region, it has always the possibility to abstain from the
controversial business practice and avoid the ambiguity.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter sets up a costly state verification model to scrutinize the effects
of legal uncertainty in competition law. A rule of reason approach is often more
selective than a per-se rule and is hence welfare-enhancing. Yet the inherent legal
uncertainty of the rule of reason might be a drawback. This chapter points out why
legal uncertainty itself might further raise social welfare.
25The first part of the argument requires homogeneous attitudes towards ambiguity of the firms.
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The uncertainty about the threshold of legality might be due to imprecision in
the measurement of the competition authority, missing precedents or unclear rules.
The model considered here shows that this uncertainty may be welfare-enhancing as
the deterrence becomes more selective without having more selective rules. Firms
self-select according to the nature of the business practice under consideration. This
is beneficial, as firms have better knowledge and information to assess the nature of
the business practice than the competition authority.
Yet there are limitations to the benefits of legal uncertainty. If there is too much
legal uncertainty, this will decrease social welfare, because it will deter procompetitive
business practices and encourage anticompetitive ones. In a dynamic framework
additional effects may appear. Legal uncertainty might give firms incentives to
experiment and therefore implement more anticompetitive business practices than
under legal certainty. On the other hand, the costs of such behavior, e.g., possible fines,
are incurred by a single firm, while the benefits spill over to all market participants,
as they learn the court decision reducing legal uncertainty. Therefore competition
might decrease the experimentation.
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2.A Endogenous Fines
Assume the fine f is endogenous and a function of the observed dimension of the
type x. Then the competition policy consists of the auditing probability and the
fine, as the threshold of legality is implicitly defined by the schedule of the fine. To
guarantee existence of a solution, there has to be an upper bound f¯ for the fines.26
Otherwise fines would be raised to infinity to save on auditing costs. For a discussion
of this effect, see, e.g., Kaplow and Shavell (1994, p. 586) and Polinsky and Shavell
(1979). The upper bound corresponds to wealth constraints of the firm or legal
considerations. If f¯ is sufficiently high, pointwise optimization yields an optimal fine
of
f(x) =

0 for x < xˆ
κ
(1−α) for x ∈ [xˆ, x1]
(1−α)b¯+h(x)+pκ
(2−α)p for x ∈ (x1, x2)
f¯ for x ≥ x2
with xˆ ≤ x1 ≤ x2 < 1.27 x1 is determined by h(x1) = pκ(1−α) − (1 − α)b¯ and x2 by
h(x2) = (2 − α)pf¯ − (1 − α)b¯ − pκ. Thus, for socially beneficial types, i.e., low x,
the competition authority tolerates active firms by setting the fine to zero. As the
threshold of legality xˆ is passed, a fine of κ/(1− α) is imposed, because lower fines
do not justify spending the costs κ to make x verifiable. Then there is a region
x ∈ (x1, x2) where f is strictly increasing, until it reaches f¯ at x2. Finally, the fine
equals the upper bound, f(x) = f¯ for all x ≥ x2.
2.B Ambiguity and Why It Matters
The ambiguity in Section 2.5 captures the vagueness of procedures in legal rules.
In general, ambiguity denotes uncertainty about probabilities resulting from missing
26The upper bar could correspond to a principle of proportionality. Accordingly, “the severity of
sanctions cannot simply be raised to excessive levels.” (Frese, 2011, p. 426)
27This result holds for the case of a rule of reason without legal uncertainty.
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relevant information. Thus, ambiguity aversion describes a preference for lotteries
where the firm has more confidence in its probability assessment. A classical example
is due to Ellsberg (1961) and considers two urns. In both urns there are red and
black balls. Yet the distribution of the balls is only known in the first urn. The ratio
of red to black balls in the second urn is unknown. Individuals can place bets on
either a red ball or a black ball drawn from one of the urns. Most subjects prefer
to take the bet on balls drawn from the first urn, the familiar one, no matter what
color was specified. Thus, under ambiguity, the exact probabilities are unknown.
Missing precedents might imply this lack of reliable probabilities for a conviction.
Savage (1954) and Schmeidler (1989) have developed two axiomatized approaches
to this problem. The Subjective Expected Utility of Savage requires agents to be
ambiguity-neutral. The representation of Schmeidler (1989) allows agents to have
preferences with respect to ambiguity.28
In order to guarantee that ambiguity is relevant in competition law, firms have to
be ambiguity-averse. Yet in contrast to risk aversion, ambiguity-averse firms seem
more plausible. First, there are empirical observations, like Kunreuther et al. (1995)
or Cabantous (2007), that even professionals in firms behave in an ambiguity-averse
way. Ambiguity makes insurers usually more restrictive, i.e., they request higher
premiums and reject to offer an insurance policy in more cases than in the absence of
ambiguity. Second, even from a theoretical point of view firms may be ambiguity-
averse. Marinacci (1999) shows that ambiguity changes the law of large numbers
and the ambiguity does not vanish when different ambiguous random variables are
combined. Therefore even perfect diversification does not protect an investor from
ambiguity in the underlying assets. Third, joint decision-making on boards or on
committees does not mitigate the effects of ambiguity aversion. On the contrary,
Keller et al. (2007) show that collaboration even amplifies ambiguity aversion. Thus,
joint decision making exhibits a higher degree of ambiguity aversion than the average
member. Consequently, the assumption of ambiguity-averse firms seems plausible.29
28Following Schmeidler (1989) different representations with ambiguity preferences have been
proposed by, e.g. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) or Klibanoff et al. (2005).
29Previous examples of the assumption include, e.g., Mukerji (1998) for incomplete contracting and
Tor and Rinner (2011) for retail price maintenance.
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2.C Additional Proofs
Lemma 2.1 determines the optimal auditing level for interior solutions.
Lemma 2.1. The optimal auditing probability is determined by (2.21).
Proof: For social welfare stated in (2.5) the first derivative with respect to the
auditing probability p equals
∂W (xˆ, p)
∂p
= −α∆2pf
2
3b¯
+ f
∫ ∆
−∆
x+ ∆
2∆b¯
h(xˆ+ x)dx− α(1− xˆ−∆)pf
2
b¯
+
+ f
b¯
∫ 1
xˆ+∆
h(x)dx+ ((1− α)f − κ)(2pf
3b¯
∆ + (1− xˆ) b¯− 2pf
b¯
)− c. (2.20)
Consequently, the first-order condition for an interior solution equals
p =
((1− α)f − κ)(1− xˆ)b¯+ f ∫∆−∆ x+∆2∆ h(xˆ+ x)dx+ f ∫ 1xˆ+∆ h(x)dx− cb¯
f((2− α)f − 2κ)(1− xˆ− 13∆)
. (2.21)
By Proposition 2.3 the optimal p is always positive. Therefore only the corner solution
p = 1 exists for values of equation (2.21) bigger than 1.
The next lemma shows the optimality of complete auditing for small costs.
Lemma 2.2. If the costs of auditing are sufficiently small, c < 13∆((1− 5α)f − κ),
the competition authority implements complete auditing, p = 1.
Proof: Proposition 2.3 shows that with complete deterrence, p ≥ b¯
f
, social welfare
W (xˆ, p) equals
xˆ−∆∫
0
αb¯
2 − h(x)dx+ ∆
2αb¯2
3pf −
∆(2 b¯pf−1)∫
−∆
∆− x
2∆ h(xˆ+ x)dx+ ((1− α)f − κ)
∆p
3 − cp.
The derivative of the social welfare W (xˆ, p) with respect to p is
−∆4αb¯
2
3p2f +
(
1− b¯
pf
)
h
(
xˆ+ ∆
(
2 b¯
pf
− 1
))
4∆ b¯
p2f
+ ((1−α)f − κ)∆3 − c (2.22)
for p ≥ b¯
f
. Rearranging yields
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1
3∆
(
(1− α)f − κ− 4αb¯
2
p2f
)
+
(
1− b¯
pf
)
h
(
xˆ+ ∆
(
2 b¯
pf
− 1
))
4∆ b¯
p2f
− c. (2.23)
4αb¯2
p2f ≤ 4αf for p ≥ b¯f . Therefore the first term is bigger than 13∆((1− 5α)f − κ),
which is positive for small welfare weights α of firms’ profits. Moreover, the second
term in the derivative is positive. This shows that (2.23) and the derivative are
positive if c < 13∆((1− 5α)f − κ).
2.D Second-Order Conditions
Given the two-dimensional optimization, there are three conditions in order to
assure that the chapter characterizes the optimum. First, I compute the second
derivatives. From (2.12) it follows
∂2W (xˆ, p)
∂xˆ2
= − pf
2∆b¯
(h(xˆ+ ∆)− h(xˆ−∆)) < 0, (2.24)
and differentiating (2.20) with respect to p yields
∂2W (xˆ, p)
∂p2
= −1
b¯
(
1− xˆ− 13∆
)
f((2− α)f − 2κ) < 0 (2.25)
for small ∆. Finally, the following steps prove that the discriminant is positive in the
relevant range. Differentiating (2.12) with respect to p results in the cross-derivative
∂2W (xˆ, p)
∂xˆ∂p
= αpf
2
b¯
− ((1− α)f − κ) b¯− 2pf
b¯
− f
2∆b¯
∫ xˆ+∆
xˆ−∆
h(x)dx =
= pf
2
2b¯
α + pf
b¯
((1− α)f − κ) = pf
2b¯
((2− α)f − 2κ). (2.26)
The second equality here follows from the first-order condition (2.13). The determinant
of the Hessian equals
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∂2W (xˆ, bˆ)
∂xˆ2
∂2W (xˆ, bˆ)
∂bˆ2
−
∂2W (xˆ, bˆ)
∂bˆ∂xˆ
2 =
= pf
2∆b¯2
(h(xˆ+ ∆)− h(xˆ−∆))(1− xˆ− 13∆)f((2− α)f − 2κ)−
−
(
pf
2b¯
((2− α)f − 2κ)
)2
=
= pf
2
2b¯2
((2− α)f − 2κ)
( 1
∆(h(xˆ+ ∆)− h(xˆ−∆))(1− xˆ−
1
3∆)−
−p2((2− α)f − 2κ)
)
=
= p
4∆b¯2
((2− α)f − 2κ)
∫ xˆ+∆
xˆ−∆
2f 2(1− xˆ− 13∆)h
′(x)− fh(x)− b¯((1− α)f − κ)dx.
For the simplification in the third line again the first-order condition (2.13) is used.
The assumption κ < (1 − α)f ensures that (2 − α)f − 2κ is positive. Finally, the
determinant is positive if the slope of the externality function h is sufficiently high, as
this lowers xˆ and increases h′. By assumption (2.3) this is satisfied. The assumption
holds, for example, if the harm function h(·) is linear and the slope is sufficiently high.
The reason is that xˆ is decreasing in the slope, while h′(·) is increasing. Therefore
(h(xˆ+ ∆)−h(xˆ−∆))(1− xˆ− 13∆) in the second line increases, while p2((2−α)f − 2κ)
is bounded from above by 12((2− α)f − 2κ).
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Chapter3
Contracting with Subjective Evaluations
and Communication
3.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes a principal-agent model in which the performance measure
of the principal is nonverifiable and unobservable by the agent, but the principal
has the possibility to communicate with the agent. Such subjective or nonverifiable
measures of performance are widely used, as verifiable, i.e., objective, performance
measures are often unavailable.1 Examples for subjective measures of performance are
the evaluations by supervisors, co-workers, and others. Their subjectivity, however,
makes it the principal’s choice whether to disclose and justify her evaluation of the
agent’s work.
In the model, the agent works for the principal who privately receives information
about the agent’s performance, like reports from colleagues, observations of the agent
at work or of the agent’s output. In addition, the principal and the agent receive
some common noise resulting from random encounters or joint observations. These
shared signals, however, are uninformative about the agent’s effort or performance.
1The extensive use of subjective performance measures is confirmed by Dessler (2008, p. 339),
Porter et al. (2008, p. 148), MacLeod and Parent (1999), and Murphy (1993). The reason is
that agents can manipulate objective performance measures or multitask problems. Consequently,
Gibbons (1998, p. 120) concludes that “objective performance measures typically cannot be used to
create ideal incentives.”
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After the principal determines her evaluation of the agent’s work, she has two options.
Either she reports only the result of her evaluation or she justifies her evaluation
by telling the agent also about the information she collected.2 Her message is not
necessarily truthful, and providing a justification is costly. The agent replies with
a cheap-talk message about the shared signals. As the messages are the only third-
party enforceable information, the contract just depends on these messages. The
chapter studies the resulting communication pattern and characterizes the optimal
contract: on the equilibrium path the principal justifies bad evaluations and pays a
fully contingent wage that is increasing in the evaluation. For good evaluations, the
principal in equilibrium saves the hassle of explaining them and simply pays a high
wage. This yields pooling and wage compression at the top.
These results fit well with empirical observations that evaluations are lenient and
wage dispersion for the best evaluations is low.3 Those observations are typically
referred to as leniency bias and centrality bias. This chapter argues that this pattern
can be understood as a feature of the optimal contract instead of biased behavior. In
addition, many studies show that principals evaluating for developmental or feedback
purposes are more likely to differentiate among subordinates than they are when the
evaluation is used for administrative purposes, like merit increases or promotions.4
In the latter case, evaluations are more compressed and show less variation between
employees. The finding goes back to Taylor and Wherry (1951, p. 39) who compare
ratings for different purposes. They find more lenient evaluations for administrative
purposes “with considerably poorer discrimination at the top.” This observation is
in line with the predictions of this chapter. The principal must be given explicit
incentives to report her evaluation truthfully. These incentives cause pooling of the
2Justifications of subjective evaluations are a common HR practice: “92% require a review and
feedback session as part of the appraisal process.” (Dessler, 2008, p. 366)
3According to Bretz et al. (1992), usually 60–70% of all employees get an evaluation from the
best or second-best category. Moreover, “Medoff and Abraham (1980) found in two companies
that, among the 99% of employees in the same position who received the top three performance
ratings, the difference in salary between the highest and lowest rated employees was about 5%.”
(Gibbs, 1991, pp. 4-5) Similarly, Murphy (1993, p. 56) reports that the top 1% of employees at the
pharmaceutical company Merck receive a pay raise just 3% higher than the median employee in
1985.
4This effect is found in Dessler (2008, p. 356), Milkovich et al. (2008, p. 351), a meta-study by
Jawahar and Williams (1997), Jawahar and Stone (1997); Harris et al. (1995); McDaniel et al. (1994),
Milkovich and Wigdor (1991, pp. 3, 72), and Landy and Farr (1980).
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best evaluations. If the evaluation is for developmental or feedback purposes, these
incentives are unnecessary, as the preferences of the principal and the agent are likely
to be better aligned. Managers at Merck, for example, experienced that “the salary
link made discussions on performance improvement difficult.” (Murphy, 1993, p. 58)
Psychological costs of supervisors to give bad evaluations to their subordinates yield
no straightforward explanation of this pattern, since those costs apply to evaluations
for all purposes similarly.
The intuition for the compression at the top is the following. First, it is never
optimal to justify all evaluations, because communication is costly. Second, if the
principal provides no feedback, the agent cannot verify the evaluation. Then the
principal has an incentive to choose the evaluation yielding the lowest wage payment.
Hence, no wage dispersion is feasible. Additionally, abstaining from feedback should
not allow the principal to save on wage and communication costs. Thus, the principal’s
payments have to be higher than in the case following a justification. Together with
the first step, this yields pooling of the highest wages. Finally, the monotone likelihood
ratio property of the subjective performance measure ensures that, with regard to
communication, a threshold strategy is optimal. Such a strategy is the most efficient
way to give the agent incentives to implement a certain level of effort. For bad
performance, the principal has to bear the communication costs, but pays a lower
wage. For good performance, on the other hand, she pays a higher wage instead of
giving feedback.5
The chapter explores the joint implication of subjectivity and communication costs.
It provides a framework to discuss a range of personnel policies, in particular, the
value of feedback and communication. This value is well known if communication
gives the agent instructions or helps him in a learning process. If communication
reveals additional information about the agent’s effort, Holmström (1979) shows that
it is beneficial to make the contract contingent on the additional information. Here,
the feedback is uninformative in the sense of Holmström (1979). Yet, the agent learns
how the principal has derived her evaluation, allowing him to verify the evaluation.
Hence, the optimal contract makes the agent’s remuneration contingent on the content
5Murphy (1993, p. 49) summarizes the reasoning as follows: Principals have “nonpecuniary costs
[here, communication costs] associated with performance appraisal, which leads them to prefer to
assign uniform ratings rather than to carefully distinguish employees by their performance.”
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of the feedback. Accordingly, ex-ante the principal wants to explain her evaluation to
the agent ex-post. Nevertheless, ex-post she might withhold this information to save
on wage and communication costs. Institutional details, like multi-source feedback,
might be used as commitment devices in addition to the mechanism proposed here to
solve this problem.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the related
literature. Section 3.3 sets up the model and characterizes the optimal contract.
Section 3.4 implements stochastic contracts and makes the optimal contract ex-post
budget-balanced. Therefore the contract requires no payments to third parties in
contrast to previous models. Instead, stochastic contracts use differences in the risk
preferences of the parties to implement the required incentives. Then Section 3.5
points out a more familiar implementation of the optimal contract by an indirect
mechanism. Section 3.6 contains the concluding remarks. All proofs are relegated to
the appendix.
3.2 Related Literature
There is a long literature on subjective performance measures. Usually, it is assumed
that evaluations are observable and relationships are long-term. This yields implicit
contracts, like for example in Compte (1998), Kandori and Matsushima (1998), Baker
et al. (1994), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), and Bull (1987). Then reputation
effects created by the continuation value for both parties allow subjective performance
measures to gain credibility and to be used as the basis for the agent’s incentives.
Levin (2003) drops the assumption that the subjective performance measure is
perfectly observable by both contracting parties. Then optimal contracts often have
a termination form, i.e., the contract ends after observing a bad performance. In
contrast to these repeated interactions, subjective evaluations are also used in static
settings.MacLeod (2003) was the first to implement subjective performance measures
in a static setting. He assumes that the agent has a signal that is correlated with
the principal’s evaluation and introduces a message game. Each party reports their
information by sending a public message. This enables the parties to condition their
contract on these messages, which essentially solves the credibility problem. As the
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information structure is exogenously given, the principal cannot decide, depending
on the performance measure, whether to reveal her evaluation. Thus, the results
correspond to two special cases of my model. If the agent’s and the principal’s
signal are correlated, MacLeod (2003) achieves the common second-best solution.
This corresponds to obligatory or costless communication in my model. If the
signals are uncorrelated, the optimal contract in MacLeod (2003) resembles the
case of prohibitively expensive communication in my model. The case of imperfect
correlation in combination with a binding upper limit on wage payments shares
some features with the optimal contract here, but the reasoning and the proofs are
different. First, I do not assume an upper limit on payments. Second, the agent
receives no private signals telling him that he received no information. Instead, it is
the principal’s incentive – resulting from the contract and the communication costs –
to withhold and distort her evaluation that yields the compression at the top result.
Economically, the main difference between this chapter and MacLeod (2003) is that
I consider the principal’s decision whether to justify her evaluation. Moreover, a
justification is meaningful, as the agent realizes any distortions, although he learns
new information by the justification.
In the current chapter, I follow a static approach. Some justification can be found
in Fuchs (2007) who considers a finitely repeated principal-agent model. He shows
that it is optimal for the principal to announce her subjective evaluation only once
at the end of the interaction. In this case, the agent does not learn whether a good
performance has already occurred. Hence, it is sufficient to penalize only the worst
outcome, while paying a constant wage following all other terminal histories. Brown
and Heywood (2005) and Addison and Belfield (2008) provide additional justification
for a static approach. They show empirically that performance evaluations are more
likely to be used for employees with shorter expected tenure.
This chapter also relates to the literature on endogenous contracts, like Kvaløy
and Olsen (2009). Yet, I do not assume any cost for writing specific contractual
arrangements. The contract can be any functions of the messages, but there are
costs for communicating. The evaluation is free of charge in contrast to Rahman
(2011). As the communication allows verifying the performance measure, there is
a parallel to the literature on costly state verification, like Hart and Moore (1998),
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Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Townsend (1979). These models allow the investor to
verify the firm’s performance by a costly audit. They show the optimality of debt
contracts, which are similar to the optimal contract in this chapter, as there are no
audits for high payments. In this literature, however, the firm learns its performance,
while the investor chooses whether to perform an audit. I assume the better-informed
party decides on the information exchange. In addition, the communication need
not be truthful and cannot be verified directly by one of the parties, while the result
of an audit is truthful and verifiable. Strausz (2006) analyses the incentives for
the principal to communicate with the agent in an adverse selection setting. The
agent is privately informed about her effort costs and effort is observable. There is,
however, always communication and the principal truthfully reports her signal about
the agent’s type. My model studies when it is optimal to communicate depending
on the principal’s signal about the agent’s effort. Ex ante, the agent has no private
information. Strausz (1997b) studies a moral hazard setting. The principal can
delegate the costly monitoring of the agent’s effort to a supervisor. Strausz (1997b)
shows that delegation is optimal. Delegation allows the principal to fine-tune the
monitoring incentives and to commit to revealing the result of the monitoring. In my
model, the principal’s evaluation is subjective and nonverifiable. Therefore making the
communication decision verifiable or delegating it to a third party has no advantages.
Moreover, a subjective evaluation is by definition unobservable by any third party.
Following truthful communication, the performance measure becomes observable,
but unverifiable – similarly to a hold-up setting. Aghion et al. (2012), Hart and
Moore (1988), and Grossman and Hart (1986) discuss solutions to this problem. In
my model, preferences are independent of the evaluation, while in the hold-up setting
the preferences depend on the types or the effort of the parties. Therefore I cannot
replicate the solutions of these models. In contrast to the literature on informed
principals, the principal’s information arises during the principal-agent relationship
and is unavailable at the contracting stage.
Furthermore, the credibility of the promised incentives is sometimes discussed
under the notion of fairness and trust. According to Bernardin and Orban (1990,
p. 197) the “trust in appraisal accounted for a significant proportion of variance in
performance ratings.” In my model, this trust is established by communication. In
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Fehr et al. (2007), Aghion and Tirole (1997), and Rotemberg and Saloner (1993),
for example, this trust is created by the extent to which the principal’s preferences
incorporate the agent’s well-being and does not depend on communication. In my
model, the principal and the agent have opposing preferences.
Finally, the present chapter concerns stochastic contracts and ex-post budget
balance. Previous literature, like MacLeod (2003) or Fuchs (2007), requires payments
to third parties. This allows the contracting parties to renegotiate in order to avoid
paying money to an outsider – as already discussed by Hart and Moore (1988). If
stochastic contracts are possible, I show how to establish ex-post budget balance. An
example of a stochastic contract is a mediation process with an uncertain outcome
or wages in shares or options, whose valuation is influenced by external random
forces. Maskin and Tirole (1999) use a similar mechanism to implement incomplete
contracts in an investment setting. Rasmusen (1987) shows that stochastic wage
payments ensure ex-post budget balance in a team-production setting. He does
not consider differences in risk aversion between the principal and the agent, as the
principal’s payment is complete deterministic, only the sharing between the agents is
stochastic. In addition, joint effort is perfectly observable in his model. In my model,
the principal’s payment has to be stochastic to guarantee budget balance. Moreover,
the principal receives only a noisy signal about the agent’s effort.
3.3 Justify Bad Evaluations
3.3.1 Actions
Consider a risk-averse agent working for a risk-neutral principal. The principal
proposes a contract that specifies the agent’s wage W depending on any information
that is available at the time of the wage payments and enforceable by a third party.
After signing such a contract, the agent chooses his work effort e ∈ [0, 1), which is
unobservable by any other person. Then, the principal collects subjective information
I(t) ∈ {0, 1} about the agent’s work from different sources t ∈ T = [0, 1], like direct
and indirect observations of the output or of the agent at work. The information of
each source indicates either a success, 1, or a failure, 0, and depends stochastically
on the agent’s work effort e as will be specified in Section 3.3.3. This closely captures
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• At t = 0, the principal proposes a contract W to the agent.
• At t = 1, the agent can accept the contract offer and determine his work effort e.
• At t = 2, the principal collects the information I(T ), while the agent learns I(S).
• At t = 3, the principal decides whether to justify her evaluation at costs κ or to
report only the evaluation’s result in her message mP .
• At t = 4, the agent sends a message mA.
• At t = 5, the agent receives the wage according to W (mP ,mA).
• At t = 6, with probability e the benefit B is realized.
?
Figure 3.1: Timing of the Model
a practical evaluation process, as “an appraiser would use evidence from direct
observation of the employee, or by reports from others, to make judgment about the
appraisee’s performance.” (Porter et al., 2008, p. 149) An alternative interpretation is
that the agent produces a number of widgets T whose quality is either good or bad.
The principal then inspects the widgets’ quality. Define the result of the subjective
evaluation by the principal as the average µ =
∫
I(t)dt.
The agent does not learn the principal’s information I(·). She just observes I(·) on
a finite subset S ⊂ T with |S| = n sources. Nature randomly chooses the subset S,
as Section 3.3.3 will explain below. n is common knowledge, while the set S is private
information of the agent. This assumption ensures that the principal does not know
which information is observed by both parties. The specification of the distributions
also guarantees that the agent does not learn anything about the result µ of the
principal’s evaluation. S includes only sources that report pure noise. Nevertheless,
the agent notices with strictly positive probability any distortion in the result of
the evaluation if the principal explains and justifies her evaluation of the agent’s
work. For this purpose, the principal can expend communication effort κ to tell the
agent all information I(·) upon which her evaluation is based. She might lie and send
any message mP ∈ I = {0, 1}T .6 The costs of communication are positive, κ > 0.
6{0, 1}T denotes the set of functions T → {0, 1} and I(S) denotes the function t 7→ I(t) for t ∈ S
and 0 otherwise.
86
3.3 Justify Bad Evaluations
They capture the opportunity costs of the principal having to justify her evaluation
and to spend time writing a report or talking instead of doing other tasks. Let
β ∈ {0, 1} denote the principal’s communication decision. For β(I) = 0 she tells the
agent only the result of the evaluation,
∫
I(t)dt. This message is cheap talk and from
the restricted message set R = [0, 1].7 The agent replies with a cheap-talk message
mA = (m1A,m2A) ∈ T n × I about his sources S and their reports I(S).
3.3.2 Payoffs
Then, the contract W is performed according to the available enforceable infor-
mation, i.e., the messages mP and mA. Thus, the contract is formally a function
W : I × T n × I → R+.8 Finally, with probability equal to the agent’s effort e, a
benefit B is realized for the principal. This delayed realization of B corresponds to
a benefit that the principal cannot observe earlier. This is a natural assumption in
many investment settings. Figure 3.1 summarizes the timing.
The agent is represented by a utility function U(W, e) = u(W ) − d(e) if he
chooses effort e. The function u(·) is increasing and strictly concave with the limit
lim
w→0u(w) = −∞ and the derivative u
′(·) >  > 0. On the other hand, the function d(·),
the disutility of performing effort, is increasing and strictly convex with the limit
lim
e→1 d(e) =∞. Both functions are twice differentiable. The agent receives a reservation
utility u¯ if he rejects the principal’s offer. The expected benefit of the principal is
eB − E[W + κβ] given work effort e of the agent.
3.3.3 Distribution of Information
The information is distributed as follows. The principal’s information I(t) is derived
from informative and uninformative sources t ∈ T . With probability 1 > q > 0 a
source t is informative, but being informative is unobservable. Uninformative sources
7In an alternative specification that yields the same optimal contract, the principal only learns
the average of the information I. Then she decides whether to spend κ to acquire the entire
information I. After that, the principal can send a cheap-talk message in I independent of her
choice β; see the discussion in the concluding section.
8The optimal contract remains unchanged if the wage also depends on the choice of communication β.
The reason is that β is observable by both parties and the message spaces are sufficiently rich to use
a shoot-the-liar mechanism. Therefore I neglect an explicit dependency on β.
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report success or failure with probability 1/2 each. Examples are results corrupted
by a computer crash. An informative source declares success with probability p
and failure with probability 1− p. The probability p is drawn from the distribution
F (p|e) = eFH(p) + (1− e)FL(p) and therefore depends on the agent’s effort e. Thus,
the average µ of the principal’s information is a sufficient statistics for the agent’s
effort, as µ =
∫
I(t)dt = qp + 1−q2 .
9 The cumulative distribution functions FH(p)
and FL(p) shall admit continuous densities fH(p), fL(p) >  > 0. In addition, the
probability p satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property, i.e.,
fH(p)/fL(p) is strictly increasing in p. (MLRP)
The monotone likelihood ratio property ensures that a higher average µ indicates
higher work effort. Therefore a higher (lower, resp.) wage for good (bad) evaluations
eases the agent’s incentive compatibility. Assume that the agent’s sample S is large
and consists of a random draw from the uninformative sources with full support and
no atoms.10 This ensures that the agent’s information is uninformative and pure noise.
Hence, the principal cannot use the agent’s signal to save on communication costs.
Denote by P (S|I) the conditional distribution and by P (I, S) the joint distribution
of the principal’s information I and the agent’s sample S.
3.3.4 Analysis
For β(I) = 0 the principal’s message space is restricted to R.11 It is crucial here
that the principal has to pay the communication costs κ to transmit the information I.
Technically, the model ensures this by making it impossible to encode the information I
in a message from the restricted message set R.12 Thus, a truthful message by the
9I assume a law of large number here. Judd (1985) constructs a probability measure that allows
avoiding measurability problems in formulating a law of large numbers for a continuum of random
variables. Sun (2006) proves such a law of large numbers assuming essential pairwise independence.
10The model does not change if the agent also learns from a small number of informative sources.
All results are such that ∃N¯ ∈ N and the result is valid for all n > N¯.
11I identify a message mP ∈ R with the step function: T → {0, 1} with 1 for t ≤ mp and 0 otherwise.
12According to Cantor’s theorem, the set of all subsets of a set A has a strictly greater cardinality
than the set A. Here, the cardinality of {0, 1}T equals the cardinality of the power set of T and is
bigger than the cardinality of T and the one of R. Hence, it is impossible to encode the information I
into a message in R.
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principal corresponds to
θ(I, β) =
I if β = 1θ′(I) if β = 0 with a function θ′ : I → R.
Due to the restriction of the message space for β = 0, the classical revelation principle
does not apply here. See Green and Laffont (1986) for an example. Lemma 3.2
in the appendix proves that nevertheless truthful revelation is optimal. Thus, in
the optimal contract both parties send a truthful message that reveals their private
information, the principal’s information I or its average µ and the agent’s sample
(S, I(S)) respectively.13 As Proposition 2 in MacLeod (2003) and Proposition 1 in
Fuchs (2007) demonstrate, some surplus has to be destroyed in this kind of model to
implement positive effort of the agent. To account for this, I denote by W (mP ,mA)
the wage paid by the principal after the parties sent messages mP and mA. On the
other hand, c(mP ,mA) is the wage received by the agent. Proposition 3.5 shows how
stochastic payments make the optimal contract ex-post budget-balanced. Grossman
and Hart (1983) prove that the model can be solved in two steps. First, for every
level of effort e, the optimal wage schedule W and its expected costs C(e) for the
principal are computed. The second step determines the optimal effort level e by
max
e∈[0,1)
eB − C(e).
Now, returning to the first step, Program A below determines the optimal contract
that implements effort e by choosing wages payments W (mP ,mA), c(mP ,mA) ≥ 0
and when to communicate, β(I). To simplify the exposition, define the equilibrium
payments Weq(I, S) = W
(
θ(I, β(I)), S, I(S)
)
and ceq(I, S) = c
(
θ(I, β(I)), S, I(S)
)
.
C(e) = inf
∫
Weq(I, S) + κβ(I)dP (I, S), (A)
subject to
∫
u
(
ceq(I, S)
)
dP (I, S)− d(e) ≥ u¯, (PC)
e ∈ arg max
∫
u
(
ceq(I, S)
)
dP (I, S)− d(e), (ICA)
13Yet it is impossible to have the agent reveal his work effort e truthfully and make the wage
dependent on his message about the effort in order to implement e > 0. Therefore it is without loss
of generality for the messages to contain only the information the parties collected at t = 2.
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κβ(I) +
∫
Weq(I, S)dP (S|I) ≤ κ˜+
∫
W (Iˆ , S, I(S))dP (S|I)
∀I ∈ I,∀(κ˜, Iˆ) ∈
{
{0} ×R, {κ} × I
}
, (ICP )
u(c(I, S, I(S)))− u(c(I, Sˆ, rˆ)) ≥ 0 ∀I, rˆ ∈ I,∀S, Sˆ ∈ T n, (ICmA)
W (I, S, r) ≥ c(I, S, r) ∀I, r ∈ I, ∀S ∈ T n. (3.1)
The objective is to minimize the expected wage payment subject to several conditions.
The participation constraint (PC) makes the agent willing to accept the proposed
contract. The agent’s incentive compatibility (ICA) guarantees that the agent chooses
the desired level of effort. The principal’s incentive compatibility (ICP ) gives her an
incentive to justify her evaluation if communication is desired. In addition, sending a
true message has to be incentive compatible for the principal (ICP ) and the agent
(ICmA). Finally, the principal’s payment has to be higher than the wage received by
the agent.
If the principal’s information I were observable and contractible, as in common
principal-agent models, the principal’s and the agent’s incentive for sending truthful
messages (ICP ) and (ICmA) can be neglected. Denote this problem by A∗, the solution,
the optimal complete wage, by w∗(µ, e), and the expected costs by C∗(e).
Lemma 3.1. If the principal’s information I is contractible, the optimal contract
offers a wage w∗(µ, e), that only conditions on the average µ of the principal’s
information. Furthermore, the wage scheme w∗(µ, e) is almost surely continuous and
increasing in µ for positive effort, e > 0.
Thus, the results of Holmström (1979) are valid here. The principal conditions the
contract only on the sufficient statistics µ instead of the entire information I and a
better performance measure implies a higher wage. If the principal’s information is
subjective and communication is a choice variable of the principal, the additional
incentive constraints for the messages do matter. First, it is not optimal to com-
municate always. With full communication, the optimal contract implements wage
payments w∗(µ, e) on the equilibrium path. Problem A∗ determines the wage-costs
minimizing way to implement effort e. Yet, I can modify this wage scheme leaving the
incentives in place and save on communication costs, because the agent is happy to
accept a high wage and does not demand an explanation. Therefore it is suboptimal to
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implement the optimal complete wage payments w∗(µ, e). Denote the communication
set by IC = {I ∈ I|β(I) = 1}.
Proposition 3.1. Complete feedback is never optimal, i.e., in the optimum Pr(IC)<1.
The expected costs of the optimal contract are below C∗(e) + κ.
The proof in the appendix shows that the principal’s costs decrease if the principal
refrains from communicating the highest wages. To further determine the commu-
nication set, it is necessary to know more about the structure of the payments in
the optimal contract. The next proposition provides a solution to Program A and
characterizes the optimal contract.
Proposition 3.2. In the optimal contract the wage is constant if no justification takes
place. Otherwise, the wage depends on the principal’s evaluation and the principal is
punished for disagreements in the messages,
c∗∗(mP ,mA) =
w
∗∗ (
∫
mP (t)dt) if mP ∈ IC
w∗∗ if mP /∈ IC
and W ∗∗(mP ,mA) =

w∗∗ (
∫
mP (t)dt) if mP ∈ IC and mP (m1A) = m2A(m1A)
w∗∗ if mP /∈ IC
w∗∗ + κ otherwise.
The principal communicates to justify low wage payments, as w∗∗ (
∫
mP (t)dt) < w∗∗
for all mP ∈ IC . The values of w∗∗ and w∗∗(µ) are determined in the proof.
Making the agent’s wage contingent on his message imposes additional risks on him
without easing the incentive constraint for sending a truthful message. Therefore in
the optimal contract the agent’s wage does not depend on his message mA, but only
on the average of the principal’s one mP . Additionally, the principal’s payments have
to be high in the absence of communication. Otherwise the principal would deviate
and abstain from communication, because the agent cannot verify such a deviation.
Furthermore, the agent’s wage equals the principal’s payments in the absence of
communication. This results from the interaction of the participation constraint with
the agent’s incentive compatibility.
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If the principal provides a justification, the agent can detect deviations by the
principal, as a mismatch of the messages occurs. Therefore payments can vary in the
principal’s message mP and a disagreement in the messages is punished by making the
principal pay the highest wage. If the messages agree, the principal’s payment equals
the agent’s wage. This structure of the wage payments allows characterizing the
communication set, that takes an interval form. There will only be communication
for low values of the performance measure in the optimal contract. In these cases,
the agent suspects a distortion by the principal and insists on a justification for the
low wages.
Proposition 3.3. In the optimal contract there is a threshold δ, such that the principal
communicates for subjective evaluations µ below δ, while she abstains from justifying
subjective evaluations µ above δ. Moreover, 1−q2 ≤ δ < 1+q2 and, on the equilibrium
path, the wage is increasing in the agent’s performance for evaluations below δ.
The proposition exhibits the communication pattern described in the introduction
and summarized by Figure 3.2. There will be partial communication. The principal
will use communication only as a justification of bad evaluations and low wages, while
she remains silent on good performances. This confirms empirical observations, like
the leniency bias and the centrality bias that there is less distinction in subjective
evaluations than in the underlying performance measure, in particular at the top.
Yet this behavior is not the result of a bias, but part of the optimal contract,
Wage on the
equilibrium
path
µ
w∗∗
δ(1− q)/2 (1 + q)/2
κ
{
Feedback No Feedback
Figure 3.2: Proposition 3.3 and the Equilibrium Wage
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which pools several evaluations and rewards them with the same wage. Thus, the
contract eliminates wage differences that the principal would have to justify. If the
evaluation is for developmental or feedback purposes only, the principal’s and the
agent’s preferences are not completely opposed, but better aligned. Therefore the
agent has less reason to assume a deviation and the principal can distinguish more
finely the agent’s performance.
The last proposition shows that communication is optimal if communication costs
are not prohibitively high. Consequently, the optimal contract makes the principal
invest some effort into communication to explain her evaluation of the agent’s work.
The communication is beneficial, although it is costly and conveys no additional
information about the agent’s effort. Yet, communication allows the principal to
ensure the agent that her evaluation is not distorted.
Proposition 3.4. In the optimal contract there is communication with positive
probability, Pr(IC) > 0, if the principal wants to implement positive effort e > 0 of
the agent and the communication costs are not too high, i.e.,
κ ≤ u−1
(
u¯+ d(e) + f(0|e)
fL(0)− fH(0)d
′(e)
)
−
∫
w∗
(
qp+ 1− q2 , e
)
dF (p|e). (3.2)
Proposition 3.4 proves that I have identified an additional reason, why commu-
nication is valuable. Here, the communication is not about the principal collecting
information for her decision making or giving the agent instructions in the sense of
learning or which tasks to perform. Instead, communication serves the purpose to
make the principal’s promise of incentives to the agent credible. Thus, it is in the
principal’s interest to be open about her evaluations, even if communication is costly
and takes place after the agent’s effort choice. Finally, consider two extensions to
simplify the contract and make it ex-post budget balanced.
3.4 Stochastic Contracts
Ex-post budget balance requires stochastic contracts. For stochastic payments,
the expected value for the principal is higher than the agent’s certainty equivalent.
Therefore it is possible to replace payments to a third party by stochastic payments.
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This does not require a risk-neutral principal. As long as there is a difference in the
degree of risk aversion between the principal and the agent, the optimal contract can
achieve ex-post budget balance.
Proposition 3.5. It is possible to make the optimal contract ex-post budget-balanced
if stochastic contracts are feasible. The optimal contract is
W¯ ∗∗(mP ,mA) =

w∗∗(
∫
mP (t)dt) if mP ∈ IC and mP (m1A) = m2A(m1A)
w∗∗ if mP /∈ IC
w∗∗ + Λ(z(
∫
mP (t)dt)) otherwise.
The lotteries Λ have a mean of E(Λ(z)) = κ and a certainty equivalent for the agent
of u−1(E[u(w∗∗ + Λ(z(µ)))]) = w∗∗(µ). The values of w∗∗ and w∗∗(µ) are determined
in Proposition 3.2.
Stochastic contracts ensure ex-post budget balance. Examples are stock options
whose valuation is influenced by external shocks to the financial sector or uncertain ar-
bitration procedures. The contracting parties might be uncertain how a disagreement
is interpreted and which wage payment is appropriate.
3.5 Indirect Mechanism
The mechanism described in Proposition 3.2 can be simplified by changing the
message spaces. The principal proposes a wage w′ from the set {w∗∗(µ)|µ ≤ δ}∪{w∗∗}.
The agent can either accept the proposed wage w′ or reject it. If he accepts w′, the
principal pays him the wage w′. If he rejects, the principal has to pay w∗∗ + Λ(z(µ)).
The principal values this payment at E(w∗∗ + Λ(z(µ))) = w∗∗ + κ, while the agent’s
certainty equivalent is w′.
Formally, the contract is now a function W : [1−q2 ,
1+q
2 ]×{Y,N} → R+ and depends
on the principal’s proposal, mP ∈ [1−q2 , 1+q2 ], and the agent’s decision, mA ∈ {Y,N}.
Thus, the agent has the possibility to object to the principal’s evaluation. This conflict
resolution might be quite realistic, as Bretz et al. (1992, p. 332) state that “most
organizations report having an informal dispute resolution system (e.g., open door
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policies) that employees may use to contest the appraisal outcome. About one-quarter
report having formalized processes available for this purpose (e.g., binding decisions
made by a third party).”
The indirect mechanism leaves the wage and the incentives of the parties unchanged.
The reason is the following. If the principal receives information in the communi-
cation set, any deviation, e.g., proposing a different wage and/or abstaining from
communication, makes her worse off, as the deviation increases her payments to at
least w∗∗ ≥ κ+ supI∈IC w∗∗(
∫
I(t)dt). For evaluations outside the communication set,
it is also not profitable to deviate, as any lower wage proposal will be rejected. For
the agent, on the other hand, the following strategy is a best reply: accept a proposed
wage if and only if the principal proposed w∗∗ or she justified her evaluation and the
justification matches the agent’s information. Consequently, the modified setting also
implements effort e of the agent at optimal costs. Hence, the relevant part of the
model is the principal’s decision to justify her evaluation to the agent at t = 3.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter discusses a principal-agent model with a private and subjective
performance measure allowing for communication. The principal can explain her
evaluation of agent’s work to the agent. Giving justifications is costly, does not convey
additional information about the agent’s effort, and does not serve a learning or
instructing purpose. Nevertheless, in the optimal mechanism the principal provides
justifications. This allows the agent to detect inappropriate or distorted evaluations
by the principal if her explanations are truthful. Therefore providing a justification
makes the incentives for the agent to expend effort credible. In the optimal contract,
the principal justifies only bad evaluations. This communication pattern results in
pooling and wage compression at the top, as illustrated in Figure 3.2 on page 92.
These results fit well with empirical observations, often referred to as leniency bias
and centrality bias.14 The chapter argues that this pattern of evaluations is a feature
of the optimal contract with unbiased agents and no proof of biased behavior per se.
The principal’s justifications convince the agent that the principal evaluates her
14“The distribution of ratings is typically both concentrated and biased.” (Gibbs, 1991, p. 5)
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appropriately ex-post. In addition, they motivate him ex-ante to implement the
specified work effort. Compare this to a naive contract that does not give the principal
an incentive to justify her evaluation. In this naive contract, the principal abstains
from justifications and always reports the evaluation associated with the lowest wage.
Anticipating this behavior the agent is unmotivated to implement any positive work
effort. This partially explains the concern of the management literature to ensure
credible feedback provision. In addition, the problem of credible evaluations provides
a partial answer to Fuchs (2007, p. 1446), who emphasizes the importance of exploring
“possible reasons for the existence of communication” between agents and principals.
Communication at the interim stages might be explained by training and instruction
reasons, but credibility problems are responsible for the communication in the final
stage of the principal-agent relation according to my model.
The results of this chapter are important for the design of incentives systems.
First, the systems have to ensure the credible provision of appropriate feedback by
institutionalizing the feedback process or using multi-source feedback. Second, the
pooling at the top could cause the costs of an incentives scheme to be substantial
if there is a bonus attached to receiving a positive evaluation and many employees
receive a positive evaluation due to the compression at the top.15 Third, my result
provides a rationale, why forced distribution systems, requiring supervisors to match
a given distribution with their evaluations, are an uncommon response to lenient
evaluations.16 These systems ensure dispersion in the results of the evaluation, but
are suboptimal, as they require too much communication.
This chapter assumes that the principal incurs costs for communicating with the
agent. I would get similar results if I instead assumed that the principal’s costs
concerned the acquisition of information. In this case, the principal only learns the
result of the evaluation, i.e., the average of the information I. Then she decides
whether to spend κ to acquire the entire information I. Independently of her choice of
15Bernardin and Orban (1990, p. 199) provide the example of the Small Business Administration
and NASA introducing a bonus scheme based on subjective evaluations. After more than 50% of
eligible employees should receive a bonus, Congress responded with the requirement that no more
than 25% of employees shall receive a bonus.
16Bretz et al. (1992) and Gibbs (1991) show that the use of forced distributions is very limited.
According to Murphy (1993, p. 47), forced distribution systems “mitigate managerial tendencies to
assign uniform ratings but may generate important counterproductive side effects.”
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information acquisition, the principal can send a cheap-talk message in the unrestricted
message set I. Both settings have some merits; in reality, there could be a mixture
of these two polar cases.
An avenue for future research is the role of communication for rewarding good
performance. Many people regard communication as an appreciation of their work
and are genuinely happy about positive feedback. Therefore communication, such
as praise or commendation, might enter the agent’s utility function. Then there is
a trade-off between communicating good outcomes as a reward and the motive for
communication discussed in this chapter.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A The Optimal Complete Contract
Lemma 3.1 characterizes the optimal complete contract and states the solution to
Program A∗ if the principal’s information I is public and verifiable. This yields a
benchmark solution w∗(µ, e), the optimal complete wage. Additionally, the lemma
shows that every effort e ∈ [0, 1) is implementable at finite costs C∗(e).
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Holmström (1979) shows that the optimal wage only
conditions on µ =
∫
I(t)dt, because the average of the principal’s information I is a
sufficient statistics for the agent’s effort, Pr(I, S|e, ∫ I(t)dt) = Pr(I, S| ∫ I(t)dt). In
order to implement no effort, e = 0, the optimal contract sets w∗(µ, 0) = u−1(u¯+d(0))
for all µ. If, on the other hand, the desired effort is positive, e > 0, the agent’s
incentive compatibility matters. The first-order approach is valid here, because
F (p|e) is a linear combination of distribution functions. This implies that the convex
distribution function condition is satisfied. According to Grossman and Hart (1983)
and Rogerson (1985), the convex distribution function condition in combination with
the convexity of d(·) and the monotone likelihood ratio property guarantees the
validity of the first-order approach. Thus, the agent’s incentive compatibility reads∫
u(w(µ))f
H(µˆ(µ))− fL(µˆ(µ))
q
dµ = d′(e) (ICA)
with the normalization µˆ(µ) = µ−(1−q)/2
q
. For positive effort, the constraint set is also
nonempty. Take for example any w¯ > 0 and the contract
w(µ) =
w¯ if f
H(µˆ(µ))− fL(µˆ(µ)) ≥ 0
h(w¯) otherwise
with h(w¯) positive, but small enough, such that the incentive compatibility (ICA)
is satisfied. This implicitly defines an increasing function h(·), as ∂h(w¯)/∂w¯ > 0.
Consequently, there is a w¯ fulfilling the participation constraint (PC) with equality.
Therefore the constraint set of Program A∗ is nonempty. Moreover, the costs of
the contract given by w¯ are h(w¯)F (ζ|e) + w¯(1 − F (ζ|e)) < w¯ < ∞ with ζ =
inf{p ∈ [0, 1]|fH(p)− fL(p) ≥ 0}.
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Holmström (1979) proves that the Lagrange multipliers of the participation con-
straint λ1 and of the incentive compatibility λ2 are positive. Pointwise optimization17
determines the optimal contract as
f(µˆ(µ)|e)− λ1u′(w(µ))f(µˆ(µ)|e)− λ2u′(w(µ))(fH(µˆ(µ))− fL(µˆ(µ))) = 0 a.s.,
1
u′(w(µ)) = λ1 + λ2
fH(µˆ(µ))− fL(µˆ(µ))
f(µˆ(µ)|e) = λ1 + λ2
fH(µˆ(µ))
fL(µˆ(µ)) − 1
ef
H(µˆ(µ))
fL(µˆ(µ)) + 1− e
a.s.
Since the fraction l−1
el+1−e is increasing in l, the right-hand side of above equation is
increasing in µ due to the monotone likelihood ratio property. Therefore the concavity
of u(·) implies that w∗(µ, e) is increasing in µ ∈ [1−q2 , 1+q2 ] almost surely. Moreover,
w∗(µ, e) is continuous almost surely and any discontinuity is removable, because the
densities fH and fL are continuous.
3.B The Optimal Contract
According to Proposition 3.1, it is suboptimal to provide justifications almost
surely.
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Suppose the principal communicates almost surely,
i.e., Pr(IC) = 1. Then the expected communication costs are κE(β(I)) = κ and it
just remains to minimize the wage costs. Yet it is possible to implement payments
w∗(µ, e) defined in Program A∗ by the following contract
W¯ (mP ,mA) =
w
∗
(
µ, e
)
if mP (m1A) = m2A(m1A)
w∗(1, e) + 2κ if mP (m1A) 6= m2A(m1A)
and c¯(mP ,mA) = w∗(µ, e) with µ =
∫
mP (t)dt. There is a N¯ ∈ N, such that a
deviation is unprofitable for the principal for all n > N¯ , because the probability of a
mismatch in the messages is sufficiently close to 1. Hence, the additional incentive
constraints (ICP ) and (ICmA) are satisfied. In addition, the realized wage payments
17This technique allows for piecewise continuous functions, as Kamien and Schwartz (1991) show in
Part II, Section 12. Therefore bonus wages are possible and there is no restriction to continuous
wage schemes.
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remain unchanged, as the parties’ messages agree in equilibrium. It is possible,
however, to implement a certain work effort e of the agent even cheaper by partial
communication. For this purpose, I modify the contract W¯ to
W¯ (mP ,mA) =

w∗
(
µ, e
)
if mP (m1A) = m2A(m1A)
w∗(1, e) + 2κ if µ < δ and mP (m1A) 6= m2A(m1A)
w∗(δ, e) + κ if µ ≥ δ and mP (m1A) 6= m2A(m1A)
with a δ < 1, such that
fH
(
δ − 1−q2
q
)
− fL
(
δ − 1−q2
q
)
≥ 0 and w∗(δ, e) + κ ≥ w∗(1, e). (3.3)
Lemma 3.1 proves that w∗(µ, e) is almost surely continuous and any discontinuity is
removable. Consequently, there exists a continuous function that almost surely equals
w∗(µ, e). Replacing w∗(µ, e) by that function in the definition of W¯ ′ also yields a
solution to Program A. This procedure guarantees that the conditions (3.3) on δ are
feasible.
In the contract W¯ ′, for n > N¯ , the principal will reveal all evaluations except the
highest ones and the communication set is
IC =
{
I ∈ I
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
I(t)dt− 1−q2
q
∈ [0, δ]
}
.
If the principal’s information indicates a very good performance, µ > δ, Lemma 3.1
has shown that w∗(δ, e)+κ < w∗(µ, e)+κ. Thus, in these cases communication would
increase her total costs consisting of wage and communication costs. In addition,
the conditions in (3.3) guarantee that constraints (PC) and (ICA) are still satisfied
by choosing the agent’s wage appropriately. Therefore the contract W¯ ′ implements
effort e of the agent and is cheaper than the contract W¯ . This shows that the principal
will not explain her evaluation to the agent with probability 1.
Lemma 3.2 shows that I can concentrate on truthful messages without loss of
generality.
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Lemma 3.2. For every contract W there is a contract W ′, such that W ′ implements
the same effort e at (weakly) lower costs than W and gives the agent and the principal
an incentive to send truthful messages. In addition, contract W ′ has the following
structure
c′(mP ,mA) =
c(mP ) if mP ∈ I
′
C
w¯ if mP /∈ I ′C
(3.4)
W ′(mP ,mA) =

w(mP ) if mP ∈ I ′C and mP (m1A) = m2A(m1A)
w¯ + κ if mP ∈ I ′C and mP (m1A) 6= m2A(m1A)
w¯ if mP /∈ I ′C
(3.5)
with the communication set I ′C = {I ∈ I|β′(I) = 1}.
Proof: The proof consists of four parts. The first part characterizes the equilibrium
utilities in the contract W. In the second part, the contract W ′ is determined in
such a way that the parties have an incentive to send truthful messages. The third
part analyzes the agent’s incentive compatibility for his work effort. The fourth part
ensures that the new contract W ′ satisfies the agent’s incentive compatibility and
participation constraint.
Step 1 Denote the expected utilities given equilibrium strategies in contract W by
w(I) for the principal and by u(c(I)) for the agent. I consider certainty equivalents
with respect to the agent’s sample S given equilibrium strategies. If contract W
specifies no communication for I /∈ IC , then in equilibrium the principal provides no
justifications and the agent cannot verify the evaluation. Therefore the principal’s
payments have to be constant or w(I) = w(I ′) for all I, I ′ /∈ IC . Moreover, they
have to be higher than the principal’s payments in the communication set including
communication costs.
w(I) ≥ κ+ sup
I′∈IC
w(I ′) ∀I /∈ IC
Otherwise, the principal would abstain from communication and act as if I /∈ IC ,
because the agent could not observe this deviation. Finally, notice that the agent
detects a deviation in the principal’s message with probability 0 if the principal
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deviates only in the reports of sources with mass 0. Therefore w(I) = w(Iˆ) for all
Iˆ(t), I(t) ∈ I with Iˆ(t) = I(t) almost surely.
Step 2 Consider the contract W ′ given by equations (3.4) and (3.5) with I ′C =
IC \ R and w¯ = w(I) for a I /∈ IC .18 The agent’s wage does not depend on his
message. Therefore he is indifferent between sending any message and the incentive
compatibility for his message is satisfied. If the principal should communicate, I ∈ IC ,
any disagreement in the messages shows a deviation by the principal and the payment
W ′(I, S, r) with r(S) 6= I(S) and I ∈ IC matters only for the right-hand side of
the principal’s incentive compatibility (ICP ). Therefore I can increase this payment
to satisfy (ICP ) without affecting any other constraint or the objective function.
Accordingly, there will be a penalty for I ∈ IC and I(S) 6= r(S). By setting the
principal’s payment in this case to
W (I, S, r) = w¯ + κ
there is a N¯ ∈ N such that for n > N¯ the principal will never deviate to another
message in the communication set IC independent of her communication choice β(I).
The reason is that the deviation either does not influence payments or the probability
of a mismatch in the messages is sufficiently close to 1 and
w¯ + κ >
∫
W ′(Iˆ , S, I(S))dP (S|I) ≥ w¯ > w(I) =
∫
W ′(I, S, I(S))dP (S|I)
for all I, Iˆ ∈ IC and Iˆ(t) 6= I(t) almost surely.
Step 3 For every µ denote the set of all information with the average µ byM(µ) =
{I ∈ I| ∫ I(t)dt = µ}. For the agent’s incentives only the expected wage in M(µ)
matters, because the agent’s information, S and I(S), does not depend on her effort
choice and the average of the principal’s information is a sufficient statistics for
the agent’s effort, Pr(I, S|e, ∫ I(t)dt) = Pr(I, S| ∫ I(t)dt). In addition, Lemma 3.1
shows that the first-order approach is valid here. Therefore, the agent’s incentive
compatibility (ICA) equals∫ 1+q
2
1−q
2
(∫
u(c(I))dP (I, S |I ∈M(µ))
)
fH(µˆ(µ))− fL(µˆ(µ))
q
dµ = d′(e) (3.6)
with the normalization µˆ(µ) = µ−(1−q)/2
q
. Consequently, the agent’s incentives remain
18If IC = I, set w¯ = κ+ supIˆ∈IC w(Iˆ).
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unchanged if
∫
u(c(I))dP (I, S|I ∈M(µ))=
∫
u
(
c′(θ(I, β(I)), S, I(S))
)
dP (I, S|I ∈M(µ)) (3.7)
for all µ ∈ [1−q2 , 1+q2 ]. By the definition of c′ in (3.4), the right-hand side equals∫
β′(I)u
(
c(I)
)
dP (I, S|I ∈M(µ)) + u(w¯)
∫
1− β′(I)dP (I, S|I ∈M(µ))
Hence, the equality in (3.7) is not guaranteed for all µ, as c(I) ≤ c′(I,mA) = w¯ for
I /∈ I ′C .
Step 4 If (3.7) is not satisfied, it is necessary to reduce the expected wage of the
agent. For this purpose, let the principal communicate every information I /∈ IC ∪R
with c(I) ≤ w¯ − κ. Set I ′C = I ′C ∪ {I}, c′(I,mA) = c(I) and
W ′(I,mA) =
c(I) if I(m
1
A) = m2A(m1A)
w¯ + κ if I(m1A) 6= m2A(m1A)
∀mA.
Thus, for any remaining information that is not communicated, I /∈ I ′C ∪ R, the
agent’s wage is w¯− κ < c(I) ≤ w¯ in contract W. Finally, increase the communication
set and make the principal communicate a fraction α of the information M(µ) \ I ′C ,
such that
∫
u(c(I))dP (I, S |I ∈M(µ)) =
∫
β′(I)u(c(I))dP (I, S |I ∈M(µ)) +
+
(
αu(w¯ − κ) + (1− α)u(w¯)
) ∫
1− β′(I)dP (I, S |I ∈M(µ))
As the agent’s wage is w¯− κ < c(I) ≤ w¯ for all I /∈ I ′C ∪R, it is possible to find such
an α ∈ [0, 1]. Set α = 1 if α is not uniquely determined, as M(µ) \ I ′C has mass 0.
Denote the addition information that is communicate by I ′′. To make communication
optimal, adjust contract W ′ by I ′C = I ′C ∪ I ′′′, I ′′′ = I ′′ \R, c′(I,mA) = w¯ − κ and
W ′(I,mA) =
w¯ − κ if I(m
1
A) = m2A(m1A)
w¯ + κ if I(m1A) 6= m2A(m1A)
∀I ∈ I ′′′, ∀mA.
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Repeat these steps for every µ. Then the agent’s incentives in the new contract W ′
are the same as in contract W. In addition, the agent’s participation constraint is also
satisfied in contract W ′, so that contract W ′ implements effort e at (weakly) lower
costs than contract W.
Lemma 3.3 proves that contracts in which the agent’s wage payment depends only
on the average of the principal’s information are no loss of generality.
Lemma 3.3. For every contract W there is a contract W ′ implementing the same
effort e at the same costs as W. Moreover, in contract W ′ the communication choice β
and the agent’s wage just depends on the average of the principal’s information, i.e.,
c′(mP ,mA) = c′(m′P ,mA) for all mA,mP ,m′P with
∫
mP (t)dt =
∫
m′P (t)dt.
Proof: Lemma 3.2 shows that the agent’s wage does not depend on his messagemA.
In addition, according to equation (3.6), the agent’s incentive compatibility (ICA)
depends only on the expected utility of the agent given the average of the principal’s
information. The same is valid for the agent’s participation constraint in Program A.
Therefore it is possible without violating these constraints to set c′(mP ,mA) = c˜ (µ)
for all mP ∈ IC and mA with
µ =
∫
mP (t)dt, u (c˜ (µ)) =
∫
u
(
c(Iˆ , S, Iˆ(S))
)
dP
(
Iˆ , S
∣∣∣Iˆ ∈M (µ) ∩ IC )
and M(µ) = {I ∈ I| ∫ I(t)dt = µ}. This reduces at least weakly the expected wage,
because the agent is risk-averse and
c˜ (µ) ≤
∫
c(Iˆ , S, Iˆ(S))dP
(
Iˆ , S
∣∣∣Iˆ ∈M (µ) ∩ IC ) . (3.8)
Yet, the agent’s new wage c′(mP ,mA) = c˜(µ) might be higher than the principal’s
payment W (mP ,mA) for some mA and mP ∈ IC . To make the contract feasible and
satisfy constraint (3.1) in Program A, set
W ′(mP ,mA) =
∫
W (Iˆ , S, Iˆ(S))dP
(
Iˆ , S
∣∣∣Iˆ ∈M (µ) ∩ IC ) ∀mP ∈ IC ,∀mA
with µ =
∫
mP (t)dt. This ensures that W ′(mP ,mA) ≥ c˜(µ) for all mP ,mA, because
W (mP ,mA) ≥ c(mP ,mA) in contract W and the new wage, c˜(µ), is lower than
the previous expected wage, as shown in equation (3.8). In addition, the expected
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payments of the principal in the new contract W ′ are the same as in contract W, as
∫
W ′eq(I, S)dP (I, S|I ∈M (µ)) =
∫
Weq(I, S)dP (I, S|I ∈M (µ)) ∀µ.
Consequently, there exists a contract that gives the principal and the agent the same
utility as the old contractW, but makes the agent’s utility depend only on the average
of the principal’s information, i.e., c(mP ,mA) = c˜(µ) for all mA and all mP ∈ IC . It
remains to ensure constraint (ICP ) in contract W ′. For I ∈ IC in the communication
set, W ′(I, S, r) with I(S) 6= r(S) matters only on the right-hand side of constraint
(ICP ). Therefore increasing W ′(I, S, r) to κ + supI¯,S¯W (I¯ , S¯, I¯(S¯)) does not affect
the objective function or the other constraints, but gives the principal incentives to
communicate truthfully. Additionally, the wage in the communication set is lower than
outside this set including the communication costs, W ′(I, S, I(S)) +κ < W ′eq(Iˆ , Sˆ) for
all I ∈ IC , Iˆ /∈ IC and all S, Sˆ, because contract W meets this condition according
to Lemma 3.2. This guarantees that there is a N¯ ∈ N such that for all n > N¯
any deviation in the communication choice, β(I), and/or the message mP makes
the principal worse off. Therefore also the new contract W ′ satisfies the principal’s
incentive compatibility.
It remains to prove that the communication choice does not change within the
set M(µ) for any µ. Suppose there is a µ such that cˆ (µ) ≤ w¯ − κ with w¯ the wage
outside the communication set according to Lemma 3.2 and cˆ defined by
u (cˆ (µ)) =
∫
u
(
c(Iˆ , S, Iˆ(S))
)
dP
(
Iˆ , S
∣∣∣Iˆ ∈M (µ)) .
Then it is possible to communicate all I ∈M(µ) by setting I ′C = I ′C ∪M(µ) and by
adapting the wage as in the first part of the proof. If, on the other hand, cˆ(µ) = w¯, the
principal can abstain from communication for all I ∈M(µ) by setting I ′C = I ′C \M(µ)
and W (I,mA) = c(I,mA) = w¯ for all mA.
Finally, in the last case w¯ − κ < cˆ(µ) < w¯. Denote by A the set of all µ with this
property,
A =
{
µ ∈
[1− q
2 ,
1 + q
2
]∣∣∣∣ w¯ − κ < cˆ(µ) < w¯} .
If the set A has no mass,
∫
A f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ = 0, set I ′C = I ′C∪M(µ) and cˆ(µ) = w¯−κ for
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all µ ∈ A and adapt the wage as in the first part of the proof. If ∫A f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ > 0,
there exists a unique δ, such that communicating only information with an average
below δ does not change the agent’s expected utility, i.e.,
∫
A
u(cˆ(µ))dF (µˆ(µ)|e) = u(w¯ − κ)
∫
A1
dF (µˆ(µ)|e) + u(w¯)
∫
A2
dF (µˆ(µ)|e)
with the sets A1 = {µ ∈ A|µ ≤ δ} and A2 = {µ ∈ A|µ > δ}. For this purpose,
modify the contract to
β′(mP ) =
1 if µ ∈ A
1
0 if µ ∈ A2
c′(mP ,mA) =
w¯ − κ if µ ∈ A
1
w¯ if µ ∈ A2
W ′(mP ,mA) =

w¯ if µ ∈ A2
w¯ − κ if µ ∈ A1 and mP (m1A) = m2A(m1A)
w¯ + κ if µ ∈ A1 and mP (m1A) 6= m2A(m1A)
for all mP ∈ M(µ), all mA and all µ ∈ A. As the agent is risk-averse and
W (mP ,mA) ≥ c(mP ,mA) ∈ {w¯} ∪ (0, w¯ − κ], this reduces the expected wage.∫
A
(∫
W (Iˆ , S, Iˆ(S))dP
(
Iˆ , S
∣∣∣Iˆ ∈M (µ))) dF (µˆ(µ)|e) ≥
≥ (w¯ − κ)
∫
A1
dF (µˆ(µ)|e) + w¯
∫
A2
dF (µˆ(µ)|e)
In addition, the difference in the agent’s incentive compatibility is positive.
∫
A1
(
u(w¯ − κ)− u(cˆ(µ))
)
∆f (µ)dµ+
∫
A2
(
u(w¯)− u(cˆ(µ))
)
∆f (µ)dµ =
=
∫
A1
(
u(w¯ − κ)− u(cˆ(µ))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
∆f (µ)f(µˆ(µ)|e)
f(µˆ(µ)|e) dµ+
+
∫
A2
(
u(w¯)− u(cˆ(µ))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∆f (µ)f(µˆ(µ)|e)
f(µˆ(µ)|e) dµ >
>
∆f (δ))q
f(µˆ(δ)|e)
(∫
A1
u(w¯ − κ)dF (µˆ(µ)|e) +
∫
A2
u(w¯)dF (µˆ(µ)|e)−
−
∫
A
u(cˆ(µ))dF (µˆ(µ)|e)
)
= 0
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with ∆f(µ) = 1
q
(fH(µˆ(µ)) − fL(µˆ(µ))). The monotone likelihood ratio property
ensures the strict inequality and the constant value of the participation constraint
yields the final equality. This shows that it is possible to satisfy the agent’s incentive
compatibility (ICA).
Consequently, contract W ′ satisfies all the constraints of Program A and the
communication decision just depends on the average of the principal’s information,
except for the null set R, as I ′C = I ′C \R and W ′(mP ,mA) = c(mP ,mA) = w¯ for all
mP ∈ R and all mA.
Proposition 3.2 characterizes the optimal contract.
Proof of Proposition 3.2: Lemma 3.2 proves the basic structure of the optimal
contract and this proof uses the notation introduced there. Lemma 3.3 shows that
the communication decision and the agent’s wage just depend on the average of the
principal’s message. It remains to calculate the agent’s wage. First, I prove that
there are no payments to third parties on the equilibrium path. For this purpose,
simplify Program A according to Lemma 3.2 and 3.3 to
inf
∫
w(I) + κβ(I)dP (I, S), (B)
subject to
∫
u(c(µ))dF (µˆ(µ)|e)− d(e) ≥ u¯, (PC)∫
u(c(µ))f
H(µˆ(µ))− fL(µˆ(µ))
q
dµ = d′(e), (ICA)
w¯ ≥ w(I) + β(I)κ ≥ (1− β(I))w¯ ∀I ∈ I, (ICP )
w(I) ≥ c
(∫
I(t)dt
)
∀I ∈ I (3.9)
with the normalization µˆ(µ) = µ−(1−q)/2
q
. (ICP ) ensures that the wage is constant out-
side the communication set. Furthermore, the condition requires that the principal’s
costs in the communication set, accounting for the communication costs, is lower
than outside this set. According to Lemma 3.2 this is equivalent to condition (ICP )
in Program A. Condition (3.9) is the equivalent to (3.1) in the initial program and
guarantees that payments to third parties are nonnegative. Assume to the contrary
that in the optimal contract there is a I ∈ I \R, such that w(I) > c (∫ I(t)dt). Then
β(I) = 1, because Lemma 3.2 and 3.3 show that c (
∫
I(t)dt) = w¯ = w(I) for I /∈ IC .
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In addition, it is possible to (weakly) decrease the objective function without violating
any constraint by setting w(I) = c (
∫
I(t)dt). Therefore the principal’s consensus
payment just depends on the average of her message and w(I) = c (
∫
I(t)dt) for all
I ∈ I \R. This results in payments to a third party of
W (mP ,mA)−c
(∫
mP (t)dt
)
=
w¯−w(mP ) +κ for mP (m
1
A) 6=m2A(m1A) andmP ∈ IC
0 otherwise.
As the principal’s consensus payments and her communication decision just depend on
the average of the principal’s information, I write them as functions of the average µ
instead of the information I in the following.
Finally, it remains to determine the values of w∗∗(µ) and w∗∗, which solve the
following program
Cc(e) = inf
∫
w(µ) + κβ(µ)dF (µˆ(µ)|e), (C)
subject to
∫
u
(
w(µ)
)
dF (µˆ(µ)|e)− d(e) ≥ u¯, (PC)∫
u
(
w(µ)
)fH(µˆ(µ))− fL(µˆ(µ))
q
dµ = d′(e), (ICA)
(1− β(µ)) (w(µ)− w) = 0 ∀µ, (3.10)
w(µ) + κβ(µ) ≤ w ∀µ. (3.11)
As before, the objective is to minimize the expected costs, here communication
costs and the principal’s payments. The participation constraint (PC) and incentive
compatibility (ICA) of the agent remain unchanged. Constraints (3.10) and (3.11)
replace condition (ICP ). Program C completes the proof and determines the optimal
contract.
3.C The Optimal Communication Pattern
Proposition 3.3 verifies that a threshold strategy is optimal, with justifications
below a threshold δ and pooling above δ. Its proof follows the intuition given in the
introduction.
108
3.C The Optimal Communication Pattern
Proof of Proposition 3.3: Proposition 3.1 proves that complete feedback is
suboptimal and Pr(IC) < 1. In order to show that there will only be communica-
tion of bad evaluations, assume to the contrary that in the optimal contract there
is a µ∗ with the following properties. With positive probability communication
takes place for µ ≥ µ∗ and with positive probability the principal does not reveal
her performance measure for µ ≤ µ∗. Denote the corresponding sets by AK =
{µ ∈ [1−q2 , 1+q2 ]|µ ≥ µ∗ and β(µ) = 1} for communicated evaluations above µ∗ and by
AN = {µ ∈ [1−q2 , 1+q2 ]|µ ≤ µ∗ and β(µ) = 0} the set of evaluations without communi-
cation below µ∗. By assumption, Pr(AK), Pr(AN) > 0. Then rewrite program C in
the following way. Change constraint (3.10) to
1
2qf(µˆ(µ)|e) (1− β(µ)) (w(µ)− w)
2 ≤ 0 (3.12)
for all µ. (3.12) is equivalent to (3.10), but simplifies the next steps of the proof.
This condition guarantees that the wage is constant outside the communication set,
in particular, in AN . In the communication set and thus in the subset AK , condition
(3.12) is trivially fulfilled, as 1− β(µ) = 0. Furthermore, multiply constraint (3.11)
by f(µˆ(µ)|e)/q for all µ to get
1
q
f(µˆ(µ)|e)(w(µ) + κβ(µ)− w) ≤ 0. (3.13)
(3.13) is equivalent to (3.11) and guarantees that it is optimal to communicate if
communication is required by the contract, i.e., β(µ) = 1. Together, both constraints
make communication optimal, whenever β(µ) = 1 and vice versa. In addition, they
ensure that the wage has to be lower in AK than in AN , as
w(µ) < w = w(µ′) ∀µ ∈ AK , µ′ ∈ AN . (3.14)
The inequality follows from condition (3.13), while the equality is given by condi-
tion (3.12). Define λ1, λ2, ν1(µ) and ν2(µ) to be the Lagrange multipliers of the
constraints (PC), (ICA), (3.12) and (3.13) respectively. Pointwise optimization19 with
respect to w(µ) yields
19Cf. footnote 17 for the generality of this method.
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1−u′(w(µ))
(
λ1 +λ2
fH(µˆ(µ))−fL(µˆ(µ))
f(µˆ(µ)|e)
)
+ν1(µ)(1−β(µ))(w(µ)−w) +ν2(µ) = 0
⇔ 1 + ν2(µ) = u′(w(µ))
(
λ1 + λ2
fH(µˆ(µ))− fL(µˆ(µ))
f(µˆ(µ)|e)
)
, a.s. (3.15)
because constraint (3.12) guarantees (1 − β(µ))(w(µ) − w) = 0 for all µ. µˆ(µ) is
increasing in µ and the monotone likelihood ratio property ensures that
fH(µ)− fL(µ)
f(µ|e) =
x(µ)− 1
ex(µ) + 1− e with x(µ) =
fH(µ)
fL(µ)
is also increasing in µ. Together with (3.14) this proves that the right-hand side of
equation (3.15) is higher for µ ∈ AK than for µ′ ∈ AN , because µ′ < µ. To match this
increase, ν2(µ) almost surely has to be positive in AK . This results in w(µ) = w − κ
almost surely for µ ∈ AK .
The next step modifies the wage contract to implement effort e cheaper than before.
For this purpose, determine the median α of AK , such that
∫
AK1
f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ =
∫
AK2
f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ (3.16)
for AK1 = AK ∩ [µ∗, α) and AK2 = AK ∩ [α, 1]. For the elements of AK above α,
the principal abstains from communication in the new contract, β(µ) = 0, while
below α, there is communication as before. Then, I add (resp. subtract) the monetary
equivalent of uˆ = u(w)− u(w − κ) to the wage, so that
w′(µ) =
u
−1(u(w − κ) + uˆ) = w for µ ∈ AK2
u−1(u(w − κ)− uˆ) = u−1(2u(w − κ)− u(w)) for µ ∈ AK1 .
(3.17)
This means that the wage increases by κ for values in AK above α and decreases by
an amount adjusted for the changes in marginal utility below α. The modification
of the wage still satisfies the condition (PC). Additionally, the left-hand side of
condition (ICA) is now strictly bigger than the marginal cost of effort, d′(e), because
the difference in the condition (ICA) equals
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uˆ
(
−
∫
AK1
fH(µˆ(µ))− fL(µˆ(µ))
q
dµ+
∫
AK2
fH(µˆ(µ))− fL(µˆ(µ))
q
dµ
)
=
= uˆ
(
−
∫
AK1
fH(µˆ(µ))− fL(µˆ(µ))
qf(µˆ(µ)|e) f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ +
+
∫
AK2
fH(µˆ(µ))− fL(µˆ(µ))
qf(µˆ(µ)|e) f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ
)
>
> uˆ
fH(α)− fL(α)
qf(α|e)
(
−
∫
AK1
f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ+
∫
AK2
f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ
)
= 0.
The last equality follows from the definition of α in (3.16). The main inequality
follows from the increasing likelihood ratio. By reducing the variance of the wage
payments until condition (ICA) holds with equality, condition (PC) becomes slack.
This allows decreasing the wage and shows a contradiction to the existence of µ∗.
Therefore the optimal contract does not require communication of good evaluations,
as the agent is pleased to accept these evaluation results. On the other hand, the
principal has to justify bad evaluations. The set AK can be replaced by any set
with communication and a wage of w − κ. Thus, in the optimal contract any set
with these properties has no mass. These sets have no influence on the optimal
contract. Hence, the wage and communication pattern can be adjusted according
to the proposition. Combining these results with Program C, allows me to prove
analogously to Lemma 3.1 that w(µ) is strictly increasing in µ ∈ [1−q2 , δ].
Proof of Proposition 3.4: The proof proceeds along the following lines. If e > 0
and there is almost surely no communication, e.g., due to high communication costs κ,
the optimal contract does not exist.20 Yet, for every  there is a contract whose costs
are at most  higher than the infimum costs to implement effort e > 0 by the agent.
Finally, the proof will show that condition (3.2) ensures that in the optimal contract
there is communication with positive probability.
According to Lemma 3.2, the principal’s payments have to be constant, as it is
impossible to verify her message mP . Denote her payments by w¯. The next steps
calculate the infimum costs to implement positive effort e > 0 of the agent. For this
purpose, the set of feasible contracts is reduced step by step, as I show that contracts
20There is an optimal contract if the distributions FH and FL have atoms at 0.
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with specific characteristics are suboptimal. First consider a contract with c(µ) < w¯
almost surely. In this case, it is possible to reduce the principal’s payments w¯ without
violating any constraint. Therefore I only have to take contracts into account with a
positive probability for {µ ∈ [1−q2 , 1+q2 ]|c(µ) = w¯}.
Second, consider an optimal contract W with a µ∗, such that there are payments
to a third party for µ > µ∗ with positive probability, but with positive proba-
bility there are no such payments for µ ≤ µ∗. Denote the corresponding sets by
AS = {µ ∈ [1−q2 , 1+q2 ]|µ > µ∗ and c(µ) < w¯} with third-party payments above µ∗ and
by AD = {µ ∈ [1−q2 , 1+q2 ]|µ ≤ µ∗ and c(µ) = w¯} the set of evaluations without such pay-
ments below µ∗. By assumption
∫
AS f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ,
∫
AD f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ > 0. Now reduce
the bigger set, until both sets have the same mass,
∫
AS f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ =
∫
AD f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ.
In the next step, I modify the wage scheme to
c′(µ) =

u−1
(
1∫
AD f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ
∫
AS u(c(µ))f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ
)
for µ ∈ AD
w¯ for µ ∈ AS
c(µ) otherwise.
(3.18)
On AD the agent’s wage is reduced to the average wage on AS in contract W , while
on AD the wage increases to w¯. Otherwise the wage scheme remains unchanged. In
order to check whether this contract is feasible, I analyze the remaining constraints
(PC) and (ICA). By the definition of the wage modification W ′ in (3.18), the agent’s
participation constraint (PC) still holds. On the other hand, the difference in the
agent’s incentive compatibility (ICA) is positive, as∫
AD
(
u(c′(µ))− u(w¯)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
∆f (µ)dµ+
∫
AS
(
u(w¯)− u(c(µ))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∆f (µ)dµ >
>
∆f (µ∗)
f(µˆ(µ∗)|e)
( ∫
AD
u(c′(µ))f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ−
∫
AS
u(c(µ))f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ
)
= 0.
with ∆f(µ) = (fH(µˆ(µ)) − fL(µˆ(µ)))/q. The monotone likelihood ratio property
ensures the strict inequality and the constant value of the participation constraint
yields the equality. Therefore the modified wageW ′ in (3.18) makes the left-hand side
of condition (ICA) strictly bigger than the marginal cost of effort, d′(e). In addition,
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the contract satisfies condition (PC). By reducing the variance of the wage payments,
until condition (ICA) holds with equality, condition (PC) becomes slack. This allows
decreasing the wage. Consequently, restrict attention to contracts with a δ < 1+q2 ,
such that c(µ) = w¯ for all µ > δ.
Third, consider such a contract W with δˆ. To satisfy the agent’s incentive com-
patibility, there has to be a payment to a third party, i.e., c(µ) < w¯, with positive
probability. Denote the corresponding set by AS = {µ ∈ [1−q2 , 1+q2 ]|c(µ) < w¯} and its
median by α. By the previous remarks, these values are below δˆ, i.e., µ ≤ δˆ for all
µ ∈ AS. Now, modify the wage scheme to
c′′(µ) =
u
−1(uˆ(µ)) for µ ≤ α and µ ∈ AS
w¯ otherwise
uˆ(µ) = u(c(µ))− u(w¯) + 2∫
AS f(µˆ(µ¯)|e)dµ¯
∫
µ˜∈AS and µ˜>α
u(c(µ¯))f(µˆ(µ¯)|e)dµ¯.
For evaluations above the median α, the agent’s wage increases to w¯, while below the
median the wage is reduced to balance the utility gain above the median. Otherwise,
the wage scheme remains unchanged. The proof is now analogous to the last case.
Therefore it is possible to improve the contract, as long as δ > 0. Yet the contract
with a constant wage for the agent and δ = 0 does not satisfy the agent’s incentive
compatibility. Therefore an optimal contract does not exist and I have to consider a
sequence of contracts.
For this purpose, construct a sequence of feasible contracts that satisfy the properties
derived in this proof. For those contracts, I derive upper and lower bounds for their
costs. Consider the following contracts for a small δ > 0: Wδ(mP ,mA) = w¯(δ) and
cδ(mP ,mA) =
w¯(δ) if
∫
mP (t)dt > δ
w¯(δ)− Λδ(∫ mP (t)dt) if ∫ mP (t)dt ≤ δ,
with w¯(δ) and third-party payments Λδ(µ) such that the agent’s incentive compatibility
and his participation constraint are satisfied. This requires
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∫ δ
(1−q)/2
u(cδ(µ))
1
q
f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ+ (1− F (µˆ(δ)|e))u(w¯(δ)) = u¯+ d(e) (PC)∫ δ
(1−q)/2
u(cδ(µ))∆f (µ)dµ− u(w¯(δ))
∫ δ
(1−q)/2
∆f (µ)dµ = d′(e) (ICA)
as
∫ (1+q)/2
δ ∆f (µ)dµ = −
∫ δ
(1−q)/2 ∆f (µ)dµ. The constraint (ICA) implies u(cδ(µ)) < 0
for all µ ≤ δ and δ sufficiently small, because ∫ δ(1−q)/2 ∆f (µ)dµ→ 0 for δ → (1− q)/2
and ∆f(µ) < 0 for all µ ≤ δ. Rearranging the agent’s incentive compatibility and
approximating it from above results in
d′(e) ≤ −u(w¯(δ))
∫ δ
(1−q)/2
∆f (µ)dµ+ f
H(0)− fL(0)
qf(0|e)
∫ δ
(1−q)/2
u(cδ(µ))f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ.
In the next step, insert the participation constraint for
∫ δ
(1−q)/2 u(cδ(µ))f(µˆ(µ)|e)dµ
to get
u(w¯(δ)) ≥
d′(e) + fL(0)−fH(0)
f(0|e) (u¯+ d(e))
− ∫ δ(1−q)/2 ∆f (µ)dµ+ fL(0)−fH(0)f(0|e) (1− F (δˆ|e))
as a lower bound or
u(w¯(δ)) ≤
d′(e) + fL(δˆ)−fH(δˆ)
f(δˆ|e) (u¯+ d(e))
− ∫ δ(1−q)/2 ∆f (µ)dµ+ fL(δˆ)−fH(δˆ)f(δˆ|e) (1− F (δˆ|e))
as an upper bound with δˆ = µˆ(δ). For δ → (1− q)/2, both bounds converge to
u¯+ d(e) + f(0|e)
fL(0)− fH(0)d
′(e).
This also coincides with the optimal contract for the case of atoms at 0, which
guarantee existence of an optimal contract. To ensure that the set of these contracts
Wδ is nonempty, consider the following contract:
w¯(δ) = u−1
u¯+ d(e) + F (δˆ|e)− ∫ δ(1−q)/2 ∆f (µ)dµd′(e)
 and
u(w¯(δ) + Λδ(µ¯)) = u¯+ d(e)− 1− F (δˆ|e)− ∫ δ(1−q)/2 ∆f (µ)dµd′(e), ∀µ¯ ≤ δ.
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This contract satisfies all the properties derived in this proof as well as constraints
(PC) and (ICA) with equality. The costs of this contract are w¯(δ) which by l’Hôpital’s
rule converges to C0(e) = u−1
(
u¯+ d(e) + f(0|e)
fL(0)−fH(0)d
′(e)
)
for δ → (1 − q)/2. The
convergence is also monotone in the costs of the contract, because w¯(δ) is strictly
increasing in δ. As the densities are continuous, for every  > 0 there exists a δ′ > 0,
such that the costs of the contractWδ for all (1−q)/2 < δ ≤ δ′ are lower than C0(e)+.
Yet it is impossible to approximate first-best, because C0(e) > u−1(u¯+ d(e)).
For the final step of the proof, compare the principal’s costs with and without
communication. If communication happens with probability 0 and Pr(IC) = 0, the
principal’s costs are C0(e). On the other hand, the expected wage costs are
C∗(e) =
∫
w∗(µ, e)dF (µˆ(µ)|e)
with communication almost surely, Pr(IC) = 1, as shown in Proposition 3.1 in
combination with Proposition 3.2. Then the optimal contract implements the second-
best benchmark wage defined by Program A∗. It is now possible to show that
assumption (3.2) is feasible, which is equivalent to the difference between C0(e) and
C∗(e) being positive. Neglecting the communication costs, the costs for implementing
the communication contract W¯ are lower than for any contract without communication.
The reason is the informativeness principle of Holmström (1979). This proves that
condition (3.2) is indeed feasible and provides a lower bound for the savings, i.e.,
Cc(e) − C0(e), which are possible with communication. Hence, as long as the
communication costs are lower than this bound, there will be communication with
positive probability.
3.D Budget-Balanced Contracts
It is possible to make the optimal contract ex-post budget-balanced.
Proof of Proposition 3.5: In order to capture stochastic payments, change the
interpretation of the notation. Now w(mP ,mA) denotes the expected wage after the
parties sent messages mP and mA. On the other hand, c(mP ,mA) is the agent’s
certainty equivalent of the wage payment. Finally, lotteries with the corresponding
mean and certainty equivalent will be specified. This formalization captures any
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stochastic payment without loss of generality. The principal could pay the agent a
lottery or could discard certain messages with some probability by ‘turning a blind
eye’.21
Program A still describes the problem. Yet constraint (3.1) now captures the agent’s
risk aversion. Proposition 3.2 states the solution to Program A. The solutionW ∗∗ gives
the principal and the agent the same utilities as the contract W¯ ∗∗ in Proposition 3.5 if
the lotteries are chosen accordingly. For the principal this is obvious, as the lotteries
have mean κ. The agent’s expected utility also remains unchanged, because the
certainty equivalent equals his former wage.
Finally, specify a lottery with the desired properties. Let Λ(z) denote a lottery
that pays κ+ z and κ− z with probability 1/2, respectively.22 z(µ) is determined,
such that
Eu(w∗∗ + Λ(z(µ))) = 12u(w
∗∗ + κ+ z(µ)) + 12u(w
∗∗ + κ− z(µ)) = u(w∗∗(µ)).
It is possible to find such a z(µ) and z(µ) is unique for every µ due to the strict
concavity of u. Adding the lottery does not change the principal’s expected payments,
but reduces the agent’s certainty equivalent. The mean preserving spread introduced
by the lottery is the reason for this loss of utility. Once the lottery is realized, the
party who gains in the lottery has an incentive to avoid renegotiations. Therefore the
lottery ought to be realized as soon as the messages are available in order to make
the contract renegotiation-proof.23
21This is optimal for example in Herweg et al. (2010).
22If the agent has limited liability, the lottery Λ(z) can be redefined to limit the negative realization,
but to assign it a higher probability.
23Rasmusen (1987) and Maskin (2002) provide a good discussion of this problem.
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Distinguishing First-Order and
Second-Order Ambiguity Aversion
4.1 Introduction
Following the seminal contribution by Schmeidler (1989), there have been many
representations of ambiguity-averse preferences. Recently, Cerreia-Vioglio et al.
(2011) have axiomatized a general representation encompassing a wide set of convex
preferences, in particular, Maxmin-Expected Utility (MEU), Choquet-Expected
Utility (CEU), Smooth Ambiguity Aversion (KMM), Variational and Multiplier
Preferences. Although all these models can now be traced to the same axioms, there
is an important distinction when it comes to economic applications. Consider a
contingent wealth space with two states of the world and the indifference curves
depicted in Figure 4.1. The indifference curves can be kinked or smooth along the 45-
degree line. I denote the former behavior first-order ambiguity aversion, and the latter
second-order ambiguity aversion. This chapter clarifies the distinction and shows
that it is relevant for behavior, like the distinction between first-order and second-
order risk aversion by Segal and Spivak (1990). Second-order risk aversion implies
approximately risk-neutral behavior, when small risks are concerned.1 First-order risk
1The Arrow-Pratt risk premium is approximately zero if the stakes are small. This risk premium
is the transfer that makes the agent indifferent between a risky gamble with zero mean and a sure
zero payoff.
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in state 1
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Figure 4.1: The Distinction between First-Order and Second-Order Ambiguity Aver-
sion
aversion allows for risk-averse behavior, even if the stakes are small. Correspondingly,
I define first-order and second-order ambiguity aversion. Some representations with
ambiguity aversion implement first-order ambiguity aversion, such as MEU, CEU,
or Multiplier Preferences, while others feature second-order ambiguity aversion, like
KMM.
Consider an ambiguity-averse agent Anna choosing between an ambiguous act and
an unambiguous endowment. In the case of second-order ambiguity aversion, denote
her by Anna2, while Anna1 exhibits first-order ambiguity aversion. Suppose the stakes
of the ambiguous act are sufficiently small. Then there exists an ambiguity-neutral
agent Nathan, so that Anna2 chooses the ambiguous act if and only if Nathan strictly
prefers the ambiguous act to the endowment. Conversely, for every ambiguity-neutral
Nathan there are some acts that Anna1 rejects, but Nathan strictly prefers, no matter
how small the stakes are. This difference is relevant in many applications. First,
in an investment setting Anna2 invests (at least a small amount) in an asset if and
only if Nathan invests in the asset. Moreover, if every asset has the same price and
short selling is possible, Anna2 generically buys or sells some amount of every asset.
Yet, there are assets that Anna1 does not want to buy or sell. Second, consider an
agent that can buy any amount of insurance coverage at a constant premium per
unit of indemnity. Anna2 demands full insurance coverage if and only if Nathan
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does so. Nathan’s behavior, meanwhile, is characterized by Mossin’s (1968) Theorem.
Anna1, however, may demand full insurance coverage, even if Nathan demands a
lower coverage. Third, in contracting, first-order ambiguity aversion could make the
contracting parties abstain from conditioning the contract on informative signals.
Sometimes even constant payments without incentives are optimal. This is impossible
with second-order ambiguity aversion, because an adjusted version of Holmström’s
(1979) informativeness principle is valid in this case.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 defines the distinction
between second-order and first-order ambiguity aversion. In addition, it introduces a
general ambiguity premium and the reference beliefs of an ambiguity-averse agent.
Then, Section 4.3 explores the consequences of this distinction for the willingness to
participate in ambiguous acts under ambiguity aversion and discusses some appli-
cations of this result. After that, Section 4.4 gives some extensions of the chapter.
Section 4.5 discusses the related literature. Finally, Section 4.6 contains the con-
cluding remarks. Appendix 4.A provides closed-form solutions of a principal-agent
model in the KMM representation. Technical details regarding decision-making under
ambiguity and the distinction between first-order and second-order risk aversion are
found in the appendix to this chapter.
4.2 Defining the Distinction
This section provides three equivalent characterizations for the distinction between
first-order and second-order ambiguity aversion. These definitions are independent of
any specific representation.
4.2.1 Decision-Theoretic Framework
Consider an agent with ambiguity-averse preferences. I operate on an Anscombe
and Aumann (1963) domain with a finite state space Ω, an algebra Σ containing
subsets of Ω, a set of consequences X = R and the set of simple lotteries over
consequences ∆X. An act in this framework is a measurable mapping from the state
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space into the simple lotteries, Ω→ ∆X.2 Denote by F the set of all acts. Notice
that any constant act is unambiguous in the sense that the act yields the same simple
lottery l ∈ ∆X in every state of the world, ω 7→ l for all ω ∈ Ω.
As in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011), assume that the agent’s preferences satisfy the
axioms of weak order, monotonicity, convexity, risk independence, and continuity. The
convexity axiom ensures that the preferences are ambiguity averse. Accordingly, the
agent (weakly) prefers any mixture of acts to the acts themselves if she is indifferent
between the acts. The reason is that the mixture allows the agent to hedge some
of the ambiguity about the state of the world. Additionally, these axioms ensure
the existence of a certainty equivalent for any simple lottery. See Maccheroni et al.
(2006, Lemma 28) for a proof. Thus, it is possible to replace the simple lotteries by
their certainty equivalents and interpret an act as a mapping Ω→ X. Consequently,
there is a representing utility function U : XΩ → R that is continuous and quasi-
concave. XΩ denotes the set of all functions Ω→ X and XΩ is homeomorphic to R|Ω|.
The upper contour set of U at f0 is denoted B(f0) = {f ∈ XΩ|U(f) ≥ U(f0)}.
The set B(f0) is nonempty, compact and convex for all f0. Finally, the axioms
guarantee that the agent’s preferences over constant acts can be represented by a
von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility index u:X → R. I assume the utility index to be
differentiable.
1 denotes the vector (1, 1, . . . , 1) and ||x|| denotes the Euclidean norm of a vector x.
The notation f means that the payoffs of an act f are rescaled by a factor  ∈ R.
4.2.2 Definitions
The first definition is based on the differentiability of the indifference curves in the
contingent wealth space in which simple lotteries are represented by their certainty
equivalents. This definition follows the distinction in Figure 4.1 in the introduction.
For this purpose, define a notion of differentiability of an indifference surface. An
indifference surface I is differentiable at an act f if there is a function η: R|Ω| → R,
so that I is the level set of η at the value η(f) and η is differentiable at f or if there
2Simple lotteries with a finite number of outcomes are written as vectors of the form
(x1, p1; . . . ;xn, pn). In a common abuse of notation, I denote degenerate lotteries by their out-
come x instead of (x, 1).
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is an  > 0 with f ∼ f − 1. If an indifference surface is not differentiable at f , I call
it kinked at f .
Definition 4.1. Ambiguity aversion is second order (I) at a wealth level if the indiffer-
ence surface is differentiable at the constant act with this wealth level. First-order (I)
ambiguity aversion features a kinked indifference surface for the constant act at this
wealth level.
The second definition is based on the agent’s reference beliefs that will be defined
below. As a motivation consider the following comparative statics with respect to
ambiguity aversion. The aim is to compare the behavior of an ambiguity-averse
agent with that of an ambiguity-neutral agent. For this purpose, the preferences of
the ambiguity-neutral agent should be similar to the preferences of the ambiguity-
averse agent. I define similarity of preferences in terms of improvement directions.
For any act f ∈ F , an improvement direction d at f is an act d ∈ F such that
there is an  > 0 with f + d  f .3 Denote the set of all improvement directions
at f by D(f). Thus, I match the ambiguity-averse preferences  with ambiguity-
neutral preferences N approximating the initial preferences in a neighborhood of
the constant act f in the sense that D(f) ⊆ DN (f). I construct these ambiguity-
neutral preferences in two steps. First, the certainty independence axiom ensures
that the agent’s preferences restricted to the constant acts can be represented by a
von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility index. Use this utility index for the corresponding
ambiguity-neutral preferences. Second, I define an object to be interpreted as a set
of beliefs of the ambiguity-averse agent and show that it shares many properties with
similar notions in the literature, like the subjective beliefs by Rigotti et al. (2008) or
the plausible priors by Siniscalchi (2006). For this purpose, consider an act f0 and
the function Wf0 : X |Ω| → R with
Wf0(f) = U(f0)− inf
{
||f − g||
∣∣∣g ∈ B(f0)}.
Define the reference beliefs for a wealth level w0 as the projection to the |Ω|-dimensional
3Rubinstein (2006, p. 60) introduces a concept of differentiability of consumer preferences in terms
of improvement directions.
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simplex of the subdifferential of Ww01 at the constant act w01.4 Lemma 4.1 ensures
the existence of these reference beliefs, as the function Wf0 is well-behaved and
preserves the upper contour set of U at f0.
Lemma 4.1. For all w0 ∈ R, the reference beliefs at w0 are a nonempty set.
Proof: The set B(f0) is convex, because it is the upper contour set of the quasi-
concave function U . The distance function of a convex set is convex. Therefore Ww01
is concave. In addition, Ww01(f) is finite for all f . Then Rockafellar (1970, Theorem
23.4) ensures that the subdifferential is a nonempty set.
Intuitively, the reference beliefs are elicited from the marginal rate of substitution
between states evaluated at the constant acts. This follows the approach of de Finetti
(1937), Ramsey (1931), and Savage (1954), identifying the decision maker’s beliefs as
the odds at which she is willing to make small bets.5 Accordingly, the reference beliefs
of an subjective expected-utility maximizer are her prior beliefs. As a motivating
example, consider the KMM representation.6 There is a set Π that contains the
possible first-order probability measures P on the state space Ω. On the other hand,
µ denotes a second-order probability measure defined on the set of priors Π. In
addition, there is an ambiguity index φ and a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility
index u. See Appendix 4.C for the details of this representation. The representation
has the following form ∫
Π
φ
(∫
Ω
u ◦ fdP
)
dµ.
In the KMM representation, the uniquely determined reference belief equals the
expected probabilities of the states of the world, i.e., Eµ(P ), the expected value of the
first-order probability measure P under the second-order measure µ. A proof follows
4The subdifferential at point f0 is the convex set of all subgradients ∂i at f0: Wf0(f) ≤Wf0(f0) +
〈∂i, f − f0〉 for all f . (Rockafellar, 1970, p. 308) The projection to the simplex normalizes each
subgradient, a vector in R|Ω|, to a length of 1 according to the L1 norm. 0 is projected to another
normalized subgradient ∂i if there is a ∂i 6= 0, and otherwise to 1|Ω|1. It is impossible to consider the
subdifferential of U , because U is only quasi-concave. Even using a generalized subdifferential, like
Aussel et al. (1994), Clarke (1975), Crouzeix (1981), or Kruger (2003), does not yield the desired
results.
5In the absence of ambiguity, Yaari (1969) formalizes these considerations.
6Similar representations are Seo (2009), Ergin and Gul (2009), Chew and Sagi (2008), and Nau
(2006).
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after Proposition 4.2. As a final example, consider MEU preferences. Then the set of
reference beliefs equals the convex hull of the set of priors in the representation.
Related notions in the literature are the relevant beliefs by Klibanoff et al. (2011),
the subjective beliefs by Rigotti et al. (2008), the plausible priors by Siniscalchi
(2006), and the uncertainty-free beliefs by Epstein (1999).7 These notions compare in
the following way. If uncertainty-free beliefs exist, the set of reference beliefs equals
the set of uncertainty-free beliefs for MEU, CEU and KMM preferences. In addition,
the set of reference beliefs is the convex hull of the plausible priors for MEU and
CEU preferences. The set of reference beliefs coincides with the set of subjective
beliefs at the constant acts. Finally, the set of reference beliefs equals the set of
relevant beliefs for MEU and CEU preferences. For KMM preferences, however, the
uniquely determined reference belief is the average of the relevant beliefs weighted
by the second-order measure µ. The reference beliefs defined above serve a reference
purpose, as they allow calculating a subjective expectation. Yet, here I am more
interested in their uniqueness.
Definition 4.2. Ambiguity aversion is second order (II) at a wealth level if there is a
unique reference belief for this wealth level. If there are several reference beliefs for
the wealth level, ambiguity aversion is first order (II) there.
The third definition relies on the ambiguity premium of an ambiguous act and
makes the distinction depending on its limit for small payoffs. The challenge lies in
disentangling the risk premium and the ambiguity premium. Therefore it is impossible
to follow the approach by Pratt (1964) directly. The idea is to use a benchmark
lottery that captures the risk and to define the ambiguity premium as the transfer
that makes an ambiguity-averse person indifferent between this benchmark lottery
and the ambiguous act in combination with the transfer.
For this purpose, consider a wealth level w0, a reference belief ν at w0 and an
ambiguous act fA ∈ F . Now construct the constant act fU : Ω 7→ lU with the
lottery lU ∈ ∆X, such that the reference belief ν assigns any prize x ∈ X the same
probabilities under fA and lU , i.e., lU (x) =
∫
Ω fA(ω|x)dν(ω) for all x ∈ X. Thus, any
ambiguity-neutral agent with the reference belief ν is indifferent between both acts.
7See Section 4.5 for details and a discussion.
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Define the ambiguity premium as the transfer piνA: Ω 7→ p¯iνA with p¯iνA ∈ X, such that
at the wealth level w0 it makes the ambiguity-averse agent indifferent between her
endowment and the act fA − fU in combination with the transfer piνA.8
w01 ∼ w01 + piνA + fA − fU
The benchmark lottery fU ensures that the ambiguity premium does not cover the
risk, but only captures the ambiguity. Yet fU depends on the chosen reference belief ν.
Therefore the ambiguity premium piνA also depends on ν. To vary the amount of
ambiguity, define the ambiguity premium piνA(t) as a function of a parameter t ∈ [0, 1],
so that
w01 ∼ w01 + piνA(t) + t(fA − fU). (4.1)
The ambiguity premium vanishes for t→ 0, as the ambiguity disappears. In order
to distinguish between first-order and second-order ambiguity aversion, consider the
following limit
L = lim
t→0
piνA(t)
t
.9
Definition 4.3. If L = 0 for a reference belief ν at a wealth level w0 and all acts fA,
the ambiguity aversion is second order (III) at w0. If, on the other hand, L > 0 for a
reference belief ν at w0 and some acts fA, the ambiguity aversion is first order (III)
there.
The proof for the equivalence shows that the orders of ambiguity aversion according
to the last definition are mutually exclusive. Therefore it is sufficient to require
L = 0 for a reference belief ν at the wealth level instead of all reference beliefs for
second-order(III) ambiguity aversion.
8See Jewitt and Mukerji (2011) for an alternative definition that differs with respect to the reference
belief, but yields the same limit results. Other available definitions are only defined for a given
representation.
9The proof of Theorem 4.1 ensures existence of this limit. If the ambiguity premium is differentiable,
it is possible to use the first derivative of the premium (piνA)′(t) in the limit L instead of piνA(t)/t.
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4.2.3 Equivalence of the Definitions
It remains to show the equivalence of the different definitions of the distinction
between first-order and second-order ambiguity aversion presented in this section.
Theorem 4.1. Consider a wealth level w0. The following statements are equivalent:
• Ambiguity aversion is second order(I) at w0.
• Ambiguity aversion is second order(II) at w0.
• Ambiguity aversion is second order(III) at w0.
The same equivalence holds for first-order(·) ambiguity aversion.
Proof: First, consider Definition 1 and 2. Assume ambiguity aversion is second
order(II) at a given wealth level w0. Denote the constant act for the wealth level w0
by f0 = w01. Without loss of generality suppose 0 /∈ B(f0). If the subdifferential of
Wf0 at f0 is {0}, the agent is indifferent between f0 and (w0 − )1 for some  > 0.
Then the indifference surface is differentiable at f0. Otherwise, define the function
W¯f0 : X |Ω| → R¯ with
W¯f0(f) =
1− inf{α ∈ R+|αf ∈ B(f0)} if ∃α ∈ R+ : αf ∈ B(f0)−∞ otherwise.
To verify that W¯f0 is concave, consider f1, f2 ∈ X |Ω| and assume W¯f0(f1), W¯f0(f2) >
−∞. Define αi = 1− W¯f0(fi) = inf{α ∈ R+|αfi ∈ B(f0)} for i = 1, 2. Since B(f0) is
a closed and convex set, αifi ∈ B(f0) for i = 1, 2 and
(λα1 + (1− λ)α2) (λ′f1 + (1− λ′)f2) = λα1f1 + (1− λ)α2f2 ∈ B(f0)
with λ′ = λα1
λα1+(1−λ)α2 ∈ [0, 1] for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Notice that λ ≥ λ′ if and only if
α2 ≥ α1.
λ′W¯f0(f1) + (1− λ′)W¯f0(f2) = 1− λ′α1 − (1− λ′)α2 ≤ 1− λα1 − (1− λ)α2 ≤
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≤ 1− inf{α ∈ R|α(λ′f1 + (1− λ′)f2) ∈ B(f0)} = W¯f0(λ′f1 + (1− λ′)f2)
The inequality, λ′W¯f0(f1) + (1− λ′)W¯f0(f2) ≤ W¯f0(λ′f1 + (1− λ′)f2), obviously holds
if W¯f0(fi) = −∞ for i = 1 or 2. Consequently, W¯f0 is a proper concave function.
This ensures that the subdifferential of W¯f0 at f0 exists. In addition, the upper
contour set of W¯f0 at f0 equals B(f0). According to Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 23.7),
the closure of the convex cone generated by the subdifferential at f0 is the normal
cone to the upper contour set of a concave function at f0. Therefore the closure of
the convex cone generated by the subdifferential of W¯f0 and the one of Wf0 at f0 are
the same. By second-order(II) ambiguity aversion, the subgradients of Wf0 at f0 are
parallel. Additionally, the two-sided directional derivative of W¯f0 at f0 with respect
to 1 exists and equals w−10 . Therefore any parallel subgradient has the same length
and W¯f0 has a unique subgradient at f0. Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 25.1) shows
that a concave function has a unique subgradient at f0 if and only if the function is
differentiable at f0. Therefore the function W¯f0 is differentiable at f0 and continuous
in a neighborhood of f0.10 In addition, the indifference surface is the level set of W¯f0
at the value 0 = W¯f0(f0). Thus, the indifference surface is differentiable at f0 and
ambiguity aversion is second order(I).
Now assume ambiguity aversion is first order(II). Then there are several reference
beliefs at w0. Therefore the subdifferential of Wf0 at f0 has several elements that
are not parallel. Assume to the contrary that there is a function η, so that the
indifference surface is the level set of η at the value η(f0) and η is differentiable at f0.
Then the gradient ∇ of η at f0 is orthogonal to the indifference surface. On the
other hand, the non-parallel subgradients of Wf0 define supporting hyperplanes at f0
and corresponding half-spaces. The indifference surface is contained in the union of
these half-spaces. Yet this yields a contradiction to the definition of the gradient ∇.
Therefore there is a kink in the indifference surface at f0. Accordingly, ambiguity
aversion is first order(I).
The second step concerns Definition 2 and 3. Consider first second-order(II) ambigu-
ity aversion at w0 and a uniquely determined reference belief ν. If the subdifferential
10By an implicit function theorem, like Kumagai (1980), in combination with the convexity and mono-
tonicity of preferences, this allows constructing a topological manifold that covers the indifference
surface in a neighborhood of f0.
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Figure 4.2: The Ambiguity Premium
of Wf0 at f0 is {0}, the agent is indifferent between f0 and (w0 − )1 for some
 > 0. Then L = 0. Otherwise, the ambiguity premium equals the distance be-
tween f0 + t(fA − fU) and the upper contour set B(f0) in the direction 1 and
piνA(t) = inf{β ∈ R+|β1 + f0 + t(fA − fU) ∈ B(f0)}. Figure 4.2 depicts this distance.
Compare this to the distance d1 between f0 + t(fA − fU) and the upper contour set
B(f0) in the direction f0 + t(fA − fU), i.e., for t sufficiently small
d1 = inf
{
β ∈ R+
∣∣∣∣∣β f0 + t(fA − fU)||f0 + t(fA − fU)|| + f0 + t(fA − fU) ∈ B(f0)
}
=
= inf
{
β ∈ R+
∣∣∣∣∣
(
β
||f0 + t(fA − fU)|| + 1
)
(f0 + t(fA − fU)) ∈ B(f0)
}
=
=
(
inf
{
α ∈ R+
∣∣∣α(f0 + t(fA − fU)) ∈ B(f0)}− 1) ||f0 + t(fA − fU)|| =
= −W¯f0(f0 + t(fA − fU))||f0 + t(fA − fU)||
By the intersection theorem
piνA(t)||1|| ≤
d1||f0||
d1 + ||f0 + t(fA − fU)|| < 2d1
for t sufficiently small. The first part of the proof showed that W¯f0 is differentiable
at f0 with a gradient ∇. Now use the gradient ∇ to construct a hyperplane I0
that contains f0. This hyperplane I0 is the indifference surface of a risk-neutral,
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subjective expected-utility maximizer with the reference belief ν. The subjective
expected-utility maximizer is, in particular, indifferent between the ambiguous act tfA
and the constant act tfU by construction of the act fU . Now consider a simple lottery
l ∈ ∆X with a scaling parameter t. According to Nielsen (1999, Theorem 1), the
differentiability of the von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility index u guarantees that the
difference between the certainty equivalent and the expected value of the lottery tl
divided by t goes to 0 for t → 0. Consequently, d2/t → 0 for t → 0 with the
distance d2 between f0 + t(fA − fU) and the hyperplane, i.e.,
d2 = inf
{
||f0 + t(fA − fU)− g||
∣∣∣g ∈ I0}= inf
{
β ∈ R+
∣∣∣∣∣f0 + t(fA−fU) +β ∇||∇|| ∈ I0
}
.
Thus,
lim
t→0
W¯f0(f0 + t(fA − fU))
t
= lim
t→0
〈∇, f0 + t(fA − fU)− f0〉
t
= lim
t→0
−||∇||d2
t
= 0
because W¯f0 is differentiable at f0 and W¯f0(f0) = 0.11 This ensures that L = 0 for the
reference belief ν and all acts fA. Therefore ambiguity is second order(III). Moreover,
L = 0 for all reference beliefs and all acts fA, because the reference belief is unique.
Finally, consider the case of first-order(II) ambiguity aversion at w0. Then there are
several reference beliefs and some subgradients of Wf0 at f0 are not parallel. Pick a
reference belief ν, a corresponding subgradient x∗1 and an act fA ∈ F . Denote another
subgradient of Wf0 at f0 that is not parallel to x∗1 by x∗2. Now use these subgradients
to construct two hyperplanes I1 and I2 that contain f0. The ambiguity premium
is bigger than the distance between the act f0 + t(fA − fU) and the upper contour
set B(f0),
piνA(t)||1|| ≥ inf{||f0 + t(fA − fU)− g||
∣∣∣g ∈ B(f0)} = U(f0)−Wf0(f0 + t(fA − fU))
for t sufficiently small. Moreover,
U(f0)−Wf0(f0 + t(fA − fU)) = Wf0(f0)−Wf0(f0 + t(fA − fU)) ≥
≥ 〈−x∗i , f0 + t(fA − fU)− f0〉
11〈x, y〉 = ∑i xiyi denotes the inner product of the two vectors x and y.
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by the definition of the subgradients (Rockafellar, 1970, p. 308). Thus,
lim
t→0
Wf0(f0)−Wf0(f0 + t(fA − fU))
t
≥ lim
t→0
〈−x∗i , f0 + t(fA − fU)− f0〉
t
for i = 1, 2. The first limit exists, because the one-sided directional derivative of
the concave function Wf0 exists everywhere. (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 23.1) As
before, by the construction of fU the distance d12 between f0 + t(fA− fU ) and the first
hyperplane I1 converges to 0 faster than t, d12/t→ 0 for t→ 0. This is valid for any act
fA ∈ F adjusting fU accordingly. Denote the distance between f0 +t(fA−fU ) and the
second hyperplane I2 by d22. By the triangle inequality, d22 is bigger than the distance
between the orthogonal projections of f0 + t(fA − fU) onto the two hyperplanes
minus d12. Moreover, the subgradients x∗1 and x∗2 are not parallel. Therefore, it is
possible to find an act fA ∈ F , for which the distance d22 between f0 + t(fA− fU ) and
the second hyperplane I2 decreases slowly, i.e., d22/t→  > 0 for t→ 0. Additionally,
either 〈−x∗i , f0 + t(fA − fU) − f0〉 or 〈−x∗i , f0 − t(fA − fU) − f0〉 is positive for t
sufficiently small. Consequently, L > 0 for either fA or −fA and ambiguity aversion
is first order(III) at w0.
Since the definitions are equivalent, I skip the subscripts in the following. Before
applying the distinction, consider a couple of specific representations.
4.2.4 Examples
The order of ambiguity aversion is defined locally at a given wealth level, but
most representations exhibit either first-order ambiguity aversion or second-order
ambiguity aversion. I begin with the representation of α-Maxmin-Expected Utility
by Ghirardato et al. (2004). Π is a closed set of first-order probability measures P
on the state space X. In addition, there is an increasing von-Neumann-Morgenstern
utility index u and a parameter of ambiguity attitude α ∈ [0, 1]. The representation
has the following form
αmin
P∈Π
∫
X
u ◦ fdP + (1− α) max
P∈Π
∫
X
u ◦ fdP.
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Special cases of this representation are Maxmin-Expected Utility for α = 1 by Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989) and Choquet-Expected Utility with ambiguity aversion by
Schmeidler (1989). Choquet-Expected Utility exhibits ambiguity aversion if the
capacity is convex. Yet, if the capacity is convex, CEU preferences can be represented
by a MEU representation with the set of priors given by the core of the capacity. See
Appendix 4.D for the details of this representation.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose the set of priors has at least two elements. Then α-MEU
preferences exhibit first-order ambiguity aversion.
Proof: Consider the closure H¯ of the convex hull of the set of priors Π. A vertex
of H¯ is a prior P ∈ Π such that P is not contained in the convex hull of Π\{P}. Define
the set H as the convex hull of {αP + (1− α)Q|P 6= Q and P, Q are vertices of H¯}.
For the constant act f0 at a wealth level w0, the one-sided directional derivative
of Wf0 at f0 with respect to −h/||h|| is −1 for any h ∈ H. Then the subdifferential
of Wf0 at f0 is {γu′(w0)h|γ ∈ [0, 1u′(w0)||h|| ], h ∈ H}. The projection into the simplex
yields the reference beliefs H. Consequently, the α-MEU representation implements
first-order ambiguity aversion by Definition 2.
The intuition is the following. Whenever the ordering of the payoffs changes, this
might yield different priors minimizing (maximizing, resp.) expected utility. Hence,
the indifference curves are kinked and there are several reference beliefs. The next
step turns to smooth ambiguity aversion by Klibanoff et al. (2005) with a utility
index u and a concave ambiguity index φ. See the beginning of this section for a
brief introduction and Appendix 4.C for details.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose u and φ are differentiable. Then KMM preferences exhibit
second-order ambiguity aversion.
Proof: The representing utility function
U(f) =
∫
Π
φ
(∫
X
u ◦ fdP
)
dµ
is differentiable. Hence, there is a unique reference belief for any wealth level w0,
because all subgradients ofWw01 at w01 are parallel. Therefore the preferences exhibit
second-order ambiguity aversion according to Definition 2.
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Maccheroni et al. (2011) study the certainty equivalent of lotteries for smooth
ambiguity aversion. They show that smooth ambiguity aversion has only a second-
order effect confirming my results here.
Next, I determine the reference beliefs explicitly. The gradient of U at the constant
act f0 with a wealth level w0 is ∇ = φ′(u(w0))u′(w0)Eµ(P ). The function Wf0 equals
Wf0(f) = φ(u(w0))− inf{||f − g||
∣∣∣g ∈ B(f0)}. In addition, the one-sided directional
derivative of Wf0 at f0 with respect to −∇/||∇|| is −1. Then the subdifferential
of Wf0 at f0 is {α∇|α ∈ [0, 1/||∇||]}. The projection into the simplex yields the
reference beliefs Eµ(P ).
Multiplier Preferences by Hansen and Sargent (2001) are based on a probability
measure Q on the state space Ω.12 In addition, there is a von-Neumann-Morgenstern
utility index u and a parameter of ambiguity attitude α ∈ R+. R(P ||Q) is the relative
entropy, also known as Kullback-Leibler divergence, of P with respect to Q measuring
a ‘distance’ between the probability measures. Then the representation is
min
P∈∆Ω
(∫
X
u ◦ fdP + αR(P ||Q)
)
.
These preferences feature second-order ambiguity aversion, because Q is the unique
reference belief for any wealth level. Finally, Variational Preferences by Maccheroni
et al. (2006) exhibit first-order or second-order ambiguity aversion depending on the
cost function c: ∆Ω→ R for choosing a prior. These preferences are represented by
min
P∈∆Ω
(∫
X
u ◦ fdP + c(P )
)
.
Variational Preferences feature second-order ambiguity aversion if and only if the
equation c(P ′) = 0 has a unique solution P ′. In addition, Maccheroni et al. (2006,
Theorem 18) show that the preference functional is everywhere differentiable if
and only if the cost function c is essentially strictly convex. MEU and Multiplier
Preferences are special cases of Variational Preferences.
12See Strzalecki (2011) for an axiomatization.
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4.3 Application of the Distinction
Consider an act f and a scaling parameter t ∈ [0, 1] to model a perfectly divisible
act. An ambiguity-averse agent with an endowment of w0 ∈ R can choose her
optimal t. To avoid less interesting cases of indifference, assume that there is no
t¯ ∈ (0, 1] such that
w01 + tf ∼ w01 ∀t ∈ [0, t¯]. (4.2)
If condition (4.2) is violated, the agent is indifferent between all t ∈ [0, t¯]. Then
the following theorem is valid if preferences are locally non-satiated and a choice of
t∗ > 0 is replaced by a strict preference for t∗ > 0. Condition (4.2) is violated, e.g.,
for ambiguity-neutral and risk-neutral preferences, risk-neutral MEU preferences, or
if the indifferences surfaces are thick.
Theorem 4.2. Assume (4.2). With second-order ambiguity aversion at w01, the
agent chooses t∗ > 0 if and only if there is a reference belief ν at w0 that yields
a positive expectation of the act, Eν(f) > 0. This condition is necessary, but not
sufficient for first-order ambiguity aversion.
Proof: Consider an ambiguity-averse agent with second-order ambiguity aversion
at the constant act f0 with the wealth level w0. Then there is a uniquely determined
reference belief ν at w0. Assume the agent prefers f0 + t∗f to f0 with t∗ > 0. Then
f0 + tf ∈ B(f0) and W¯f0(f0 + tf) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, t∗), because the preferences are
convex and monotone in addition to (4.2). The proof of Theorem 4.1 shows that the
concave function W¯f0 is differentiable at f0 with a gradient ∇. Therefore
W¯f0(f0 + tf) = W¯f0(f0 + tf)− W¯f0(f0) ≤ 〈∇, tf〉 (4.3)
and 〈∇, f〉 > 0. ∇ and ν are parallel and 〈ν,∇〉 = ||∇||||ν||. Hence 〈ν, f〉 > 0. Yet
〈ν, f〉 > 0 if and only if Eν(f) > 0. This proves that the condition is necessary.
To prove the other direction, assume Eν(f) > 0. Then 〈ν, f〉 > 0 and 〈∇, f〉 > 0.
As
lim
t→0
W¯f0(f0 + tf)
t
= lim
t→0
W¯f0(f0 + tf)− W¯f0(f0)
t
= lim
t→0
〈∇, tf〉
t
= 〈∇, f〉,
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there is a t∗ > 0, such that W¯f0(f0 + tf) > 0 and f0 + tf ∈ B(f0) for all t ∈ [0, t∗].
Consequently, the agent prefers f0 + t∗f to f0. This concludes the sufficiency part.
Now consider an ambiguity-averse agent with first-order ambiguity aversion at
wealth w0. Assume the agent prefers f0 + t∗f to f0 with t∗ > 0. Then f0 + tf ∈ B(f0)
and W¯f0(f0 + tf) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, t∗), as before. The proof of Theorem 4.1 shows
that the concave function W¯f0 has a subgradient x∗ at f0. Therefore equation (4.3)
is still valid after replacing the gradient ∇ with the subgradient x∗. This yields
〈x∗, f〉 > 0. In addition, there is a reference belief ν at w0 that is parallel to x∗.
Hence 〈ν, f〉 > 0 and Eν(f) > 0. Thus, the condition is necessary.
Finally, according to the proof of Theorem 4.1 there is a subgradient x¯∗ of W¯f0
at f0 that is not parallel to x∗. Consequently, there is an act f with 〈x∗, f〉 > 0 and
〈x¯∗, f〉 < 0. The necessity part shows that the agent prefers f0 to f0 + tf for all
t ∈ (0, 1], although Eν(f) > 0.13
Consider an ambiguity-neutral agent Nathan whose subjective beliefs are given by
a reference belief of the ambiguity-averse agent Anna at w0. By convexity, Anna’s
set of improvement directions at w0 is a subset of Nathan’s set of improvement
directions. In the case of second-order ambiguity aversion, the sets are equal. In
the case of first-order ambiguity aversion, Anna is willing to participate in the
ambiguous act if the act has a positive expectation for all reference beliefs at w0.
Hence, Anna’s set of improvement directions at w0 is the intersection of Nathans’ sets
of improvement directions where there is a Nathan for every reference belief at w0.
Notice that ambiguity aversion changes the agent’s optimal exposure t to ambiguity,
independently of the order of ambiguity aversion. I now turn to some applications of
the distinction.
4.3.1 Investment
Assume the agent’s preferences are locally non-satiated. The agent with an
endowment of w0 ∈ R can buy or sell t ∈ R units of an asset f ∈ XΩ at a exogenously
given price per unit, P . Suppose that the remaining part of the agent’s wealth is
invested in a risk-free and unambiguous asset. Now hold the price P and the agent’s
endowment fixed and vary the asset f .
13For a specific counterexample to the equivalence, see the end of Appendix 4.D.
133
Chapter 4
Lemma 4.2. With second-order ambiguity aversion, the agent generically buys or
sells a strictly positive amount of the asset. First-order ambiguity aversion makes the
agent avoid any investment for assets with a strictly positive mass under the Lebesgue
measure.
The proof of the lemma is based on the following corollary of Theorem 4.2.14
Corollary 4.1. With second-order ambiguity aversion, the agent invests some fraction
of her wealth in an ambiguous asset f if and only if the expected return under a
reference belief of the ambiguous asset is higher than the return of the risk-free
asset. First-order ambiguity aversion can make the agent avoid any investment in
the ambiguous asset, even if the condition is satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 4.2: Suppose ν is a reference belief of the agent at her endow-
ment. The expected return under the reference belief ν of the asset f at price P is
either higher, equal or lower than the the return of the risk-free asset. According to
the corollary, the agent either buys or sells a fraction of the asset f at price P with
second-order ambiguity aversion whenever the expected returns are unequal. The set
of assets whose expected return equals the return of the risk-free asset is a null set in
the asset space XΩ with the Lebesgue measure. Hence, the agent generically buys or
sells a strictly positive amount of each asset. With first-order ambiguity aversion,
there is a set of assets with strictly positive mass under the Lebesgue measure so
that the agent avoids any investment in these assets. In addition, the agent strictly
prefers not to invest in these assets. With second-order ambiguity aversion,
the set of assets that the agent does not buy coincides with the agent’s indifference
surface at her endowment. This set has no mass in the asset space. Hence, ambiguity
aversion in general does not yield no-trade results.15 There are natural implications
for asset prices.
Corollary 4.2. With second-order ambiguity aversion, asset prices are uniquely
determined. First-order ambiguity aversion can yield indeterminacies in equilibrium.
14The result of the corollary for the special case of KMM corresponds to Lemma 1 in Gollier (2011).
15See also Epstein and Schneider (2010, pp. 316, 337) who discuss the robustness of no-trade results
depending on the representation.
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This result implies that the incompleteness of financial markets in Mukerji and
Tallon (2001) requires first-order ambiguity aversion. Rigotti and Shannon (2012),
however, show in a general equilibrium model that equilibrium prices will be generically
determined, even in a representation with first-order ambiguity aversion. The reason
is that CEU or MEU preferences feature only kinks at non-generic endowments. Thus,
for generic endowments indifference curves are differentiable in a neighborhood of
the endowment. Mandler (2011) endogenizes the endowment values by adding an
ex-ante investment stage. In his model, asset prices are generically indeterminate
with MEU preferences. Intuitively, this result probably extends to any preferences
with first-order ambiguity aversion. The next section turns to an insurance setting.
4.3.2 Insurance
Consider an agent who faces a potential loss L˜ ∈ F that may be ambiguous. Denote
the expected loss under a reference belief ν by Lν = Eν(L˜) and the agent’s endowment
by w0 ∈ R. She can buy an insurance contract covering an fraction α ∈ R0+ of the
loss to protect her from the loss. The insurer requests a constant premium P per unit
of coverage α. Therefore buying an insurance contract with a coverage α corresponds
to the act w01 + (1− α)L˜− αP1. Assume that the agent’s preferences are locally
non-satiated.
Lemma 4.3. With second-order ambiguity aversion, full insurance coverage is de-
manded at a unique premium. With first-order ambiguity aversion, demand for full
insurance coverage is consistent with an interval of premium levels.
Again the proof uses a corollary of Theorem 4.2.
Corollary 4.3. With second-order ambiguity aversion, (at least) full insurance
coverage is demanded if and only if the premium P is lower than Lν. Exactly full
insurance coverage is demanded at the premium P = Lν. With first-order ambiguity
aversion, demand for full insurance coverage is consistent with premium levels P
above Lν.
The proof of Lemma 4.3 is analogous to the one of Lemma 4.2 and therefore I omit
the proof here. Notice that according to the corollary Mossin’s (1968) Theorem on
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the optimality of full coverage versus partial coverage still holds with second-order
ambiguity aversion. Similar results are valid if the agent can self-insure or invest into
prevention effort. I assume that prevention effort is costly with strictly increasing
and convex costs.
Corollary 4.4. With second-order ambiguity aversion, the risk of a potential loss
will be completely eliminated if and only if the marginal costs of the last prevention
effort are lower than Lν. With first-order ambiguity aversion, the agent might be
willing to avoid the loss completely, even if the marginal costs are higher than Lν.
Finally, consider the effects of the distinction on contracting.
4.3.3 Contracting
Ghirardato (1994) was the first to point out that more informative signals might
hurt the principal if the agent is ambiguity-averse in a CEU model. This result
violates the informativeness principle of Holmström (1979). I will show that the
violation of the informativeness principle hinges on first-order ambiguity aversion. The
chapter proceeds in two steps. First, it will establish that constant wages can only be
optimal under first-order ambiguity aversion. In the second step, an adapted version
of the informativeness principle is proven for the representation of KMM. Coming
back to the first step, consider a risk-averse and ambiguity-averse agent working
for a risk-neutral and ambiguity-neutral principal. They can enter a contract that
specifies the agent’s wage W (y) depending on his performance y ∈ Y ⊂ [0, 1] with Y
finite. Then the principal’s objective function is Eµ(y −W (y)) under the beliefs µ
of the ambiguity-neutral principal. After signing such a contract, the agent chooses
effort e ∈ R0+, which is unobservable by the principal. The agent’s preferences satisfy
the conditions of subsection 4.2.1 and are locally non-satiated. His payoff is given
by W (y)− c(e) if he chooses effort e. The function c(·), the disutility of performing
effort, is increasing and strictly convex with the limits lim
e→0 c
′(e) = 0, lim
e→∞ c
′(e) =∞
and c(0) = 0. c is twice differentiable. The agent receives a reservation utility of u¯ if
he rejects the principal’s offer. Define the reservation wage w¯ = u−1(u¯).
There is a stochastic and ambiguous relationship between the agent’s effort e
and the performance y. Effort positively influences performance in the sense of
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∂Eµ(y)
∂e
(e) > ¯ > 0 for all e ∈ [0, e¯) with a e¯ > 0 under the principal’s prior µ.
To avoid issues of shifting supports, assume that the principal’s prior µ has full
support on Y for all e ∈ R0+. For consistency, I assume that the principal’s prior µ is
contained in the agent’s reference beliefs for all wealth levels w ∈ [w¯ − ˆ, w¯ + ˆ] with
ˆ > 0. Moreover, the ambiguity-averse agent shares the principal’s view, i.e., ∃δ ∈ Y :
∀w ∈ R,∀b, e ∈ R+,∀ ∈ (0, e]
f(e)  f(e− ) with the act f(e) =
w if y(e) ≤ δw + b if y(e) > δ. (4.4)
Hence, the agent expects effort to influence performance positively. Neglecting the
disutility of effort, this effect increases his valuation of pay-offs conditional on good
performances.
Proposition 4.3. The principal pays a performance-related wage if the ambiguity
aversion is second order. With first-order ambiguity aversion a constant wage can be
optimal.
Proof: A constant wage of w¯ implements zero effort, e = 0. In order to give the
agent incentives to implement a positive effort e, let the agent participate in the
performance. Consider, for example, the following wage
W (y) =
w˜ if y(e) ≤ δw˜ +  if y(e) > δ
with w˜ = w¯, δ given by (4.4) and  > 0. By the definition of w¯, the agent prefers
to accept the contract W (y). Now decrease w˜ until the agent is indifferent between
accepting the contractW (y) and rejecting it. Ignoring the effort costs for the moment,
the agent prefers more effort to less effort under this wage schedule by the choice of δ.
In addition, there is a reference belief such that choosing a positive effort level in
expectation increases income even including effort costs, as ∂Eµ(W (y))
∂e
(e)− c′(e) > 0
for e sufficiently small. Then, according to Theorem 4.2, second-order ambiguity
aversion ensures that the wage schedule W (y) implements positive effort. This defines
an implicit function e().16 Now consider the limit of the change in the principal’s
16In cases of indifference, pick a value of e suitably.
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expected profits
lim
→0
Eµ(y(e()))− c(e())− pi()− piA()− Eµ(y(0))

. (4.5)
According to Nielsen (1999, Theorem 1), pi()/→ 0 for → 0, as the utility index is
differentiable. In addition,
lim
→0
Eµ(y(e()))− c(e())− Eµ(y(0))− c(0)

=
= lim
→0
(
∂Eµ(y(e))
∂e
(e())− c′(e())
)
e()

≥ 0
because ∂Eµ(y)
∂e
> ¯ > 0 and lim
e→0 c
′(e) = 0. By Definition 3, for  → 0 second-order
ambiguity aversion yields piA()/→ 0. Consequently, the change in the principal’s
expected profits (4.5) is positive for  sufficiently small if the agent exhibits second-
order ambiguity aversion. In this case the wage is performance-related and the
optimal effort is positive.
With first-order ambiguity aversion, however, piA()/→ b > 0. Then the change
in the principal’s expected profits (4.5) is negative if the agent’s performance is
sufficiently ambiguous. Consider the following example with MEU preferences. Let
Y = {0, 1} and c(e) = e2/2. Assume that the set of the agent’s subjective probabilities
for y = 1 are Π(e) = [12µ(e),
1
2µ(e) +
1
2 ] with the principal’s prior µ(e) = 1− p˜ exp(−e)
and p˜ ∈ (0, 1). The optimal wage scheme is wL = c(e) + w¯ − µ(e) eµ′(e) for low
performances, y = 0, and wH = wL + 2eµ′(e) for high performances, y = 1. The
principal’s expected profits are µ(e)(1− e
µ′(e))−c(e)− w¯. Hence, profits are decreasing
in e if p˜ <
√
5−1
2 . Then a constant wage is optimal and the principal does not give
the agent any incentives. This optimality of a constant wage requires first-order
ambiguity aversion.17
Mukerji and Tallon (2004a) analyze a similar cause for incomplete contracts in
the presence of ambiguity aversion. They consider wage indexation with aggregate
17Mukerji (2003) shows that with MEU incomplete contracts can be optimal and informative signals
are neglected in the optimal contract. He proves that MEU can make it optimal to pay a constant
wage independent of the performance. Weinschenk (2010) confirms this finding for the widely-used
LEN setting under MEU. Lopomo et al. (2011) show the optimality of a bonus wage. Yet, they
assume incomplete preferences. These preference, however, feature a kinked indifference surface, as
well. This allows a comparison to first-order ambiguity aversion.
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and idiosyncratic price shocks. Aggregate price shocks affect the prices of all goods
in the economy, while idiosyncratic price shocks just affect a good not consumed
or produced by the firm and the agents. Agents have CEU preferences. If the
idiosyncratic price shock is sufficiently ambiguous and the aggregate price shock is
sufficiently small, wages are contracted in absolute terms and no wage indexation
takes places. This result requires a representation with kinks like MEU or CEU
according to the previous considerations. In KMM, it is always optimal to have some
wage indexation. The reason is that wage indexation allows hedging some ambiguity
about aggregate price shocks and the ambiguity premium for doing so is negligible.
Second-order ambiguity aversion as defined here is not sufficient for wage indexation,
because the results require differentiability of the indifference surfaces at all acts f
where the agent is indifferent between the outcome of the act in at least two different
states, i.e., {f ∈ F|f(ω1) ∼ f(ω2) for ω1 6= ω2 ∈ Ω}.
There is another line of reasoning in the literature why ambiguity aversion makes
incomplete contracts optimal. Mukerji (1998) considers a bilateral hold-up setting
with CEU preferences. Although first-best is implementable in a complete contract
for risk-neutral agents, it is unattainable for ambiguity-averse agents. This result
is robust with respect to the representation of ambiguity-averse preferences. A
formal proof with second-order ambiguity aversion would proceed along the lines of
Section 5 in Williams and Radner (1988), who show that first-best is unattainable
with second-order risk aversion in the absence of ambiguity aversion.
Appendix 4.A contains an closed-form solution to a principal-agent problem in
a KMM representation. More generally, an adapted version of Holmström’s (1979)
informativeness principle still holds for KMM, such that all relevant information is
used in any contract.
4.3.4 Informativeness
For this purpose, adjust the assumptions of the previous section. The principal
can contract on the output y ∈ Y ⊆ R and on a signal s ∈ S¯ ⊆ Rn about the agent’s
effort e ∈ E¯ ⊆ R. With first-order ambiguity aversion, in particular for MEU or CEU
preferences, it is possible to construct examples where it is optimal to condition the
wage only on the output y and to neglect any signal s if the signal is sufficiently
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ambiguous and the output is not too ambiguous. This is impossible with KMM
preferences. To make the contrast as stark as possible, assume that the output y
is unambiguously distributed and only the signal s is ambiguous. Then there is a
joint distribution F (y, s; e, δ) of the output y and the signal s given effort e. The
distribution depends on a parameter δ ∈ D. This parameter δ is some aspect of the
world that is ambiguous. The agent and the principal have a subjective second-order
distribution G about δ. Both distributions have full support and admit densities f
and g. In addition, ∂f(y, s; e, δ)/∂e should be well-defined for all y, s, e, and δ. The
output y is unambiguously distributed. Therefore the marginal distribution FY (y; e) is
constant in δ. The agent’s effort e positively influences output with ∂FY (y; e)/∂e ≤ 0
for all e ∈ E¯ and y ∈ Y . The inequality shall be strict for some y with positive mass
for every e. The principal maximizes the expected output minus the wage payments,
EGEF (y−W (y, s)). On the other hand, the agent’s preferences are separable in effort
and represented by
UA(W (y, s), e) =
∫
D
φ
(∫
Y×S¯
u
(
W (y, s)
)
dF (y, s; e, δ)
)
− c(e)dG(δ).
The assumptions on the function c remain unchanged.18 The risk index u and the
ambiguity index φ are increasing, concave and twice differentiable. It remains to
define informativeness. A signal s is uninformative if y is a sufficient statistic for
(y, s) with respect to e under the agent’s reference belief. Then it is possible to find
functions i and h, such that for all e ∈ E¯
∫
D
f(y, s; e, δ)dG(δ) = i(y, s)h(y, e) ∀y ∈ Y, s ∈ S¯. (4.6)
This means that the signal s provides no (additional) information about the agent’s
effort e. The next proposition shows that it is optimal to condition the contract on s
– no matter how ambiguous the signal s is – if s is informative.
Proposition 4.4. Consider the optimal contractW (y) with a unique and interior best
response eˆ of the agent if the signal s is unavailable. Suppose signal s is informative.
Then there is a contract W (y, s) that makes both parties strictly better off.
18The proposition also holds if the preferences are not separable in effort. The assumption is made
for ease of exposition.
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Proof: Define fe(y, s; eˆ, δ) = ∂f(y,s;e,δ)∂e (eˆ). Now consider a fixed y and a subset
S ⊂ S¯ with the following properties. ∫D ∫S f(y, s; eˆ, δ)dsdG(δ) = f(y, S, eˆ) > 0 and
f(y, Sc, eˆ) > 0 for the complementary set Sc = S¯ \ S. In addition, S shall satisfy
fe(y, S, eˆ)
f(y, S, eˆ) >
fe(y, Sc, eˆ)
f(y, Sc, eˆ) . (4.7)
Hence a signal from the set S indicates a better outcome than a signal from Sc. It is
possible to find such an S, because the signal s is informative about the agent’s effort e.
Then (4.6) is false and
∫
D fe(y, s; e, δ)dG(δ)/
∫
D f(y, s; e, δ)dG(δ) is not constant, but
varies with the signal s. For any  > 0, I define
c = f(y, S, eˆ)
f(y, Sc, eˆ) > 0.
Now change the wage W (y) by ∆W (y, s). This adds  for all s ∈ S and subtracts c
for all s ∈ Sc.
∆W (y, s) =
 if s ∈ S−c if s ∈ Sc
The steps so far can be repeated for a set Y¯ of y with positive mass under FY (y; eˆ),
because the signal s is informative. Denote the aggregate change in the wage also by
∆W (y, s). The definition of each c ensures that the expected wage does not change
and ∫
D
∫
S¯
∆W (y, s)f(y, s; eˆ, δ)dsdG(δ) = 0 ∀y ∈ Y.
In addition, the expectation of the derivative of ∆W (y, s) with respect to  is 0. Since
eˆ is a unique and interior best response of the agent, the introduction of ∆W (y, s)
does not change the agent’s effort choice on the margin. Thus, the introduction of
∆W (y, s) yields a marginal change in the agent’s utility from the contract equal to
dUA(W (y) + ∆W (y, s), eˆ)
d (0) =
=
∫
D
φ′
(∫
Y×S¯
u
(
W (y)
)
dF (y, s; eˆ, δ)
)∫
Y×S¯
u′
(
W (y)
)∂∆W (y, s)
∂
dF (y, s; eˆ, δ)dG(δ) =
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=φ′
(∫
Y
u
(
W (y)
)
dFY (y; eˆ)
)∫
D
∫
Y×S¯
u′
(
W (y)
)∂∆W (y, s)
∂
dF (y, s; eˆ, δ)dG(δ) =
=φ′
(∫
Y
u
(
W (y)
)
dFY (y; eˆ)
)∫
Y
u′
(
W (y)
)∫
D
∫
S¯
∂∆W (y, s)
∂
f(y, s; eˆ, δ)dsdG(δ)dy =
=φ′
(∫
Y
u
(
W (y)
)
dFY (y; eˆ)
)∫
Y
u′
(
W (y)
)
0dy = 0. (4.8)
On the other hand, the marginal change in the principal’s utility from the contract
is the change in the expected wage plus additional terms from the constraints. As
the agent’s utility does not change according to (4.8), there is no effect on the
participation constraint.19 Yet there is an effect on the incentive compatibility. This
delivers
− EGEF
(
∆W (y, s)

)
+
+µ
∫
D
φ′
(∫
Y
u
(
W (y)
)∂fY (y; eˆ)
∂e
dy
)∫
Y×S¯
u′
(
W (y)
)∂∆W (y, s)
∂
fe(y, s; eˆ, δ)d(y, s)dG(δ)=
=µφ′
(∫
Y
u
(
W (y)
)∂fY (y; eˆ)
∂e
dy
)∫
Y
u′
(
W (y)
) ∫
D×S¯
∂∆W (y, s)
∂
fe(y, s; eˆ, δ)dsdG(δ)dy
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier of the incentive compatibility. The multiplier is
strictly positive, µ > 0, because a constant wage is the cheapest way to satisfy the
agent’s participation constraint. In addition, φ′(·) > 0 and u′(·) > 0, as the agent’s
ambiguity and risk index are increasing. Rewrite the last term with the help of the
definition of c
∫
D×S¯
∂∆W (y, s)
∂
fe(y, s; eˆ, δ)dsdG(δ) = (4.9)
= 1

(fe(y, S, e)− cfe(y, Sc, e)) = f(y, S, e)
(
fe(y, S, e)
f(y, S, e) −
fe(y, Sc, e)
f(y, Sc, e)
)
> 0
for all y ∈ Y¯ . Here (4.7) yields the inequality. The term (4.9) equals 0 for y ∈ Y \ Y¯ .
This shows that the principal can be made strictly better off. Redistributing some of
the principal’s gains to the agent ensures that both parties are strictly better off for
a sufficiently small .
19Kellner (2010) shows that in KMM the participation constraint need not be binding in the optimal
contract.
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As there is second-order ambiguity aversion, giving the agent some small additional
incentives makes both parties better off without increasing the ambiguity premium
or the risk premium necessary to compensate the agent for the risk and ambiguity
that she has to bear. With first-order ambiguity aversion, equation (4.8) is not valid,
because the agent requires a positive ambiguity premium. In this case, giving the
agent the appropriate incentives might be too expensive for the principal. Thus the
principal might find it optimal to neglect some informative signals.
4.4 Extension
First-order aversion to uncertainty is not restricted to ambiguity aversion, but there
are several other non-expected utility representations that incorporate behavioral
insights and feature a first-order aversion to uncertainty. For example, Quiggin
(1982) proposes rank-dependent preferences. This approach uses probability weights
instead of probabilities to account for behavior associated with the distortion of
subjective probabilities. Thus, individuals seem to overweight small probabilities
and underweight high-probability events. Yet this kind of preferences can also imply
first-order risk aversion. Chew et al. (1987) explore the implication of rank-dependent
preferences on the order of risk aversion. Epstein and Zin (1990) use this approach,
in particular the dual theory of Yaari (1987), in order to implement first-order risk
aversion into their model.
Another approach is to use reference-dependent preferences, like Kőszegi and
Rabin (2006). These preferences allow for loss-averse behavior and an endogenously
determined reference point. In their model, agents consider not only absolute wealth
or consumption, but also differences to anticipated outcomes. If the difference is
negative, they feel a loss and consider this loss to be more important than a gain of
equal size. Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) show that these preferences feature first-order
risk aversion. The optimal contract with loss-averse agents often takes the form of a
bonus contract according to Herweg et al. (2010). Thus, much performance-related
information is neglected when determining the wage.
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4.5 Related Literature
There is some literature discussing the existence of beliefs of ambiguity-averse
agents and defining such beliefs. Klibanoff et al. (2011) define relevant beliefs as
all the beliefs about the state of the world that the agent deems relevant. The
relevant beliefs are, e.g., the set of priors in MEU and the support of the second-order
distribution in KMM. Rigotti et al. (2008), on the other hand, define subjective beliefs
for an act as the set of (normalized) supporting hyperplanes of the upper contour
set of the act.20 This requires a more restrictive monotonicity axiom than the one
in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011), not allowing for null events. The approach of using
the (normalized) supporting hyperplanes goes back to Debreu (1972). The plausible
priors of Siniscalchi (2006) are defined as the beliefs of a subjective expected-utility
maximizer whose preferences coincide with the preferences of the ambiguity-averse
agent on a suitable defined subset of the action space. Plausible priors are not defined
in the KMM representation. Epstein (1999) also derives uncertainty-free beliefs from
approximating ambiguity-neutral preferences. He works on a Savage domain and
only implicitly derives these beliefs. Existence of the uncertainty-free beliefs requires
additional assumptions.
The chapter also relates to the discussion initiated by Rabin (2000). As classical
expected utility implies second-order risk aversion, he points out that classical expected
utility seriously limits the amount of risk aversion for small stakes. Most risks we face
are small compared to lifetime earnings and total wealth. Nevertheless, empirically
uncertainty-averse behavior is very common, even for small stakes. Calibrating a
model with second-order risk aversion with this data implies that very favorable
gambles ought to be rejected if the stakes are sufficiently high. Yet, this is inconsistent
with observed behavior.21 First-order ambiguity aversion may be one way to describe
this behavior consistently if the objects of choice are ambiguous.
20Alternatively, Chambers and Quiggin (2007) use the subdifferential of the benefit (translation,
resp.) function to define beliefs in the case of generalized risk preferences. The definitions are
equivalent.
21Safra and Segal (2008) show that the argument is also valid for many non-expected utility theories.
Loomes and Segal (1994), e.g., experimentally confirm this tension between actual behavior and the
predictions of classical expected utility.
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter applies the distinction between first-order and second-order aversion
by Segal and Spivak (1990) to ambiguity aversion, as Klibanoff et al. (2005, p. 1873)
suggest. I provide three equivalent definitions for the distinction between first-order
and second-order ambiguity aversion. For this purpose, I introduce the notion of
reference beliefs of an ambiguity-averse agent. In addition, I define an ambiguity
premium of an ambiguous act as the monetary equivalent of the agent’s ambiguity
aversion towards the act.
Then I show that second-order ambiguity aversion does not change the decision
whether to accept some exposure to ambiguity compared to an ambiguity-neutral agent.
This general result is applied to an investment and an insurance setting. Moreover, I
study the implication of this result for contracting problems. The optimality of a
constant wage and a violation of the Informativeness Principle requires first-order
ambiguity aversion. In the case of second-order ambiguity aversion, some incentives
will always be given. Furthermore, an adapted version of the Informativeness Principle
is still valid for KMM preferences.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
4.A Moral Hazard in KMM
This section provides an explicit solution for a principal-agent model in KMM.
Consider the setting of Section 4.3.3. The agent’s output y is determined by her effort
e ∈ R+0 and a noise term s ∈ R with y = e+ s. The random variable s is distributed
according to a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ21, s ∼ N(µ, σ21).
The expected value µ of s is unknown, but the agent subjectively expects it to be
normally distributed, µ ∼ N(0, σ22). The random variable might represent cyclical
noise or random elements in the business cycle that have an influence on the agent’s
performance, but cannot be verified and the agent is not able to affect them. Effort
is unverifiable and hence not contractible in contrast to output. In a general setting
with KMM preferences, Kellner (2010) shows that the contract need not be monotone.
In order to make closed-form solutions possible, restrict possible contracts to the
class of linear wage payments, W (y) = δ + γy.22 Given work effort e of the agent,
the expected benefit of the principal is
(1− γ)(e+ E[s])− δ.
The agent’s preferences are represented by the KMMmodel. See Section 4.C for further
details. I assume constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), u(x) = − 1
A
exp(−Ax) with
A > 0, and constant relative ambiguity aversion (CRAA), φ(u) = − 11+B (−u)1+B with
B > 0. This setting with CARA risk preferences and CRAA ambiguity preferences
was introduced by Gollier (2011) and makes closed-form solutions possible.23 On
the other hand, the function c(·), the disutility of performing effort is increasing,
convex and thrice differentiable with c′′′(·) ≥ 0 and the limits lim
e→0 c
′(e) = 0 and
lim
e→∞ c
′(e) =∞, as before. The agent receives a reservation utility of u¯ if he rejects
the principal’s offer. Denote u−1(u¯) by w¯.
22Linear wages are used in many contracts, as their simplicity makes them appealing. Yet the
optimal contract in this framework is not linear. Holmström and Milgrom (1987), however, show
that linear contracts are optimal in a repeated setting.
23Gollier (2011) studies the comparative statics of an ambiguity-averse investor and shows that in
some circumstances an increase in ambiguity aversion raises the demand for the ambiguous asset. It
is an interesting question whether such a result is also possible in a principal-agent framework.
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Grossman and Hart (1983) show that the model can be solved in two steps. First,
for every level of effort e, the optimal wage schedule W e(y) and its costs C∗(e) are
computed. This is done in the following program
C∗(e) = min
δ,γ∈R
δ + γ(e+ E[s]) (4.10)
subject to Eφ(Eu[δ + γ(e+ s)− c(e)]) ≥ φ(u¯) (PC)
e ∈ arg max
e′∈R+
Eφ(Eu[δ + γ(e′ + s)− c(e′)]). (IC)
Due to the participation constraint (PC), the agent is willing to accept the contract.
The incentive compatibility (IC) guarantees that the agent chooses the desired level
of effort. Finally, the program
max
e∈R+
e− C∗(e) (4.11)
determines the optimal effort. Solving Program (4.11), shows that it is never optimal
to pay a constant wage.
Proposition 4.5. The principal pays a performance-related wage with
γ∗ = c′(e∗) > 0 and δ∗ = w¯ − c′(e∗)e∗ + c(e∗) + 12Ac
′(e∗)2(σ21 + (1 +B)σ22).
The optimal effort level e∗ is determined by equation (4.14). Furthermore, an increase
in the ambiguity or in the agent’s ambiguity aversion reduces the level of incentives.
Proof: First, determine the agent’s utility
Eφ (Eu[δ + γ(e+ s)− c(e)]) = Eφ
(
− 1
A
E exp(−A[δ + γ(e+ s)− c(e)])
)
.
Due to the properties of the exponential function, her utility equals
Eφ
(
− 1
A
exp(−A[δ + γe− c(e)])E exp(−Aγs)
)
.
Additionally, for the normally distributed random variable s,
E exp(a+ bs) = exp(a+ bµ+ 12b
2σ21), (4.12)
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because the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact for the combination of constant
absolute risk aversion and normally distributed random variables. Then the agent’s
utility is
Eφ
(
− 1
A
exp(−A[δ + γe− c(e)]) exp(−Aγµ+ 12A
2γ2σ21)
)
.
Rearranging and using the functional form of φ leads to
E
(
− 11 +B
1
A
1+B
exp[−A(1 +B)(δ + γe− c(e)− 12Aγ
2σ21)] exp(−A(1 +B)γµ)
)
.
To compute the expectation, use equation (4.12) again. This results in
− 11 +B
1
A
1+B
exp
(
−A(1 +B)(δ + γe− c(e)− 12Aγ
2σ21 −
1
2A(1 +B)γ
2σ22)
)
. (4.13)
The agent maximizes her utility with respect to e. Therefore the agent chooses his
effort e, such that c′(e) = γ∗. Consequently, every e can be implemented by setting
γ∗ = c′(e). The principal determines δ∗, so that the agent is indifferent between
accepting and rejecting the contract. Therefore she chooses
δ∗ = w¯ − c′(e)e+ c(e) + 12Ac
′(e)2(σ21 + (1 +B)σ22)
This completes the first step, because the proof has now determined the cost-
minimizing γ∗ and δ∗ to implement any e. In summary, the costs for the principal of
implementing effort e are
C∗(e) = δ∗ + γ∗e = w¯ + c(e) + 12Ac
′(e)2(σ21 + σ22 +Bσ22).
The second step calculates the optimal e∗ by solving Program (4.11). This results in
1 = c′(e∗)(1 + c′′(e∗)A(σ21 + σ22 +Bσ22)). (4.14)
The assumptions on c(·) and A(σ21 + σ22 + Bσ22) > 0 guarantee that there is an
interior solution for e∗. Moreover, the second-order condition is satisfied, as −c′′(e∗)−
(c′′2(e∗) + c′(e∗)c′′′(e∗))A(σ21 + (1 +B)σ22) < 0. Consequently, e∗ > 0 and this results
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in a performance-related wage with γ∗ = c′(e) > 0, which is the first part of the
proposition.
The more ambiguity there is, the higher is σ22 and correspondingly the lower is e∗,
because it becomes more expensive to compensate the agent. To show this, notice
that sgn(∂γ∗/∂σ22) = sgn(∂e∗/∂σ22) and by the implicit function theorem
∂e∗/∂σ22 = −
c′(e∗)c′′(e∗)A(1 +B)
c′′(e∗) + (c′′2(e∗) + c′(e∗)c′′′(e∗))A(σ21 + σ22 +Bσ22)
< 0.
This proves the second part of the proposition. The same comparative statics hold
with respect to the degree of ambiguity aversion B.
It is interesting to scrutinize the agent’s certainty equivalent revealed by equa-
tion (4.13). The first part δ + γe− c(e) is the expected wage minus the effort costs.
Yet this is reduced by two terms. The first is the risk premium pi = 12Aγ
2(σ21 + σ22),
as the wage is risky. The second term corresponds to piA = 12ABγ
2σ22, the ambiguity
premium. The ambiguity premium is proportional to σ22. This confirms the second-
order ambiguity aversion. If the ambiguity gets very small and σ2 → 0, the derivative
of the ambiguity premium with respect to σ2 goes to 0. This is different to a model
with first-order ambiguity aversion, like MEU preferences. There the limit of the
derivative of the ambiguity premium is positive.
For better illustration, assume MEU preferences, σ22 = 0 and the mean of the
random variable s from the interval [µ, µ¯] with µ < 0 < µ¯.24 Then with a linear wage
the certainty equivalent of the wage payment to the agent is
δ + γe− c(e)− 12Aγ
2σ21 + γµ.
Thus, the ambiguity premium is piA = −γ(µ− µN) with µN the expectation of the
noise term under a reference belief. This premium is of first order and sometimes a
constant wage is optimal.
24See Weinschenk (2010), Proposition 1, for a nice exposition of such a model.
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4.B Orders of Risk Aversion
Consider a classical expected utility representation with a twice differentiable
von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility index and a lottery l. Then the risk premium is
proportional to the variance for small risks, as already recognized by Pratt (1964,
p. 126).25 Consequently, the risk premium only contains terms of second order. This
yields risk-neutral behavior for small stakes and is called second-order risk aversion.
Segal and Spivak (1990) introduce the notion of first-order risk aversion if the risk
premium is proportional to the standard deviation.
Their definition works as follows. The lottery l is distributed according to F and
EF (l) = 0. Assume a risk-averse individual with the choice between a zero payoff
and the lottery l. Given her risk aversion, the agent prefers the certain payoff to the
lottery, 0 < l. If preferences are continuous in wealth, there exists a payment pi, such
that the individual is indifferent between −pi and the lottery l.
0− pi ∼ l
pi is the risk premium of the lottery l.26 To capture small risks, consider t ≥ 0 and
the function pi(t): R0+ 7→ R0+ implicitly defined by 0− pi(t) ∼ tl. Thus, the payment
pi(t) makes the individual indifferent between the lottery tl and the zero payoff. If
the risk disappears, the risk premium vanishes and pi(t)→ 0 for t→ 0. According to
Segal and Spivak (1990), the agent exhibits first-order risk aversion if
lim
t→0 pi(t)/t > 0.
On the other hand, she is second-order risk-averse if the risk premium is proportional
to the variance and declines quadratically. Then
lim
t→0 pi(t)/t = 0 and limt→0 pi(t)/t
2 > 0.
It is common to subsume all higher risk orders under second-order risk aversion and
25See Hellwig (2004) for the multidimensional case.
26There are different definition of the risk premium. Sometimes it is the transfer that is added to
the lottery in order to make the agent indifferent to the zero payoff. See also Schlesinger’s (1997)
footnote 2 for a discussion of the different definitions.
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neglect the second condition. Consequently, an individual is second-order risk-averse
if and only if she behaves in a risk-neutral way with regard to infinitesimal risks.
If the risk premium is differentiable for t ∈ (0, a) with a > 0, the definition can be
stated equivalently in terms of derivatives.
lim
t→0 pi
′(t)
> 0 for first-order risk aversion= 0 for second-order risk aversion
Segal and Spivak (1990) prove that expected utility theory with a differentiable utility
index implies second-order risk aversion. If the utility index is nondifferentiable at
a wealth w, expected utility theory features first-order risk aversion. Risk aversion
implies a concave utility index u. Hence, there exist the right and the left derivative
of u at w and
pi′(t)|t=0+ =
(
1− u
′
+(w)
u′−(w)
)∫
{x∈X|l(x)>0}
l(x)dF (x).
The same holds in the setting of Machina (1982), where local utility functions allow
approximating non-standard behavior in an expected-utility framework. Segal and
Spivak (1997) show that also in this case, non-differentiability of the local utility
functions is equivalent to first-order risk aversion.
4.C Smooth Ambiguity Aversion
Klibanoff et al. (2005) propose a model to represent preferences with second-order
ambiguity aversion. Their approach goes back to Segal (1987). The agent knows the
first-order and second-order probability measures, but does not compute the reduced
lottery. The first-order probability measure is a measure for the states of the world,
i.e., the state space. The second-order probability measure, on the other hand, reflects
the probabilities for a first-order measure. In their interpretation, the first-order
measure characterizes risk, and the second-order measure ambiguity. This distinction
corresponds to the assumption that the first-order and second-order probabilities are
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based on different information. The preferences  of the agent are represented by
U(f) =
∫
Π
φ
(∫
X
(u ◦ f)dP
)
dµ.
The function φ reveals the attitude of the agent towards ambiguity. An ambiguity-
neutral individual with a linear function φ calculates the expectation and derives
simple probabilities for each state of the world. With ambiguity aversion, the
function φ is concave. The function u is a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility index
and determines the attitude towards risk. In addition, P is a probability measure on
the state space and Π is a set of first-order probability measures. µ is a probability
measure that represents the second-order measure. The preference functional may be
interpreted as a double expectation. First, the expected utility for every first-order
measure P is calculated. Then, the expected utility for every P is transformed by
the function φ. Finally, the expectation regarding the second-order probabilities µ is
calculated.
4.D Choquet Expected Utility
CEU of Schmeidler (1989) exhibits first-order ambiguity aversion. This representa-
tion is based on capacities. Capacities mathematically model probability intervals
and are therefore non-additive.27 Let Ω be an non-empty set and A a σ-algebra
of subsets of Ω. A capacity v is a function A → R which maps sets into the real
numbers with the following properties:
• v(∅) = 0 and v(Ω) = 1
• A ⊂ B ⇒ v(A) ≤ v(B) ∀A,B ∈ A
Consequently, capacities have values between 0 and 1. Ambiguity aversion corresponds
to the convexity of a capacity. A capacity v is convex if
v(A ∪B) ≥ v(A) + v(B)− v(A ∩B) for all A,B ∈ A.
27Sometimes capacities are also called non-additive probability measures or Choquet measures.
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Calculating expectations regarding a capacity requires integrals regarding a capacity.
Choquet (1953/4) introduced these integrals. Let f be a A-measurable and bounded
function Ω→ R. Then the Choquet integral of f regarding (Ω,A, v) is defined as
∫
Ω
fdv =
∫ ∞
0
v(f ≥ t)dt+
∫ 0
−∞
v(f ≥ t)− 1dt.
v(f ≥ t) stands for v({ω ∈ Ω|f(ω) ≥ t}) and is a function R→ [0, 1] of t. Accordingly,
the Lebesgue integrals on the right-hand side are well defined. If v is a probability
measure, the Choquet integral equals the Lebesgue integral regarding the measure v.
Schmeidler (1989) was the first to propose an axiomatization of the CEU represen-
tation. He uses the common decision-theoretic axioms, except that the independence
axiom has to hold only for comonotonic functions. This is less restrictive than
independence for all acts. So, according to the representation, there exists a utility
function u and a capacity v, such that for two acts f and g
f  g ⇐⇒
∫
(u ◦ f)dv ≥
∫
(u ◦ g)dv.
To see the first-order ambiguity aversion in this representation, consider the following
example. Assume an ambiguity-averse, but risk-neutral individual. She can bet on a
coin flip of an unknown coin. With heads up, she wins t consumption goods. For
tails she loses t goods. As the individual has no information regarding the coin,
her capacity assigns each side the same value, i.e., v(heads)= v(tails)=(1 − α)12 .
α ∈ [0, 1] captures the suspicion about the fairness of the coin, which corresponds
to the amount of ambiguity and the degree of ambiguity aversion at the same time.
Then the Choquet Expected Utility of the act is
t(1− α)12 + ((1− α)
1
2 + α)(−t) = −αt
Consequently, the ambiguity premium piA(t) is (α− 2p+ 1)t with a reference belief
p ∈ [(1− α)12 , (1 + α)12 ] according to Definition (4.1). Suppose the agent is ambiguity
averse and the coin is ambiguous, i.e., α > 0. Then, the derivative of the ambiguity
premium is positive pi′A(t) = α−2p+1 > 0, except for the reference belief p = (1−α)12 .
In this case, the opposite act yields a positive derivative.
153

Bibliography
Addison, J. and Belfield, C. R. (2008). The Determinants of Performance Appraisal
Systems: A Note (Do Brown and Heywood’s Results for Australia Hold Up for
Britain?). British Journal of Industrial Relations, 46(3):521–531.
Aghion, P., Fudenberg, D., Holden, R., Kunimoto, T., and Tercieux, O. (2012).
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Value Perturbations and the Hold-up
Problem. Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
Aghion, P. and Tirole, J. (1997). Formal and Real Authority in Organizations. Journal
of Political Economy, 105(1):1–29.
Ahlborn, C., Evans, D., and Padilla, A. J. (2004). The Antitrust Economics of Tying:
A Farewell to Per Se Illegality. Antitrust Bulletin, 49(2):287–341.
Anscombe, F. J. and Aumann, R. J. (1963). A Definition of Subjective Probability.
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 34(1):199–205.
Aussel, D., Corvellec, J.-N., and Lassonde, M. (1994). Subdifferential characterization
of quasiconvexity and convexity. Journal of Convex Analysis, 1(2):195–201.
Bade, S. (2011a). Ambiguous Act Equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior,
71(2):246–260.
Bade, S. (2011b). Electoral Competition with Uncertainty Averse Parties. Games
and Economic Behavior, 72(1):12–29.
Baker, G., Gibbons, R., and Murphy, K. J. (1994). Subjective Performance Measures
in Optimal Incentive Contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4):1125–1156.
Baliga, S. and Sjöström, T. (2008). Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation.
Journal of Political Economy, 116(6):1023–1057.
155
Bibliography
Baron, D. P. and Besanko, D. (1984). Regulation, asymmetric information, and
auditing. RAND Journal of Economics, 15(4):447–470.
Bernardin, H. J. and Orban, J. A. (1990). Leniency Effect as a Function of Rating
Format, Purpose for Appraisal, and Rater Individual Differences. Journal of
Business and Psychology, 5(2):197–211.
Bernheim, B. D. and Whinston, M. D. (1998). Incomplete Contracts and Strategic
Ambiguity. American Economic Review, 88(4):902–932.
Besanko, D. and Spulber, D. F. (1989). Antitrust Enforcement Under Asymmetric
Information. Economic Journal, 99(396):408–425.
Besanko, D. and Spulber, D. F. (1993). Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust
Policy. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 9(1):1–29.
Bodoh-Creed, A. L. (2012). Ambiguous Beliefs and Mechanism Design. Games and
Economic Behavior, 75(2):518–537.
Border, K. and Sobel, J. (1987). Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and
Plunder. Review of Economic Studies, 54(4):525–540.
Bose, S., Ozdenoren, E., and Pape, A. (2006). Optimal Auctions with Ambiguity.
Theoretical Economics, 1(4):411–438.
Bretz, R. D., Milkovich, G. T., and Read, W. (1992). The Current State of Perfor-
mance Appraisal Research and Practice: Concerns, Directions, and Implications.
Journal of Management, 18(2):321–352.
Brockett, P. L., Xia, X., and Derrig, R. A. (1998). Using Kohonen’s self-organizing
feature map to uncover automobile bodily injury claims fraud. Journal of Risk and
Insurance, 65(2):245–274.
Brown, M. and Heywood, J. S. (2005). Performance Appraisal Systems: Determinants
and Change. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 43(4):659–679.
Bull, C. (1987). The existence of self-enforcing implicit contracts. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 102(1):147–159.
Cabantous, L. (2007). Ambiguity Aversion in the Field of Insurance: Insurers’
Attitude to Imprecise and Conflicting Probability Estimates. Theory and Decision,
62(3):219–240.
Calfee, J. E. and Craswell, R. (1984). Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
with Legal Standards. Virginia Law Review, 70(5):965–1003.
156
Bibliography
Caron, L. and Dionne, G. (1997). Insurance fraud estimation: more evidence from
the Quebec automobile insurance industry. Assurances et gestion des risques,
64(4):567–578.
Cerreia-Vioglio, S., Maccheroni, F., Marinacci, M., and Montrucchio, L. (2011).
Uncertainty averse preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1275–1330.
Chambers, R. G. and Quiggin, J. (2007). Dual approaches to the analysis of risk
aversion. Economica, 74(294):189–213.
Chew, S. H., Karni, E., and Safra, Z. (1987). Risk aversion in the theory of expected
utility with rank dependent probabilities. Journal of Economic Theory, 42(2):370–
381.
Chew, S. H. and Sagi, J. S. (2008). Small worlds: Modeling attitudes toward sources
of uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory, 139(1):1–24.
Choné, P. and Linnemer, L. (2008). Assessing horizontal mergers under uncertain
efficiency gains. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(4):913–929.
Choquet, G. (1953-54). Theory of capacities. Annales de l’Institut Fourier, 5:131–295.
Christiansen, A. and Kerber, W. (2006). Competition Policy with Optimally Differen-
tiated Rules Instead of ’Per Se Rules Vs. Rule of Reason’. Journal of Competition
Law and Economics, 2(2):215–244.
Clarke, F. H. (1975). Generalized gradients and applications. Transactions of the
American Mathematical Society, 205:247–262.
Compte, O. (1998). Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private
Monitoring. Econometrica, 66(3):597–626.
Craswell, R. and Calfee, J. E. (1986). Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards.
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2(2):279–303.
Cronshaw, M. B. and Alm, J. (1995). Tax compliance with two-sided uncertainty.
Public Finance Review, 23(2):139–166.
Crouzeix, J.-P. (1981). Some differentiability properties of quasiconvex functions
on Rn. In Auslender, A., Oettli, W., and Stoer, J., editors, Optimization and
Optimal Control, volume 30 of Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences,
pages 9–20. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg.
D’Amato, A. (1983). Legal Uncertainty. California Law Review, 71(1):1–55.
157
Bibliography
de Finetti, B. (1937). La prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives. Annales
de l’Institut Henri Poincaré, 7:1–68. Translation reprinted in H.E. Kyburg and
H.E. Smokler (eds.) (1980), Studies in Subjective Probability, New York.
Debreu, G. (1972). Smooth Preferences. Econometrica, 40(4):603–615.
Dessler, G. (2008). Human resource management. Pearson Prentice Hall, Upper
Saddle River, New Jersey, 11th edition.
Dionne, G., Giuliano, F., and Picard, P. (2009). Optimal auditing with scoring theory
and application to insurance fraud. Management Science, 55(1):58–70.
Dow, J. and Werlang, S. (1994). Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty:
Breaking down backward induction. Journal of Economic Theory, 64(2):305–324.
Ehrlich, I. and Posner, R. A. (1974). An economic analysis of legal rulemaking.
Journal of Legal Studies, 3(1):257–286.
Eichberger, J. and Kelsey, D. (2000). Non-additive beliefs and strategic equilibria.
Games and Economic Behavior, 30(2):183–215.
Ellsberg, D. (1961). Risk, ambiguity and the savage axioms. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 75(4):643–669.
Epstein, L. G. (1999). A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion. Review of Economic
Studies, 66(3):579–608.
Epstein, L. G. and Schneider, M. (2010). Ambiguity and Asset Markets. Annual
Review of Financial Economics, 2(1):315–346.
Epstein, L. G. and Zin, S. E. (1990). ‘First-order’ risk aversion and the equity
premium puzzle. Journal of Monetary Economics, 26(3):387–407.
Ergin, H. and Gul, F. (2009). A theory of subjective compound lotteries. Journal of
Economic Theory, 144(3):899–929.
European Commission (2005). DG Competition discussion paper on the application
of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses. Discussion Paper.
European Commission (2006). Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed
pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003. Official Journal of the
European Union, C 210(02):2–5.
158
Bibliography
European Commission (2009). Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying
Article 82 (EC) to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings. Official
Journal of the European Union, C 45(02):7–20.
European Commission (2010a). Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. Official Journal of
the European Union, C 130(01):1–46.
European Commission (2010b). Summary of Commission Decision of 16 December
2009 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. Official Journal of
the European Union, C 36(06):7–8.
Fehr, E., Klein, A., and Schmidt, K. M. (2007). Fairness and Contract Design.
Econometrica, 75(1):121–154.
Frese, M. J. (2011). Fines and Damages Under EU Competition Law: Implications
of the Accumulation of Liability. World Competition, 34(3):393–428.
Fuchs, W. (2007). Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations.
American Economic Review, 97(4):1432–1448.
Gabaix, X. and Laibson, D. (2006). Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and
information suppression in competitive markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
121(2):505–540.
Gajdos, T., Hayashi, T., Tallon, J., and Vergnaud, J. (2008). Attitude toward
imprecise information. Journal of Economic Theory, 140(1):27–65.
Gale, D. and Hellwig, M. (1985). Incentive-compatible debt contracts: The one-period
problem. Review of Economic Studies, 52(4):647–663.
Gergen, M. P. (2011). Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for Modest
Fault-Based Penalties. Tax Law Review, 64(4):453–487.
Ghirardato, P. (1994). Agency theory with non-additive uncertainty. Mimeo, Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley.
Ghirardato, P., Maccheroni, F., and Marinacci, M. (2004). Differentiating Ambiguity
and Ambiguity Attitude. Journal of Economic Theory, 118:133–173.
Ghirardato, P. and Marinacci, M. (2002). Ambiguity Made Precise: A Comparative
Foundation. Journal of Economic Theory, 102(2):251–289.
Gibbons, R. (1998). Incentives in organizations. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
12(4):115–132.
159
Bibliography
Gibbs, M. J. (1991). An Economic Approach to Process in Pay and Performance
Appraisals. Mimeo.
Gilboa, I. and Marinacci, M. (2011). Ambiguity and the Bayesian Paradigm. In
Acemoglu, D., Arellano, M., and Dekel, E., editors, Advances in Economics and
Econometrics: Theory and Applications. Cambridge University Press.
Gilboa, I. and Schmeidler, D. (1989). Maxmin Expected Utility with a Non-Unique
Prior. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18(2):141–153.
Gollier, C. (2011). Portfolio Choices and Asset Prices: The Comparative Statics of
Ambiguity Aversion. Review of Economic Studies, 78(4):1329–1344.
Green, J. R. and Laffont, J.-J. (1986). Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism
Design. The Review of Economic Studies, 53(3):447–456.
Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D. (1983). An analysis of the principal-agent problem.
Econometrica, 51(1):7–45.
Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D. (1986). The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:
A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy,
94(4):691–719.
Gual, J., Hellwig, M., Perrot, A., Polo, M., Rey, P., Schmidt, K., and Stenbacka,
R. (2005). An Economic Approach to Article 82. Technical report, European
Advisory Group on Competition Policy. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/
economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf.
Hansen, L. P. and Sargent, T. J. (2001). Robust control and model uncertainty.
American Economic Review, 91(2):60–66.
Harel, A. and Segal, U. (1999). Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics:
Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime. American
Law and Economics Review, 1(1-2):276–312.
Harris, M. M., Smith, D. E., and Champagne, D. (1995). A field study of perfor-
mance appraisal purpose: Research versus administrative based ratings. Personnel
Psychology, 48(1):151–160.
Harsanyi, J. (1973). Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale
for mixed-strategy equilibrium points. International Journal of Game Theory,
2(1):1–23.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1967). Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian”
Players, Part I. The Basic Model. Management Science, 14(3):159–182.
160
Bibliography
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1988). Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Economet-
rica, 56(4):755–785.
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1998). Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of
Debt. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1):1–41.
Heidhues, P., Kőszegi, B., and Murooka, T. (2012). The Market for Deceptive
Products. Working Paper.
Hellwig, M. F. (2004). Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. When Outcomes
are Multidimensional. Preprint Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective
Goods, 2004(6).
Herweg, F., Müller, D., and Weinschenk, P. (2010). Binary Payment Schemes: Moral
Hazard and Loss Aversion. American Economic Review, 100(5):2451–2477.
Holmström, B. (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. Bell Journal of Economics,
10(1):74–91.
Holmström, B. and Milgrom, P. (1987). Aggregation and linearity in the provision of
intertemporal incentives. Econometrica, 55(2):303–328.
Jawahar, I. M. and Stone, T. H. (1997). Appraisal Purpose versus Perceived Conse-
quences: The Effects of Appraisal Purpose, Perceived Consequences, and Rater
Self-Monitoring on Leniency of Ratings and Decisions. Research and Practice in
Human Resource Management, 5(1):33–54.
Jawahar, I. M. and Williams, C. R. (1997). Where all the children are above average:
the performance appraisal purpose effect. Personnel Psychology, 50(4):905–925.
Jewitt, I. and Mukerji, S. (2011). Ordering ambiguous acts. University of Oxford,
Department of Economics, Working Papers, 553.
Jost, P.-J. (1996). On the Role of Commitment in a Principal–Agent Relationship
with an Informed Principal. Journal of Economic Theory, 68(2):510–530.
Judd, K. (1985). The law of large numbers with a continuum of iid random variables.
Journal of Economic Theory, 35(1):19–25.
Kamien, M. I. and Schwartz, N. L. (1991). Dynamic optimization – the calculus of
variations and optimal control in economics and management. Advanced textbooks
in economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2nd edition.
Kandori, M. and Matsushima, H. (1998). Private Observation, Communication and
Collusion. Econometrica, 66(3):627–652.
161
Bibliography
Kaplow, L. (1995). A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules. Journal of
Law, Economics and Organization, 11(1):150–163.
Kaplow, L. and Shapiro, C. (2007). Antitrust. Harvard Olin Discussion Paper Series,
575.
Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S. (1994). Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of
Behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 102(3):583–606.
Katsoulacos, Y. and Ulph, D. (2009). On Optimal Legal Standards for Competition
Policy: A General Welfare-Based Analysis. Journal of Industrial Economics,
57(3):410–437.
Katsoulacos, Y. and Ulph, D. (2012). Legal Uncertainty and the Choice of Enforcement
Procedures. CRESSE Working Paper.
Keller, L. R., Sarin, R. K., and Sounderpandian, J. (2007). An examination of
ambiguity aversion: Are two heads better than one? Judgment and Decision
Making, 2(6):390–397.
Kellner, C. (2010). The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity. Mimeo.
Kőszegi, B. and Rabin, M. (2006). A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4):1133–1165.
Kőszegi, B. and Rabin, M. (2007). Reference-Dependent Risk Attitudes. American
Economic Review, 97(4):1047–1073.
Klibanoff, P., Marinacci, M., and Mukerji, S. (2005). A smooth model of decision
making under ambiguity. Econometrica, 73(6):1849–1892.
Klibanoff, P., Mukerji, S., and Seo, K. (2011). Relevance and Symmetry. Working
paper.
Kroes, N. (2006). Tackling Exclusionary Practices to Avoid Exploitation of Market
Power: Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Policy Review of Article 82. Fordham
International Law Journal, 29(4):593–600.
Kruger, A. Y. (2003). On Fréchet subdifferentials. Journal of Mathematical Sciences,
116(3):3325–3358.
Kumagai, S. (1980). An implicit function theorem: Comment. Journal of Optimization
Theory and Applications, 31:285–288.
162
Bibliography
Kunreuther, H., Meszaros, J., Hogarth, R., and Spranca, M. (1995). Ambiguity and
underwriter decision processes. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
26(3):337–352.
Kvaløy, O. and Olsen, T. E. (2009). Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Con-
tracting. American Economic Review, 99(5):2193–2208.
Lagerlöf, J. N. and Heidhues, P. (2005). On the desirability of an efficiency defense in
merger control. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23(9-10):803–827.
Laibson, D. and Yariv, L. (2007). Safety in markets: An impossibility theorem for
dutch books. Working Paper, UCLA Department of Economics.
Landy, F. J. and Farr, J. L. (1980). Performance rating. Psychological Bulletin,
87(1):72–107.
Lang, M. and Wambach, A. (2010). The Fog of Fraud – Mitigating Fraud by
Strategic Ambiguity. Preprint Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective
Goods, 2010(24).
Levin, D. and Ozdenoren, E. (2004). Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders.
Journal of Economic Theory, 118(2):229–251.
Levin, J. (2003). Relational Incentive Contracts. American Economic Review,
93(3):835–857.
Lo, K. C. (1996). Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty. Journal of Economic
Theory, 71(2):443–484.
Lo, K. C. (1998). Sealed Bid Auctions with Uncertainty Averse Bidders. Economic
Theory, 12(1):1–20.
Lo, K. C. (1999). Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players. Games and
Economic Behavior, 28(2):256–270.
Lo, K. C. (2009). Correlated Nash equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory,
144(2):722–743.
Loomes, G. and Segal, U. (1994). Observing different orders of risk aversion. Journal
of Risk and Uncertainty, 9(3):239–256.
Lopomo, G., Rigotti, L., and Shannon, C. (2011). Knightian uncertainty and moral
hazard. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(3):1148–1172.
163
Bibliography
Maccheroni, F., Marinacci, M., and Ruffino, D. (2011). Does Uncertainty Vanish in
the Small? The Smooth Ambiguity Case. IGIER Working Papers, 391.
Maccheroni, F., Marinacci, M., and Rustichini, A. (2006). Ambiguity Aversion,
Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences. Econometrica,
74(6):1447–1498.
Machina, M. J. (1982). “Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom.
Econometrica, 50(2):277–323.
MacLeod, W. B. (2003). Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation. American
Economic Review, 93(1):216–240.
MacLeod, W. B. and Malcomson, J. M. (1989). Implicit Contracts, Incentive Com-
patibility, and Involuntary Unemployment. Econometrica, 57(2):447–480.
MacLeod, W. B. and Parent, D. (1999). Job characteristics and the form of compen-
sation. Research in Labor Economics, 18:177–242.
Mandler, M. (2011). Endogenous indeterminacy and volatility of asset prices under
ambiguity. Mimeo.
Marinacci, M. (1999). Limit Laws for Non-additive Probabilities and Their Frequentist
Interpretation. Journal of Economic Theory, 84(2):145–195.
Maskin, E. (2002). On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts. European
Economic Review, 46(4):725–733.
Maskin, E. and Tirole, J. (1999). Unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts.
Review of Economic Studies, 66(1):83–114.
McDaniel, M. A., Whetzel, D. L., Schmidt, F. L., and Maurer, S. D. (1994). The
validity of employment interviews: A comprehensive review and meta-analysis.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 79(4):599–616.
Medoff, J. L. and Abraham, K. G. (1980). Experience, Performance, and Earnings.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 95(4):703–736.
Melumad, N. and Mookherjee, D. (1989). Delegation as Commitment: The Case of
Income Tax Audits. RAND Journal of Economics, 20(2):139–163.
Milkovich, G. T., Newman, J. M., and Milkovich, C. (2008). Compensation. McGraw-
Hill/Irwin, Boston, Mass., 9th edition.
164
Bibliography
Milkovich, G. T. and Wigdor, A. K. (1991). Pay for Performance: Evaluating
Performance Appraisal and Merit Pay. National Academy Press, Washington, DC.
Mossin, J. (1968). Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing. Journal of Political
Economy, 76(4):553–568.
Motta, M. (2006). Michelin II – The treatment of rebates. Mimeo.
Mukerji, S. (1998). Ambiguity Aversion and the Incompleteness of Contractual Form.
American Economic Review, 88(5):1207–1232.
Mukerji, S. (2003). Ambiguity Aversion and Cost-Plus Procurement Contracts.
Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, 171.
Mukerji, S. and Tallon, J.-M. (2001). Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of
Financial Markets. Review of Economic Studies, 68(4):883–904.
Mukerji, S. and Tallon, J.-M. (2004a). Ambiguity aversion and the absence of wage
indexation. Journal of Monetary Economics, 51(3):653–670.
Mukerji, S. and Tallon, J.-M. (2004b). An overview of economic applications of David
Schmeidler’s models of decision making under uncertainty. In Gilboa, I., editor,
Uncertainty in Economic Theory: Essays in honor of David Schmeidler’s 65th
birthday, pages 283–302. Routledge.
Murphy, K. J. (1993). Performance measurement and appraisal: Merck tries to
motivate managers to do it right. Employment Relations Today, 20(1):47–62.
Nau, R. F. (2006). Uncertainty Aversion with Second-Order Utilities and Probabilities.
Management Science, 52(1):136–145.
Neven, D. J. and Roller, L.-H. (2005). Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in
a political economy model of merger control. International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 23(9-10):829–848.
Nielsen, L. T. (1999). Differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility. Economic
Theory, 14:285–296.
Osofsky, L. (2011). The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty. Tax Law
Review, 64(4):489–538.
Picard, P. (1996). Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility
issue. Journal of Public Economics, 63:27–56.
165
Bibliography
Polinsky, M. and Shavell, S. (1979). The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability
and Magnitude of Fines. American Economic Review, 69(5):880–891.
Porter, C., Bingham, C., and Simmonds, D. (2008). Exploring human resource
management. McGraw-Hill Education, London.
Pratt, J. W. (1964). Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. Econometrica,
32(1/2):122–136.
Quiggin, J. (1982). A theory of anticipated utility. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 3(4):323–343.
Rabin, M. (2000). Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem.
Econometrica, 68(5):1281–1292.
Rahman, D. (2011). But Who will Monitor the Monitor? American Economic Review,
forthcoming.
Ramsey, F. (1931). Truth and probability. Foundations of Mathematics and other
Logical Essays. Reprinted in H.E. Kyburg and H.E. Smokler (eds.) (1980), Studies
in Subjective Probability, New York.
Rasmusen, E. (1987). Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams. RAND Journal of
Economics, 18(3):428–435.
Rees, R. and Wambach, A. (2008). The Microeconomics of Insurance. Now Publishers,
Boston.
Reinganum, J. F. and Wilde, L. L. (1988). A Note on Enforcement Uncertainty and
Taxpayer Compliance. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(4):793–798.
Riedel, F. and Sass, L. (2011). The Strategic Use of Ambiguity. Working Paper 452,
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics.
Rigotti, L. and Shannon, C. (2012). Sharing Risk and Ambiguity. Journal Economic
Theory, forthcoming.
Rigotti, L., Shannon, C., and Strzalecki, T. (2008). Subjective Beliefs and Ex-Ante
Trade. Econometrica, 76(5):1167–1190.
Rincke, J. and Traxler, C. (2011). Enforcement spillovers. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 93(4):1224–1234.
Rockafellar, R. T. (1970). Convex Analysis. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
166
Bibliography
Rogerson, W. P. (1985). The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems.
Econometrica, 53(6):1357–1367.
Rotemberg, J. J. and Saloner, G. (1993). Leadership Style and Incentives. Management
Science, 39(11):1299–1318.
Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1971). Increasing risk II: Its economic consequences.
Journal of Economic Theory, 3(1):66–84.
Rubinstein, A. (2006). Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory: The Economic Agent.
Princeton University Press, revised 2011 edition.
Safra, Z. and Segal, U. (2008). Calibration Results for Non-Expected Utility Theories.
Econometrica, 76(5):1143–1166.
Savage, L. J. (1954). The foundations of statistics. Wiley, New York.
Schinkel, M. P. and Tuinstra, J. (2006). Imperfect competition law enforcement.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(6):1267–1297. The Economics
of Cartels, Cartel Policy, and Collusion.
Schlesinger, H. (1997). Insurance Demand without the Expected-Utility Paradigm.
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64(1):19–39.
Schmeidler, D. (1989). Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity.
Econometrica, 57(3):571–587.
Segal, U. (1987). The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility
Approach. International Economic Review, 28(1):175–202.
Segal, U. and Spivak, A. (1990). First Order Versus Second Order Risk Aversion.
Journal of Economic Theory, 51(1):111–125.
Segal, U. and Spivak, A. (1997). First-Order Risk Aversion and Non-Differentiability.
Economic Theory, 9(1):179–183.
Seo, K. (2009). Ambiguity and Second-Order Belief. Econometrica, 77(5):1575–1605.
Siniscalchi, M. (2006). A behavioral characterization of plausible. Journal of Economic
Theory, 128(1):91–135.
Snow, A. and Warren, R. S. (2005). Ambiguity about Audit Probability, Tax
Compliance, and Taxpayer Welfare. Economic Inquiry, 43(4):865–871.
Strausz, R. (1997a). Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship.
Review of Economic Studies, 64(3):337–357.
167
Bibliography
Strausz, R. (1997b). Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship.
Review of Economic Studies, 64(3):337–357.
Strausz, R. (2006). Interim Information in Long-Term Contracts. Journal of Eco-
nomics & Management Strategy, 15(4):1041–1067.
Strausz, R. (2011). Regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation. Economic
Journal, 121(553):740–762.
Strzalecki, T. (2011). Axiomatic Foundations of Multiplier Preferences. Econometrica,
79(1):47–73.
Sun, Y. (2006). The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characteri-
zation of insurable risks. Journal of Economic Theory, 126(1):31–69.
Taylor, E. K. and Wherry, R. J. (1951). A Study of Leniency in Two Rating Systems.
Personnel Psychology, 4(1):39–47.
Teitelbaum, J. C. (2007). A Unilateral Accident Model under Ambiguity. Journal of
Legal Studies, 36(2):431–477.
Tor, A. and Rinner, W. J. (2011). Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the
Rule of Reason after Leegin. University of Illinois Law Review, 2011(3):805–864.
Townsend, R. M. (1979). Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly
State Verification. Journal of Economic Theory, 21(2):265–293.
Weinschenk, P. (2010). Ambiguity in a Principal-Agent model. Preprint Max Planck
Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2010(39).
Williams, S. R. and Radner, R. (1988). Efficiency in Partnership When The Joint Out-
put is Uncertain. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management
Science Discussion Papers, 760.
Wils, W. P. (2007). The European Commission’s 2006 Guidelines on Antitrust Fines:
A Legal and Economic Analysis. World Competition: Law and Economics Review,
30(2):197–229.
Yaari, M. E. (1969). Some remarks on measures of risk aversion and on their uses.
Journal of Economic Theory, 1(3):315–329.
Yaari, M. E. (1987). The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk. Econometrica, 55(1):95–
115.
168
